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I. Introduction 
During the late 19th century, the state has taken on a much stronger role protecting those 
who have or had difficulties to provide for themselves during their life; various welfare state 
programmes for the sick, disabled, elderly and survivors, as well as for families have been 
introduced. Nowadays societies are characterised by a variety of public welfare state 
programmes and occupational welfare policies; these measures affect the well-being of 
individuals, families, and households in manifold ways. Sickness and family-related benefits 
mostly protect individuals during the working phase, disability benefits protect the 
temporarily or permanently disabled, survivor payments secure the family in case of loss of 
the main income earner, and old-age benefits maintain the standard of living for the elderly 
during the retirement phase.  
In advanced economies, such as Western Europe and the Anglo-Saxon countries, the elderly 
population is primarily secured by regular payments from institutionalised pension systems. 
A pension system can be defined as the complete set of individual public and private 
schemes within a country that provide institutionalised saving opportunities, regular 
annuities, or cash-sums for old age. Along these lines, it is common in scientific debates to 
describe the income situation of the elderly by the public-private mix of income (Rein and 
Rainwater 1986), referring to the idea that not only public welfare state benefits generate 
stable income; individuals can contribute also to various private plans, provided by 
employers and financial institutes. 
Public pension schemes offer two main mechanisms securing the financial well-being of the 
elderly: contributory and non-contributory pension schemes. Contributory pensions are 
frequently strongly tied to earnings during the working phase; contributions are typically 
calculated as a percentage deducted from the wage, and accumulated in individual 
entitlements to later old-age benefits. Non-contributory pensions do not require individuals 
to make contributions to a scheme, but instead are paid based on age or residency in a 
country or obtained by those in need with no stable income. 
In addition, various states grant also access to former benefits of a deceased spouse. All 
pension transfers can be paid as lump-sums or annuities; however, particularly the benefits 
for old age are usually foreseen as annuity payments, as the main function of public 
programmes is income security during the entire retirement phase. 
Besides public welfare state activity, trade unions’ and employers’ involvement in 
occupational welfare policy, their strength, and their perception of occupational pensions are 
some of the central determinants for pension policy outcomes. Trade unions’ and employers’ 
engagement in social security and pension policy shows strong cross-national differences (cf. 
Ebbinghaus 2010). Alternatively, individuals can take up personal pension plans with 
financial institutes. Thus national solutions of private (occupational + personal) pension 
regulations differ strongly. A key distinction in private schemes can be made in mandatory 
vs. voluntary occupational/personal savings plans (cf. World Bank 1994). 
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There exist two main types of private pension plans: defined-benefit (DB) and defined-
contribution (DC) plans. DB plans are typically linked to the years of contributions and (final) 
salary; DC plans foresee individual accounts and investments in manifold financial products 
and funds managed either by financial institutes, or by occupational pension funds offered 
by employers or a group of employers (Queisser et al. 2007).  
During the last decades public pension systems were frequently reformed in order to 
respond to concerns of competiveness and financial sustainability due to demographic 
ageing: whereas reform measures in the early 1990s focused primarily on cost containment 
strategies, more recent reforms aimed at increased coverage with both mandatory and 
voluntary schemes, better incentives to prolong the working career, a more diversified 
pension savings profile, and a strengthened focus on adequacy of pensions (see Chapter 1 in 
OECD 2013a; Arza and Kohli 2008b). Recent reforms have in common a trend towards 
individualisation of pension provision, and a strengthened role of private actors in providing 
pension plans (Arza 2008). 
As a result, a variety of multi-pillar systems emerged; these cross-national differences in 
pension provision were documented in various edited volumes focusing on the politics of 
pension reform (Arza and Kohli 2008a; Bonoli and Shinkawa 2005; Disney and Johnson 2001; 
Ebbinghaus 2011a; Immergut et al. 2007; Meyer et al. 2007; OECD 2013a). Nowadays, OECD 
countries show a broad variation in terms of coverage with private pension schemes, public 
and private spending, and pension fund accumulation (Queisser et al. 2007).  
The design of public and private pension schemes and the linkages between each element, 
altogether characterise the financial well-being of the elderly. The regulations for individual 
pension schemes, such as contributions, coverage, eligibility and benefit calculation, are 
essential sources of institutional differences that explain cross-national differences in the 
income-mix of the elderly. Particularly, social partners are not only a major actor in 
occupational pension provision, but also strongly affect the distribution of primary market 
income and thus shape also the redistributive outcomes of pension systems (Ebbinghaus 
2010).  
These cross-national differences in public and private pension regulation may create quite 
unequal income level across countries. In general, outcomes of pension policies can be 
measured in terms of achievement of the two main goals on which pension systems were 
built up in the first place: poverty prevention and income maintenance (World Bank 1994; OECD 
2007). In order to reach these goals, labour market attachment and pension systems interact 
strongly. Strong labour market attachment that is leading to reasonably high accumulated 
contributions might be considered a pre-condition to enable adequate poverty prevention 
and income security in old age (Hinrichs and Jessoula 2012).  
A major concern today, however, is that the elderly are not adequately secured through the 
mix of the manifold pension system regulations; through week labour market attachment 
and public pension reforms that cut benefits due to demographic ageing, current workers 
face an increased risk of under-protection and poverty (Hauser 2008; Hinrichs 2008). Results 
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of recent reforms might limit the redistributive focus of social security towards the income 
poor; the individualisation of risks may create a broader share of elderly at the bottom end of 
the income distribution (Zaidi et al. 2006). Similar concerns have also been reflected by the 
OECD: ‘People who do not have full contribution careers will struggle to achieve adequate 
retirement incomes in public schemes, and even more so in private pension schemes which 
commonly do not redistribute income to poorer retirees’ (OECD 2013a: 14). 
In terms of recipient patterns of non-contributory pensions, a gender divide is likely to occur. 
As women’s labour market attachment is weaker, contributions to pension systems are 
lower, thus dependency on non-contributory pensions is expected to be higher among 
women (Arza 2015; Behrendt and Woodall 2015; Zaidi 2007). 
Pension systems and social protection – a comprehensive perspective 
Pension policy and its outcomes for different groups of people is a multifaceted field of 
study in the disciplines of economics, political science, and sociology. Researchers in the field 
of economics are mostly concerned with financial sustainability, individual risk profiles, and 
cost minimising strategies. Political scientists and macro-sociologists seek to explain reform 
paths in pension policy and try to identify societal exclusion and reform opportunities. 
Researchers in micro-sociology seek to discover societal consequences for specific groups 
shaped by specific mixes of public and private regulation. 
In the following, it is argued that in order to understand inequality of pension income among 
the elderly comprehensively, it is necessary to relate pension income back to (1) pension 
system characteristics, (2) individual labour market attachment, and (3) living arrangements at the 
same time. Pension systems interrelate with labour markets and living arrangements in 
manifold ways. For instance, periods of inactivity due to unemployment, parental leave or 
disability typically lower an individual’s pension at retirement age. Also the income mix of 
couples might be quite different than the one of never-married, divorced, or widowed single 
elderly persons. 
The dimension pension system characteristics relates to the fact that historically, nation-specific 
pension systems have developed along various paths, redistributing income differently 
across the aged (see Chapter II.2). Whereas some elements of pension schemes, like earnings-
related social insurance may have favoured the reproduction of market inequality, other 
mechanisms such as minimum pension regulation, means-testing, care credits and survivor 
benefits (see for example overview by Monticone et al. 2008) are additional redistributive 
elements of public pension schemes. Manifold private schemes by trade unions, employers, 
or groups of employers can substitute or complement individual’s saving. The entire 
package of public and private pension schemes influence the savings profiles and generate 
differences in the income mix in old age. 
Individual labour market attachment also strongly affects individual’s public private pension 
provision mix. Nowadays, to stay in well paid and stable jobs can be considered as the new 
social risks (Armingeon and Bonoli 2006; Bonoli 2006; Bonoli 2007; Taylor-Gooby 2004a; 
Taylor-Gooby 2004b). New social risks proponents argue that further adjustments are needed 
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to protect various risk groups better as compared to the current pension system design. 
Therefore, Hinrichs and Jessoula (2012) propose a new analytical approach that brings 
together research on instability of employment, social protection, and pension systems and 
its consequences for social protection in old age.  
Closely linked to the dimension individual labour market attachment is the dimension of living 
arrangements. The sphere living arrangements can be further subdivided in two elements: 
living arrangements during the working career and living arrangements during retirement. 
Couple households may choose a shorter period of full-time labour market participation for 
one partner, particularly when raising children; thus contributions to specific pension 
schemes also differ by household type. The situation during retirement simply describes the 
potential resource sharing with a partner and/or other household members. 
In addition to these three dimensions, individuals’ income mix has in recent decades also 
been strongly influenced by changing early-retirement policies in public and private 
schemes. While in the 1980s and early 1990s such measures were attractive means for 
employers and employees to retire early (OECD 2001), such options were taken back more 
and more in the second half of the 1990s. Incentives to work longer than statutory retirement 
age were also introduced (OECD 2001; Ebbinghaus 2006a). Particularly in systems where 
minimum benefits are paid only when reaching the statutory retirement age, occupational 
and personal pensions might work as a bridge for senior workers who were excluded from 
the labour market before reaching statutory retirement age (OECD 2001: 12; 35-37). On the 
other hand, if workers choose to postpone retirement, they might accumulate further 
pension credits/points. 
This comprehensive perspective on pension systems, labour market attachment, and living 
arrangements signifies the relevance of cross-national comparisons that study financial 
outcomes of individual pension schemes and the entire pension system in order to give 
evidence-based policy advice. Different risk profiles require different pension system 
regulation to be adequately protected in old age; it is argued that this protection can be 
organised in various ways depending on the national circumstances to take action securing 
social needs and to set up protective pension schemes. 
Therefore this monograph will address four major research questions: Why is there cross-
national variation of income received by the elderly? What implications do different 
institutional pathways of pension systems have for the income situation? What role do non-
public pension systems play in the income-mix and for the development of inequalities? 
Which developments can be observed in the public-private income mix and generosity of the 
pension system? 
This cross-national study of past and current pension system legislation and the current 
public-private mix will reveal how pension systems compare and whether or not these 
systems succeeded guaranteeing a minimum living standard respectively were regulated 
well maintaining the previous income level. This monograph will particularly look at the 
financial well-being of the elderly and attempt to explain sources of cross-national 
differences.  
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The key dimension of this comparative study will be the detailed study of variation in 
second-tier pension schemes and their effect on the outcomes. The second dimension of 
analysis will be the development of pension outcomes over time. An extended overview on 
the research questions and agenda (see Chapters III.2 and III.3) will be presented after a 
laying the theoretical foundation for the study of pension systems and studying general 
cross-national differences among the elderly around the world. 
One aim of this comparative study is to contribute to the political debates and challenges 
faced by pension policy. Pension policy actors find it difficult to predict the future outcomes 
of newly designed or modified pension schemes/systems. Frequently the future outcomes of 
pension policies remain a black box at the time of their implementation; it requires a period of 
40 to 50 years of unchanged regulation and stable employment patterns under the new 
regulation to capture the complete and pure outcomes of the reform. However, at the same 
time other occupational and/or personal pension schemes might develop, and change the 
initial perspective on expected consequences for financial outcomes at the time of reform. It 
becomes evident that pension institutions need to be adjusted on a regular basis in order to 
effectively protect the society’s changing risk groups.  
But also reforms of specific pension schemes affect particular groups at different points in 
their employment career. Each person may be affected quite differently by modified pension 
policies. Depending on a specific birth cohort, years of employment, year of retirement, or 
age at retirement, pension benefits are expected to differ. A good example is the extension of 
occupational pension schemes that occurred in many European countries some decades later 
than the extension of public schemes. Younger birth cohorts could successively receive 
higher income from strengthened occupational schemes than older birth cohorts. Thus, as 
soon as policies change combined pension entitlements from the various pension schemes 
also change, and birth cohorts are differently affected; this situation makes it difficult for 
policy evaluators to measure the various effects of reform packages independently.  
Overview of chapters  
Chapter II sets the framework for this study – this section documents how outcomes of 
pension systems are typically studied in a cross-national perspective. The first section is 
mainly concerned with conceptual approaches studying pension systems. These concepts are 
extended by a discussion of institutional set ups which further explain which types of 
pension systems have developed in which context. The separate section on pension reform 
processes will show which combinations of pension systems have developed, and which 
factors have been shaping them; an overview of various pension systems around the world 
will be presented. The third section on inequality measures will link the institutional 
framework of pension systems to measurement tools and data-specific findings; it also 
evaluates studies that are analysing distributional outcomes of pension systems. The 
concluding subsection will establish an overarching research framework for the study of 
pension systems; it aims at building up an agenda how to best study pension systems, and 
their implications for old age. 
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Chapter III will first assess living arrangements, labour market participation, and the income 
packaging of the elderly around the world; for these empirical studies, data from the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database will be evaluated. A second section then further 
elaborates research questions and the pursued research agenda for the empirical studies in 
Chapters IV to VI. 
Chapter IV includes a comparison of three countries that were primarily focusing on poverty 
prevention policies (Beveridge tradition) with their public pension system: Denmark, Finland, 
and the United Kingdom. The study aims at contrasting variation in private pension scheme 
regulation that broadly developed due to the limited role of public minimum protection. 
First, a historical overview of pension system development is presented. In a second step, 
inequalities are analysed. The analyses include an evaluation of recipient rates and income 
shares of private pensions in the income mix along various socio-demographic characteristics 
(sex, age, and household size) and along the income distribution by income deciles. The 
study clarifies also in how far individuals benefit from intra-household redistribution; 
therefore recipient rates and income shares are evaluated on an individual and household 
level. For each decile of the elderly population the income-mix is first compared relatively to 
society’s median disposable income, and second to income received by each decile in the 
total population in order to interpret income replacement and pension adequacy of the elderly. 
Chapter V aims at contrasting the outcomes of mixed systems from the Beveridge type 
minimum pension tradition against the outcomes from public contribution-based 
Bismarckian systems. This study analyses Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. Similarly as in Chapter IV, a first section documents the main pathways of 
pension system regulation. The empirical section evaluates recipient rates and income shares 
of private pensions in the income mix along various socio-demographic characteristics (sex, 
age, and household size) and along the income distribution. A special focus is placed on the 
development of various indicators between two points in time. Evaluated indicators are 
poverty rates, poverty gaps, the Gini coefficient, and relative income level of the low, middle, 
and high-income group of the elderly in comparison to society’s median disposable income 
split by various income sources. 
Chapter VI includes a comparison of six Western European countries that show broad 
institutional variation in terms of pension system design: Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. This study aims at analysing the current shifts in the 
income mix and the income distribution by birth cohorts. First, recipient rates and income 
shares of private pensions in the income mix are presented. Then absolute income levels 
from public and private pensions are compared by deciles and cohorts. An evaluation of two 
specific birth cohorts of the elderly that are ten years apart, clarifies the development of the 
income mix over time. In a last step, a specific birth cohort is studied in order to assess the 
generosity of pension income along the income distribution by deciles; similar as in the 
earlier chapters pension income is shown in relative terms in comparison to each society’s 
median income; the analyses focus on comparing the ranking of countries by income deciles 
before and after taxes. 
7 
 
Chapter VII is the concluding chapter that will summarise the main findings from the 
individual studies. This section explicitly sums up the cross-national variation in pension 
system regulation and its implications for the design of pension systems and the public-
private pension income mix and inequality across the elderly. Final remarks will also point 
to limitations of this monograph and present future research needs and alternatives.  
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II. Theoretical framework: varieties of pension systems  
II.1. Pension systems – the public-private mix 
Pension system regulation has grown to a complex field of study, many actors have been 
included setting up institutional arrangements, which serve two main purposes: poverty 
prevention and income maintenance in old age (OECD 2005; European Commission 2003; 
World Bank 1994). This institutional diversity can be distinguished along various lines (cf. 
Ebbinghaus 2011b). Who provides pensions? Which functions serve specific pension 
schemes? What benefits are paid? Who pays? Who governs pension plans? But most 
importantly from an inequality perspective: who is covered by which (public or private) 
pension plans?  
The following literature review will set up the core framework for the analysis of pension 
systems. This chapter will clarify how different pension schemes within an entire pension 
system can be classified and which actors are typically involved in pension provision. This 
section contains three major sections. First, a general section introduces common concepts in 
order to study pension systems. The following section emphasises the role of occupational 
welfare policies that may build a crucial counterpart to public welfare state activity. A last 
section gives a brief overview of personal savings opportunities that each individual may 
possibly take up in addition to public and occupational schemes. 
General conceptual approaches to study pension systems 
In scientific contributions and policy debates it is common to distinguish between pillars 
and/or tiers of old-age protection systems. In the following I will also apply this terminology, 
keeping in mind its different meaning. The concept of pillars is mainly concerned with the 
provider of each pillar (Goodin and Rein 2001); the concept of tiers (World Bank 1994; OECD 
2007; Whitehouse 2006) describes its function. The first-pillar is organised by the state 
through the social security system, the second pillar is provided by occupational groups, 
social partners, and/or individual firms through specific agreements, and the third pillar is 
made available by private financial institutions through personal saving plans. The first tier 
aims at providing a minimum income protection to prevent poverty (poverty prevention 
function). The second tier is linked to previous labour market earnings and insurance by 
replacing a certain level of the previous earnings (income maintenance function) and thus 
ensuring pension adequacy (European Commission 2003). Third-tier pensions describe an 
individual topping up of second-tier benefits.  
In order to further classify the combinations of pension schemes, various typologies were 
introduced in pension research. The following paragraph will provide a short overview on 
the main typologies; its current prototypes will be discussed in detail in the subsection of 
pension reform processes (Chapter II.2). This section sets the conceptual basis on how these 
typologies can be linked to the pillars and tiers approaches. In present societies two major 
types of public pension systems are still predominant: Bismarckian and Beveridge type 
systems (Ebbinghaus 2011b; Hinrichs 2009; Schludi 2005). 
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Bismarckian social insurance systems primarily aim at maintaining acquired living 
standards. Bismarckian social insurance systems focus on two main components: 
accumulated individual pension entitlements that closely relate to an individual’s previous 
earnings and the derived benefits for survivors or partners taking care of children or the 
elderly. In many Western societies major extensions were introduced in the 1950s, e. g. 
Germany, Italy, Belgium. Replacement rates of 60-70 per cent of previous labour market 
earnings were envisaged for the broad majority of contributors.  
The Bismarckian contribution-based pension promises fostered a crowding out of 
complementary systems as income maintenance was already broadly provided by the public 
system (Ebbinghaus and Gronwald 2011; Pedersen 2004). However, the existence of 
contribution or benefit ceilings created an income gap for high-income earners that made it 
necessary for this group to save outside the public system if they aimed at similar 
replacement rates like the low to middle-income earners. Depending on the influence of 
coordinated policies, selective schemes were introduced in favour of high-income groups, e. 
g. VBL in Germany and TfR in Italy. 
In contrast to the Bismarckian approach, several countries took up the Beveridgean idea of 
pension provision. This type of pension guaranteed only an absolute minimum level of 
public benefits to prevent poverty, e. g. Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, United 
Kingdom, and Sweden (before 1990s). Broadly defined, minimum pensions represent the 
idea to pay at least a certain minimum amount as a universal social right (Marshall 1950). 
Full entitlement can either be based on accumulated years of employment (United Kingdom) 
or residency (for example Canada, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands. 
The World Bank and the OECD distinguish Beveridgean minimum pension systems further 
in basic, targeted, and minimum pension schemes (Whitehouse 2007: 5-7; OECD 2009b: 19-21; 
World Bank 1994): Basic pensions are universally paid to all retirees, albeit they might be 
lowered due to insufficient years of employment or residency. Targeted or resource tested 
schemes include incomes and/or asset tests for eligibility. Income tests measure the amount 
of other pension income or various other incomes, means tests take into account incomes and 
assets. Minimum pension schemes are similar to targeted schemes. Payment is granted in the 
case of insufficient accumulated earnings-related entitlements that otherwise would fall 
below a certain minimum income threshold. All these systems have in common a strong 
redistributive focus to the income poor. 
A Beveridge-type system in its pure form provides first-tier benefits only. However, most of 
the initial Beveridge type systems have at a later stage been supplemented by second-tier 
earnings-related components from public or occupational schemes (Hinrichs 2009). In 
contrast to earnings-related social insurance systems, the limited function of first-tier 
minimum pension schemes crowded in the development of further public and/or occupational 
schemes, for example in Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and the 
United Kingdom (Ebbinghaus and Gronwald 2011). The modest public efforts to maintain 
the living standard for the middle to high-income earners strengthened the activity of unions 
and employers to bargain for occupational welfare policies. 
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Nowadays, the income maintenance function (second-tier provision) in Beveridgean systems 
is mostly reached by additional mandatory personal accumulated earnings-related 
entitlements. Korpi and Palme (1998) refer to encompassing pension systems, when old-age 
income security is provided by accumulated contributions and citizenship; this mixed 
approach between Bismarck and Beveridge type pension systems provides both a universal 
basic protection and compulsory coverage with contributory pensions for the active 
population. These systems have been developed particularly in the Nordic countries since 
the 1960/1970s (Korpi and Palme 1998). 
Public vs. occupational welfare policies and theoretical framework 
Besides the welfare state, employers also offer social security. Historically, entrepreneurial 
strategies aimed at binding workers to their firm by setting up beneficial occupational 
retirement plans; hence, occupational plans tended to favour particularly high qualified 
employees. Potential beneficiaries were rewarded and thus received incentives to stay with 
the same employer. Later occupational pension system legislation led to further inclusion of 
various occupational groups of employees, preventing discrimination and exclusion of 
employees from such beneficial agreements. Inclusion was strongly achieved by social 
partner’s aims of universal protection for their workers (Esping-Andersen 1996).  
Often firms remained the decisive actor of occupational pension scheme design and 
accumulation rules. However, collective agreements might decide upon comprehensive 
coverage for workers in a specific branch or industry, and fix minimum contributions or 
minimum rates of return (Ebbinghaus and Wiß 2011).  
This section focuses on the interplay of public and occupational pensions. In previous 
research there is much variation how the interplay of public welfare state provision and 
occupational welfare policies has been conceptualised. Overall, there is consensus that 
occupational welfare policies contribute to the overall welfare level and therefore need to be 
included in cross-national comparisons (Esping-Andersen 1990; Kangas and Palme 1991). 
Rein and Turner (2004) emphasise the role of negotiated solutions to be a partial substitute 
towards public pensions. Greve (2007) considers occupational pensions as both a substitute 
to public welfare state activity and complementary welfare. According to Shalev (1996) 
occupational pensions are the central programme of occupational welfare that complements 
the public pension scheme.  
Public pension policies may crowd out or crowd in further institutionalised pension schemes 
by the state, employers, or trade unions in order for individuals to maintain their living 
standard after retirement. In a first section I will provide a literature overview of theories 
that analyse the role of employers and social partners to provide social protection. Then, I 
take a closer look at occupational pension policies and its pathways of implementation that 
can be primarily distinguished into firm-based solutions and collective agreements. 
Various theoretical concepts provide helpful lines of argumentation to explain the 
development and current importance of occupational welfare policy in general and the 
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current structure of occupational pension schemes in particular. Among them are the power 
resources theory (Korpi 1983), the varieties of (welfare) capitalism approach (Ebbinghaus and 
Manow 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001b), occupational welfare theory (Rein and Rainwater 1986; 
Reynaud et al. 1996; Shalev 1996; Greve 2007; Titmuss 1958) and in some part also Esping-
Andersen’s (1990) three worlds of welfare capitalism, and the crowding in/out thesis (Ebbinghaus 
and Gronwald 2011; Pedersen 2004; Rein and Behrendt 2004).  
Most specific is Titmuss’ (1958) early approach to conceptualise occupational welfare theory 
and the role that occupational pensions take up. Occupational pension plans are related to 
the employment position and thus tied to employer and firm policies. In his early essays on 
occupational welfare Titmuss fears that occupational welfare is narrowly related to 
‘occupational success’ (Titmuss 1958: 52). Therefore, employer-based policies might be more 
exclusive than a universal public welfare state solution, insofar as occupational benefits may 
reflect occupational achievement channelled by the interests of specific groups of employees, 
employers, or social classes, implementing vested rights (fringe benefits) for themselves 
(Titmuss 1958). Not surprisingly, this situation can be linked to social class privileges and a 
gender divide in terms of inclusion/exclusion to occupational pension plans (Papadakis and 
Taylor-Gooby 1987). 
Additionally, the established structure of industrial relations, i.e. unions and employer 
associations, shape working conditions and social security coverage within a country 
(Crouch 1993; Ebbinghaus 2006b). Collective agreements can be viewed as a counterbalance 
to firm-based individual agreements. Such contractual agreements result from labour 
negotiation and can be reached by industry, by occupation, or at the firm level (Rein and 
Turner 2004). Social partner’s influence is channelled through the following areas: legislative 
framework, bargaining over plan structures and benefits, management and administration of 
plans, and controlling of pension funds (Davies 1996). In this level playing field, unions take 
action via the channels consultation, self-regulation, or concertation (Ebbinghaus 2006b). The 
state has the option of legal extension to all workers (erga omnes declaration) covered under a 
specific basic agreement within a branch or industry (Ebbinghaus 2005). Related to the area 
of pensions, collective agreements are strongest in France, the Netherlands and the Nordic 
countries (Rein and Turner 2004). 
Ebbinghaus (2010) classified three major bargaining systems across advanced welfare states: 
Liberal countries deregulated their labour markets and the influence of unions is mainly 
based on voluntarism. In Nordic countries unions have always been playing a strong role for 
the extension of welfare state benefits. Tripartite solutions are also an important way of 
regulation. In between, Continental European countries are located. Their political power is 
also important, but it is mainly oriented to defending acquired social rights. 
The development of structured occupational pension schemes can be further conceptualised 
through divergent traditions in state governance. Whereas Liberal market economies aim at a 
low influence of state actors, Coordinated market economies seek to balance market inequalities 
more strongly by regulatory efforts, particularly through union influence (Korpi 1983; Hall 
and Soskice 2001a). In line with this distinction, welfare state policies are in general more 
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developed in Coordinated market economies. By placing the firm in the centre of the production 
regime, Hall and Soskice’s (2001a) varieties of capitalism approach tries to link industrial 
relations, vocational training, and corporate governance. Especially occupational pensions 
are a field of occupational welfare policy where these three dimensions are strongly 
intertwined. Altogether they all impact the outcomes of pension policies in terms of coverage 
and inequalities in social security, resulting in pension income inequalities (Ebbinghaus 2010; 
Ebbinghaus and Manow 2001). 
Inadequate public pensions might increase union’s interest in universal occupational 
provision; their strength is a pre-condition to push employers to negotiate about such 
binding agreements (Esping-Andersen 1996; Ebbinghaus 2005). However, unions may find it 
hard to agree on universal occupational plans with employer associations (Øverbye 1996); 
thus they show a tendency to prefer public earnings-related systems over employer provided 
schemes. For unions it seems more promising to reach influence directly via political 
agreements with political parties (Anderson and Meyer 2003).  
Figure 1 classifies various OECD countries in pension system categories. Rein and Turner 
(2004) distinguish four major pathways in occupational pension scheme design: voluntary, 
contracting out, labour contracting, and mandatory. These four categories were also utilised in 
Figure 1 to signify the degree of compulsion in occupational pension systems. At the same 
time, a distinction of the public pension system has been introduced, referring to the main 
tradition (Bismarck vs. Beveridge) of the public pension pillar.  
Various countries in this overview are borderline cases that make a clear classification almost 
impossible. The German system consists of mostly voluntary schemes and labour contracted 
schemes for some occupations. The French systems ARRCO and AGIRC are complementary 
to the basic first-pillar, labour contracted, and mandated by law; but also other labour 
contracted systems besides these two major schemes exist (Rein and Turner 2004). 
Figure 1: Classification of public and occupational pension schemes 
 
Notes: category Bismarck (+) refers to public pension systems with high generosity of benefits;       
             category Bismarck (-) refers to public pension systems with low generosity of benefits. 
Sources: Behrendt 2000; Ebbinghaus and Gronwald 2011; Rein and Turner 2004; OECD 2007. 
13 
 
The Finnish system consists of various hybrid public-occupational schemes, resulting from 
tripartite negotiations about pension plans (Kangas and Luna 2011); as these systems are 
varying across occupation, they are considered as mandatory occupational. Canada only in 
the 1960s developed a state-based earnings-related system; whereas before it originated from 
the group of Beveridge type countries (Rein and Turner 2004). The Danish system might be 
considered as a latecomer with respect to labour contracted pension policies, as the 
voluntary solution was departed only in the 1990s when various collective agreements were 
implemented (Kangas et al. 2010).  
The third pension pillar - variety of individualised personal pension accounts and hybrid systems 
Pedersen (1999) distinguishes three main groups of individual retirement provision 
opportunities: financial wealth, housing wealth, and life-insurance/pension annuities. In the 
following, this study will concentrate on life-insurance/pension annuities, as these plans 
generate income flows relevant for the income mix. However, a short description of the 
alternative pathways for old-age protection should be given.  
Financial wealth refers to the idea of accumulated savings over time through cash, deposit 
accounts, and financial investments, such as bonds, stocks, or mutual funds (Annex B in 
OECD 2013b). Housing wealth is not necessarily linked to old-age provision, however, 
homeownership is the main private savings mechanism; reversed mortgage regulations in 
various countries may allow even a dissaving option during the retirement phase (cf. 
Pedersen 1999). 
Long-term savings products have frequently in common favourable tax treatment, 
encouraging take up of such plans (World Bank 1994); participation in such plans, and 
deferred taxation might be particularly attractive for high-income earners, who could 
accumulate tax-free contributions and interest rates to long-term savings products (Blinder 
1982). 
While in Western European countries, the US and Canada, personal pensions remained 
mostly voluntary long term savings plans, Latin American countries and Eastern European 
countries introduced mandated individual savings accounts during the 1990s (Yermo 2000; 
Müller 2002). One plausible explanation for mandating personal pensions rather than contri-
butory public schemes can be seen in the mistrust of the government and the inefficiencies of 
the government in providing pensions (Rein and Turner 2004; World Bank 1994). 
Also various hybrid systems of public / occupational / personal pension schemes have 
developed. The Australian superannuation system constitutes a hybrid case between 
occupational and personal pensions, as it foresees mandated contributions and voluntary 
contributions embedded in one account (Barrett and Chapman 2001). The British and 
Japanese contracting out structures secure mandatory contribution payments to public or 
private second-tier pension schemes (Shimizu 2001). The Swedish system has created 
personalised investment accounts (premium pensions), as a mandatory deduction from the 
salary, where individuals could decide about individualised financial investments (Engström 
and Westerberg 2003; Palmer 2008). 
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Conclusion – extended conceptual framework for pension system design 
Figure 2 summarises the conceptual framework for pension system design in this study: this 
approach integrates the typology of Bismarckian vs. Beveridgean systems in the framework 
of pension pillars and income tiers of the elderly. Public first-pillar pensions by the state or in 
some countries also by the local governments provide either Bismarckian social insurance 
systems or Beveridge minimum pension schemes. The non-public pillars offer various 
alternative pathways of pension system design. 
Bismarckian social insurance systems (for example Germany, Spain, Italy, and the United 
States) can be referred to as earnings-related pension schemes that secure individuals with 
first and second-tier benefits for the low to middle-income earners, and partly the high-
income earners depending on the existence of contribution and/or income ceilings. The self-
employed typically can either voluntarily contribute to earnings-related schemes or similar 
counterparts for the self-employed were introduced. In various contributory pension 
schemes minimum pensions are also foreseen (for example Estonia, Greece, Hungary, 
Mexico, Poland, Russia, and Spain); full amounts of the minimum pension are typically only 
granted when a minimum period of contributions is reached. Such contributory schemes 
cover typically the active population. 
The first-pillar scheme in a Beverigdean pension system might foresee two types: basic 
pensions and/or targeted means-tested pensions. Basic pensions aim at guaranteeing the first 
tier of pension income for the entire elderly population; for the low-income earners these 
benefits possibly will also guarantee their second tier of income, when the level of the basic 
pension is rather high. In contrast to this, minimum pension schemes can also in general be 
targeted to the poor (for example Australia, Finland, Italy Spain, the United States) or foresee 
a means-tested supplement to the basic pension (for example Canada, Denmark, and the 
United Kingdom). Depending on the generosity of the amount they might provide first and 
second-tier benefits for the low to middle-income earners. Such non-contributory schemes 
typically cover the whole resident population.  
Occupational second-pillar pensions mostly differ with regard to their inclusion rules; 
inclusion can be strongly determined by the obligation to participate in these schemes. When 
occupational pensions were kept mostly on voluntary decision basis by firms and 
individuals, this approach was frequently combined with a Bismarckian social insurance 
system (for example Germany, Italy, the United States). In contrast, countries that designed 
their public pension scheme in order to protect the poor only by providing basic and/or 
targeted pensions, frequently introduced collective agreements between employers and 
employees (Ebbinghaus and Gronwald 2011; Hinrichs 2009). Thus most initial Beveridge 
type pensions have developed towards Beveridge + Bismarck systems. Typically 
comprehensive coverage for second-tier earnings-related schemes is reached through erga-
omnes regulations in collective agreements by employers and trade unions (for example in 
the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden), or in the case of Finland by tripartite 
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legislation of employers, trade unions, and the government. Notable exceptions are the 
pension systems in the United Kingdom and Denmark (until the mid 1990s), which hardly 
provided earnings-related pensions, and kept occupational pensions mostly on voluntary 
basis. Yet a different pathway exists in the United Kingdom and Japan, where the mandatory 
contributions to a state second tier can be contracted out to private plans (cf. Figure 1). 
In some pension systems, occupational schemes may possibly also partially substitute the 
public targeted component. This happens when eligibility to targeted pensions is reduced as 
soon as other pension income exceeds a certain threshold. 
Besides the provision of second-tier benefits, second-pillar schemes may possibly provide 
also a part of third-tier pensions as well; this is particularly true, when additional 
occupational schemes on top of the general earnings-related system have been introduced 
(for example VBL in Germany and TfR in Italy). 
Third-pillar pensions can be considered a more recent development that gained further im-
portance in the course of reforming traditional Bismarckian social insurance systems. Before 
personal pensions were mostly voluntary tax favoured savings plans offered by financial 
institutes. Nowadays more and more state regulations in third-pillar arrangements can be 
observed, in these recent reforms former contributions to the public system are transferred to 
private sector pension funds or similar investments. Embedded in this transformation can be 
a switch from voluntary to mandatory contributions; most notable example in Europe is the 
case of the premium pension in Sweden (cf. Engström and Westerberg 2003).  
Figure 2: Pension pillars and pension income tiers
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II.2. Pension reform processes and pension systems around the world 
This section will focus on the historical development of pension systems. The main pathways 
of how public and occupational pension schemes are currently organised will be described. 
A second subsection will provide a worldwide overview on various pension systems around 
the world and try to group them along their regulatory similarities.  
Country-specific and comparative pension reform processes are documented in several 
edited volumes (Arza and Kohli 2008a, Bonoli and Shinkawa 2005, Disney and Johnson 2001, 
Ebbinghaus 2011a, Immergut et al. 2007). These studies mostly elaborated nation-specific 
reform processes based on the national circumstances. The editors addressed mainly the 
following questions: How have policies been implemented, when and why have they been 
reformed? Are there common developments in politics? Commonly detailed argumentative 
country-specific chapters dealt with the political process of reformation and the interplay of 
actors that finally led to reforms of the systems. The following overview will highlight some 
of the central findings and clarify which combinations of pillars and tiers are predominant in 
current pension systems.  
Arza and Kohli (2008a) included several studies of the political economy and sociological 
discussions of welfare models in their edited volume. Schludi’s (2008) contribution 
approached partisan politics and corporatist bargaining in pension regulation from a more 
general analytical perspective. He argued that government’s and social partner’s strategies 
are diverse among countries and specific contexts; thus we hardly could expect clear cut 
pension outcomes derived from ‘functional imperatives’ (Schludi 2008: 66). Arza (2008) 
identified a general development towards individualisation of pension provision; 
privatisation has not only occurred in terms of strengthened regulation towards private 
actors, but also in the redistribution principles within statutory systems. The recent 
restructuring of public systems, such as reforms away from universal to means-tested 
minimum pensions and the cut back of early retirement incentives favoured the 
individualisation of benefits. Thus future beneficiaries might expect old-age pensions to be 
more generally closely in line with previous contributions. Frericks and Maier (2008) draw 
attention to the fact that pension system models and their outcomes possibly will imply 
gender specific inequalities. Pension system arrangements balance labour market 
inequalities, but generate different channels for inequalities. Individualisation of pension 
system regulation may have favoured economic autonomy for women, but equally put a 
burden of own saving on them. According to the chapter on attitudes towards the functions 
that statutory pension systems should fulfil (Kohli 2008), modern societies welcome efforts in 
poverty prevention and income maintenance by broad majority.   
Ebbinghaus (2011a) was mainly interested in governance types of private pension systems 
and its implications for societies’ risk taking structures. National studies of ten Western 
European economies, as well as cross-national studies documented the major steps of 
reformation and pre-existent forms of governance to secure individuals’ contributions. 
Various questions were addressed: Who decides upon the introduction of complementary 
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systems? Who administrates these systems? What do these systems regulate? Ebbinghaus 
argued that ‘the cross-national varieties of pension governance […] will certainly remain 
important for the coming years’ (Ebbinghaus 2011b: 19).  
In a comparative view, Ebbinghaus and Gronwald (2011) clarified which regulatory 
pathways were pursued across European welfare states. The authors identified three critical 
junctures that were similarly relevant in each country’s pension system. Whereas the first 
juncture defined the first introduced general type of public scheme, the second juncture 
occurred shortly after the Second World War, setting the stage for intensified security offered 
by the state or private actors. Various states followed their traditions and extended pre-
existent schemes. This had particular consequences for Bismarckian systems, where a 
crowding out of additional private schemes occurred. The situation was more diversified 
among the Beveridge type systems. All countries had in common a development of earnings-
related schemes besides the minimum pension scheme; however, the interplay of actors and 
the degree of regulation differed. Whereas the United Kingdom and Denmark upheld a 
mostly unregulated occupational pension landscape, tripartism in Finland and Sweden 
favoured solutions based on broad obligation. Also the Dutch system that had switched to a 
minimum pension in 1949, regulated private pensions broadly mandatory through collective 
agreements and its extension to covered workers. Thus Beveridgean systems show a broad 
variation of voluntary and/or mandatory earnings-related systems, which may have 
manifold redistributive effects in addition to public minimum pension.  
Ebbinghaus and Wiß (2011) pinpointed three major governance modes of complementary 
pensions: individual decisions, employer commitments, and collective agreements. 
Individual plans were typically based on own efforts to save for old age; such plans favoured 
portability in the case of switching jobs. Employer commitments were typically organised on 
prospective careers within specific firms; they were a good way to bind workers within the 
firm, by offering generous pension promises. They were by majority financed by the respect-
tive employers and thus portability was often problematic. Collective agreements favoured 
universal contribution payments by both employees and employers. In addition related 
policies can regulate portability between employers, investment rules, minimum returns, 
and insolvency protection. Empirical research of these institutions showed that each country 
had diversified regulations, also broadly specifying a diversified risk of adequate provision.  
Ebbinghaus and Neugschwender’s (2011) contribution analysed the public-private mix and 
income inequality of current pensioners in a cross-national setting. The study of nine 
European countries focused on recipient rates of private pension income along the income 
distribution, and how important private pension income was in the income mix; analyses on 
the individual were contrasted against the household level. The findings showed that 
gender-specific inequalities were essentially reduced when taking a household perspective. 
However, the lower inclusion of women to private pension plans remained evident. It also 
was shown that in multi-pillar systems, where private pension income was also quite 
relevant in the income mix as a result of the limited role of the public first-pillar scheme, 
market inequalities were similarly reproduced like in purely Bismarckian contribution-based 
systems.  
18 
 
Disney and Johnson’s (2001) edited volume is beneficial to the cross-national study of old-
age income security systems and income inequalities in various ways. Mainly originated 
from an economist perspective the authors developed an agenda how cross-national studies 
help to understand outcomes of pension policies in terms of inequality and sustainability. 
Besides the study of pension system development in the public and private sphere and 
theoretical clarification of eligibility criteria for certain types of pensions, they also were 
interested in the financial outcomes of the elderly (Disney and Johnson 2001: 2). Major 
interests were coverage with private pensions and its future development, and pensioner 
income in relation to non-pensioner income and its inequality development over time. 
Lastly, future expectations for policy shifts were also part of the research agenda. The 
authors pointed to the effects of different indexation mechanisms of pension benefits, which 
can cause a decrease in pension income levels during the years in retirement. 
The design of Disney and Johnson’s (2001) edited volume provided a systematic approach to 
evaluate pension outcomes; the authors paid attention to follow a strict structure for their 
country-specific contributions that were written by country experts. Thus the chapters 
provided both expert knowledge on the country’s institutions and harmonised statistics at 
the empirical level. Based on nation-specific findings of their edited volume (Disney and 
Johnson 2001), the authors concluded that there were manifold options in structuring 
pension systems, these different pathways however led to rather similar outcomes for the 
average retiree. The authors observed a general development towards a broader role of 
private pension schemes; these schemes generated not only a partial substitution of public 
pensions, they kept public pension expenditures on a rather low level. However this 
minimalist state plus private pension solution may have favoured also a selective situation 
for the middle to high-income groups; the share of persons earning above average earnings 
was lower under such types of regulation as compared to social insurance systems. 
A world-wide perspective on pension system development might reveal substantial 
differences in the policy approach to pension system regulation. Whereas in most advanced 
economies such as Western Europe, the Anglo Saxon countries, and Japan, the development 
of earnings-related systems covered a broad share of the population, the problem load is 
quite different in less developed countries. As mentioned by the World Bank (1994) large 
informal sectors and tax evasion led to inefficient coverage with public pension programmes 
in many Latin American countries. But also voluntary private solutions were problematic in 
developing countries; underdeveloped capital markets and insurance market failures created 
restrictions for personal old-age savings (World Bank 1994). 
In the following a brief overview on pension systems around the world is provided. Table 1 
in the Appendix (Chapter II) describes the main elements of pension systems in 21 countries; 
five types of programs are distinguished:  
o first-pillar targeted/basic schemes,  
o first-pillar work-related schemes, 
o second-pillar mandatory/quasi mandatory schemes,  
o second-pillar voluntary schemes,  
o and third-pillar schemes. 
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It is worth mentioning that the grouping into work-related schemes, rather than earning-
related schemes is driven by the conceptual grouping of pensions in the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS) Database. This approach is chosen in order to keep consistency between the 
empirical overview in Chapter III.1 and the classification of these pension schemes.  
More in detail, LIS separates out all pension schemes which require a work history in work-
related insurance transfers. Thus minimum pension schemes embedded in the earnings-
related pension scheme are also included in this category: such pensions are not earnings-
related, as they guarantee minimum amounts when the accumulated entitlements in the 
earnings-related scheme remained below a certain threshold. Thus the contents of the 
category work-related schemes are a bit broader than the contents in a strictly defined 
earnings-related category would be. 
In the following, I will concentrate on a description of old-age pension systems: Besides old-
age pension income, the elderly may possibly also receive disability pensions or survivor 
pensions. Particularly in the case of survivorship there exists also a huge cross-national 
variation in terms of regulation. In some countries survivors are mostly covered through the 
old-age pension system, whereas in other countries the transfers of a formerly insured are 
partially transferred to the surviving family. In addition to that, there exist also systems 
where benefits are paid to survivors that are independent of the insurance history of the 
deceased and/or the beneficiary. Also disability pensions might be paid either based on a 
personal insurance history, or independent of any previous insurance. Frequently the right 
to disability pension income ceases as soon as the recipient becomes eligible to an old-age 
pension. For further interest the EU’s Mutual Information System on Social Protection 
(MISSOC), the Social Security Programs throughout the World (SSPTW) reports, as well as 
the institutional tables from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database provide a broad 
overview on these areas of social security protection. 
Regarding their old-age pension system, the countries show a broad variation in their 
combination of pension pillars and eligibility rules. Basic protection schemes exist in Canada, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Japan, the United Kingdom, and partly in Brazil and Mexico, 
where either the rural population is covered or specific regional schemes were implemented. 
Besides a minimum age, eligibility to the full amounts is restricted in case of insufficient 
years of residence (Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands) or insufficient years of employment 
(Japan, the United Kingdom, Brazil).  
Targeted protection schemes are more common than basic protection schemes. Australia, 
Brazil, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, South Africa, 
Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States have incorporated targeted components in 
their pension systems. In Canada, Denmark, and the United Kingdom targeted schemes are 
set up in addition to basic schemes. Targeted pension schemes are tested against either other 
pension income (Australia, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Spain), or other income (Brazil, Canada, 
Denmark, India, the United Kingdom), or other income and assets (Germany, Ireland, South 
Africa, the United States), or assets (Hungary). In Australia, and Estonia eligibility to the full 
amount is also reduced by insufficient years of residency in the country. 
20 
 
The first-pillar (public) work-related component is typically related to the years of 
employment or insurance and employer and employees contributions during these 
insurance years. Some countries contain stronger redistributive elements than others, as 
there is less equivalence between contributions paid and final amounts received. This is 
particularly the case when minimum pensions are paid to the ones who did not have 
sufficient contributions (Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Spain). Most of 
the countries have a pay-as-you-go (PAYG)-structure, where the amount is calculated on a 
specific formula that typically requires a cross-financing from state subsidies. Individual 
accounts mostly exist in Finland and have been introduced in Mexico. The Italian system, as 
well as the Polish and the Russian pension system have recently introduced notional defined 
contribution (NDC) accounts.  
The main difference in the second-pillar (occupational) schemes can be identified by 
mandatory vs. voluntary participation in these schemes. Countries that focus more on 
targeted/basic protection schemes and less on public work-related systems, typically comple-
mented the public system by (quasi) mandatory occupational systems (Australia, Denmark, 
Finland1, India, Japan, the Netherlands). Exceptions from this pattern are Ireland and the 
United Kingdom, where the occupational systems remained on a voluntary structure.  
Social partners play an important role in setting up the rules for contributions and 
participation in industry-wide schemes in Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands, which 
cover the broad majority of the working population (more than 80 per cent) (OECD 2013a). 
Much more selective is the mandatory inclusion in Germany, where only some collective 
agreements foresee a mandatory enrolment to occupational pension schemes. 
All second-pillar schemes in this overview are financed only by employer and employees 
contributions, but they can be further distinguished in defined-contribution (DC) and defined-
benefit (DB) schemes. In DC schemes amounts are calculated through accumulated 
contributions and investment returns, whereas DB schemes typically provide benefits based 
on years of contributions and (final) earnings (Queisser et al. 2007). DB schemes are mostly 
common in Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 
However, the broad majority of countries offer DC plans. In some countries it is also 
common to receive lump-sum amounts instead of annuities (Australia, Denmark, India, and 
South Africa). 
Besides the occupational schemes, many countries also established a regulated third pillar of 
pension provision. Hybrid schemes in Brazil, Germany, and the United States allow either 
employment-related contribution payments as deductions from the wage or personal 
contribution payments.  
                                                          
1 The Finnish system is classified as first-pillar earnings-related and second-pillar mandatory system, 
as it is the outcome of a specific tripartite arrangement between the state, employer associations, and 
trade unions (cf. Kangas and Luna 2011).  
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II.3. Measurement of pension outcomes and inequality  
Having clarified the main conceptual differences in classifying pension systems, I will now 
turn to the measurement of pension outcomes. The measurement of pension outcomes 
extends the pure knowledge about institutional variety of pension systems. Empirical 
analyses of pension outcomes provide important feedback on the impact of introduced 
pension policy measures.  
In the following, I will first point out general ideas of measurement. Then I will describe 
findings about inequalities among the elderly. Each study that evaluates pension outcomes 
applies certain measurement techniques to interpret and/or compare the findings. Thus in 
contrast to the previous section ‘pension reform processes’ (Chapter II.2) that only provided 
an introductory overview, this section will contain a critical review of the studies.  
Various measures are commonly used to evaluate living standards. Among these measures 
are common inequality measures, such as the Gini-coefficient, percentile ratios, and poverty 
rates that are in general widely used to study the inequality of the income distribution. There 
are also specific measures that relate more closely to the institutional settings. For example 
replacement rates of pensions express the generosity of the social security system and private 
arrangements. All these measures are indicators that measure outcomes. In addition to 
indicators there exist also theoretical approaches that describe pension outcomes, such as 
income security / pension adequacy and horizontal vs. vertical redistribution.  
Myles (1989) introduced the terms income adequacy and income security conceptualising 
pension outcomes. He argued that income security of the elderly should express a certain 
income level of pre-retirement earnings; he stressed that a general replacement ratio between 
60 and 80 per cent might provide effective security. By defining this benchmark, Myles 
added an indicator to measure income security.  
Similarly income adequacy describes the necessity that low-income earners need additional 
support, as meeting income security did not protect them from poverty. Thus low-income 
groups are in need of higher replacement ratios to escape poverty, which relates to 
additional efforts by the state to redistribute income to the poorest of the elderly (Myles 1989: 
53-57). Also income adequacy can be measured by an indicator; being income poor can be 
measured by the share of persons with income below a certain threshold, frequently 
expressed as a percentage of median earnings among the total society. According to the 
European Union and also applied by many European nation states, extreme poverty face 
those that have less than 40 per cent, those with less than 50 per cent are considered income 
poor, whereas those with financial resources between 50 and 60 per cent of median income 
are threatened by poverty (European Commission 2011). In contrast to this relative measure-
ment, poverty can be similarly measured based on a nationally defined absolute poverty line. 
The terms income adequacy and income security raised by Myles (1989) were similarly concept-
tualised by the OECD referring to prevention of destitution in old age and income maintenance. 
‘The first [goal] is redistribution of income towards low-income pensioners and prevention 
of destitution in old age. The second [goal] is helping workers maintain living standards 
during retirement by replacing income from work at an adequate level’ (OECD 2005: 15).  
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The European Commission (2003) also refers to these two core functions in a similar way: 
preventing social exclusion and enabling people to maintain living standards. Additionally, a 
broader goal of pension adequacy that fulfils both is mentioned. The two objectives are further 
concretised:  
Objective 1: preventing social exclusion 
Ensure that older people are not placed at risk of poverty and can enjoy a decent standard of living; that 
they share in the economic wellbeing of their country and can accordingly participate actively in public, 
social and cultural life (European Commission 2003: 23). 
Objective 2: enabling people to maintain living standards 
Provide access for all individuals to appropriate pension arrangements, public and/or private, which 
allow them to earn pension entitlements enabling them to maintain, to a reasonable degree, their living 
standard after retirement (European Commission 2003: 30). 
Another common approach to study pension systems and pension outcomes is the analysis 
of redistributive effects. Fulfilling old-age security goals, nation states provide two sorts of 
redistributive mechanisms: horizontal and vertical redistribution (Esping-Andersen and Myles 
2009; Palme 2006). Horizontal redistribution describes benefit structures where providers 
accumulate own entitlements during their working career. Thus later pension transfers are 
closely related to contributions during the employment years; such transfers can be 
described as deferred use (consumption smoothing) of financial resources, referring to income 
security/maintenance. Vertical redistribution describes the reallocation of benefits to the 
poorest income group, securing income/pension adequacy for the poorest income group. 
Besides the already mentioned indicators poverty rates and replacement rates to measure 
income adequacy and living standards, redistributive effects are also measured by analysing 
percentile ratios. Percentile ratios measure the distance of specific points in the income 
distribution in comparison to another point. For example the income of the median earner 
could be three times higher than the income of the person at the 10 per cent percentile. In 
order to analyse the redistributive effect for the elderly, policy analysts can evaluate if this 
number decreased when only looking at the elderly population as compared to the total 
population, indicating a redistributive effect in favour of the poorest income group of the 
elderly. 
The OECD and the World Bank published various studies about pension system components 
and the financial well-being of the elderly. These studies give a brief overview on pension 
schemes across many developed and developing countries around the world: Ageing and 
Income (OECD 2001), Pensions at a Glance (OECD 2005/2007/2009/2011/2013), Complementary 
and Private Pensions throughout the World 2008 (OECD et al. 2008), Pensions Panorama: 
Retirement-Income Systems in 53 Countries (Whitehouse 2007), Averting the Old Age Crisis 
(World Bank 1994). The following paragraphs will concentrate on the studies by the OECD, 
as these studies primarily discuss and evaluate the old-age income of advanced 
industrialised countries, which similarly will be pursued in the research agenda of this 
monograph. 
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The OECD’s (2001) report on Ageing and Income focused on both current income of the 
elderly and simulated income based on current pension system regulation, whereas the more 
recent reports Pensions at a Glance (OECD 2005/2007/2009/2011/2013) have shifted to income 
simulation techniques in general. The main finding of the Ageing and Income report that is 
also in line with Disney and Johnson’s (2001) study was that pension benefits were rather 
similar in terms of income generosity across countries. This was the case although there 
existed rather divergent combinations of pension income sources that were created by 
various pension schemes (OECD 2001). The OECD divided the income distribution in ten 
income deciles for which the mean disposable income was calculated. (OECD 2001: 24). 
During the mid 1990s, in two countries, Canada and Italy, the poorest elderly were 
financially much better off than the poorest individuals in working age. However this 
beneficial situation was already reversed for the persons in the second and respectively third 
income decile group; here income standards of the working-age population exceeded those 
of the elderly population, signifying that old-age security systems tended to generate in 
general lower income standards. For the highest income deciles Finland, Italy, and the 
United Kingdom lagged behind the relative income levels reached in the other countries.  
This measurement is problematic, as it depends on the income distribution among the 
current working aged population. Thus if inactivity through unemployment or care 
responsibilities were rather high at a specific point in time or social assistance or 
unemployment benefits were particularly low, these figures produced rather distorted 
outcomes. Similarly if there existed a much higher share of elderly that were still working 
among the persons aged 65 and older in one country, these persons were likely to end up in 
high-income deciles, in particular when delayed retirement relates to high qualification. The 
findings by the OECD documented that this effect was non-negligible, as the replacement 
levels increased strongly in the highest income decile; the beneficial situation was caused by 
both working income and capital income (OECD 2001: 24; 27-30). However, analyses of mean 
pension income by decile did not allow conclusions if both income sources were equally 
important for the individuals who ended up in the highest decile. Work incomes as well as 
private pensions might be rather selectively important for a very small group of beneficiaries 
that at the same time received very high amounts. The major income sources for the low-
income group were particularly public pensions or transfers from social assistance schemes. 
The OECD also documented real income growth between the 1980s to the 1990s for the 
working aged and the elderly population (OECD 2001: 38-40). The results showed a mixed 
picture: Germany, the United States, and Japan showed higher increases for the total 
population than for the elderly population, whereas the other countries showed the reversed 
pattern. Diverging tendencies also occurred when looking at income quintiles. Whereas in 
Sweden and the United Kingdom particularly the high-income elderly group showed the 
strongest increases in income, the picture was reversed in Germany, Finland and Canada; 
these countries showed stronger increases among the low-income group of the elderly. The 
report also evaluated which income sources were driving this development. In most 
countries social transfers caused the increases; in contrast British retirees benefitted from 
higher capital income.  
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These evaluations can be very beneficial for the evaluation of different pension income 
sources received by various pension schemes; however, a further distinction in pension 
income components was not pursued in this OECD study. By knowing the state of maturity 
of various pension schemes in each nation state, one might be able to identify how these 
schemes affected the income distribution, e. g. the strong increases for Swedish retirees on 
the upper end may relate to the maturing of the earnings-related ATP scheme. Similarly, the 
better financial situation of retirees in the United Kingdom may possibly relate to increasing 
importance of private pensions.  
Another chapter of the Ageing and Income report laid the groundwork for further studies by 
the OECD, documenting the outcomes of pension systems, specifically the Pensions at a 
Glance reports. In contrast to the previous setting, where financial well-being of the current 
elderly was shown, this OECD approach involved a pension scheme modelling for future 
contributors and retirees (OECD 2001: 47-65). Pension outcomes were depicted for specific 
working-career paths, while taking into account accumulated pension entitlements from 
various schemes of the pension system. Thus specific pension schemes and the entire 
pension system should be analysed in a standardised way in terms of generosity for specific 
income groups. According to the OECD the strength of the approach is the evaluation of 
current pension system design, whereas interpretations of current incomes are necessarily 
out-dated, as they were created by the pension schemes from the past.  
However, this modelling approach comes with several unsatisfactory results that were 
mentioned by the OECD as well (OECD 2001: 49): contributions were calculated based on 
future scenarios, thus further reforms besides current transformations could not be taken 
into account. The OECD’s Pensions at a Glance report revealed some of the basic assumptions; 
depending on each parameter quite different estimates could be calculated (OECD 2005: 39-
46; 73-80). It becomes clear that persons with interrupted labour-market careers cannot be 
analysed appropriately with this generalised approach. It needs many additional modelling 
steps to reflect typical and atypical employment careers. The OECD’s simulation of 35 
instead of 45 employment years are one step in this direction, but still far too inflexible to 
capture relevant employment patterns within a specific society. Similarly, modelling 
procedures are only barely adaptable to economies of scale and inter/intra household 
redistribution; these scenarios might vary a lot in cross-national perspective, and are much 
better captured in a study of current pension incomes. A general problem is also to 
document replacement rates for the low-income group; depending on the level of the 
minimum pension at a specific point in time, the replacement rate varies for the recipients of 
the minimum amount. For minimum pension and social assistance recipients the evaluation 
of current income is much more appropriate, as it closely relates to the regulation in place at 
this point in time. 
Simulation techniques have been also applied in an edited volume by Meyer et al. (2007) that 
contained a sample of six European countries. The editors constructed risk biographies, 
reflecting common employment patterns and family types (Bridgen and Meyer 2007a); 
simulated working careers for single mothers, two parent families, and interrupted 
25 
 
employment careers were included. These profiles were simulated according to their 
contribution payment and their future pension income. The authors found the Dutch system 
scoring best in terms of social inclusion which is measured as percentage of the elderly 
receiving higher income than 40 per cent of average earnings, the severe poverty indicator. 
Countries that had left private pensions on voluntary participation showed problematic 
income gaps, which, if not filled by private pensions, were not closed by the mandatory 
schemes. Therefore, the authors concluded that the type of private pensions is an essential 
feature for social inclusion (Bridgen and Meyer 2007b).  
Similarly to the critique of the simulation approach, Bridgen and Meyer’s (2007a) modelling 
can be seen as problematic. Although the editors took up the main critique of insufficient 
possibility to capture interrupted employment careers in the OECD’s technique, the design 
showed an additional weakness. The calculated risk profiles did not take cross-national 
variation into account. The proposed risk biographies were not based on actual employment 
careers; the risk profiles were predicted employment careers of the future. Thus the findings 
may be misleading; some modelled groups which were found to be at risk may reflect an 
idealised problem that possibly is irrelevant for a specific society, as the modelled group did 
barely match the typical career patterns. 
The most systematic approach to bring together the study of institutional variety and 
pension outcomes has been undertaken by Disney and Johnson (2001) that has been already 
described in Chapter II.2. However a few shortcomings remained. The country selection was 
primarily concentrated on the liberal tradition of welfare states; the conservative countries 
are represented by Germany, France, and Italy. However, there was only one case 
representing encompassing pension provision: the Netherlands that combined a universal 
minimum pension with broad obligation to participate in complementary pensions. Lacking 
in this edited volume were the Nordic countries that also implemented rather compulsory 
private schemes that affected strongly the outcomes of the income mix of the elderly; the 
Nordic countries offered various other important alternatives for pension provision that 
would have been beneficial for the analyses. The second shortcoming lies in the use of 
national data sets and the evaluation by country experts. This proceeding can limit data 
comparability across countries if not the same standards in data preparation and analysis 
were applied. 
II.4. Pension systems and social protection – a comprehensive perspective 
The following paragraphs try to establish a comprehensive perspective for the study of 
pension systems and redistribution. This framework contains three components (1) pension 
system characteristics, (2) individual labour market attachment, and (3) living arrangements. All 
three areas have in common that risk groups can be better conceptualised, as compared to a 
purely empirical study on pension income inequalities. Although pension systems in general 
may be able to reduce poverty and inequalities among the elderly, their design may still 
involve strong stratification mechanisms (Palme 2003). Thus to interpret inequalities in 
pension income, one needs to first understand the redistributive potential of specific 
schemes.  
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Distributional consequences of a combination of public and private pension pillars can be 
expected to be twofold. First-tier schemes may include a high degree of vertical redistribution 
towards the poor, whereas second-tier schemes entirely provided by private actors may 
distort redistributive outcomes again. Korpi and Palme (1998) concluded from a cross-
national study that there might be a paradox of redistribution: ‘The more we target benefits at 
the poor only and the more concerned we are with creating equality via equal public 
transfers to all, the less likely we are to reduce poverty and inequality’ (Korpi and Palme 
1998: 681-82). The authors claimed that earnings-related schemes should thus be considered 
as a pre-condition for reducing inequality structures.  
(1) Pension system characteristics 
Historically, nation-specific pension systems have developed along various paths, 
redistributing income differently across the aged. Whereas some elements of pension 
systems, like earnings-related social insurance systems may have favoured reproduction of 
market inequality, other benefit structures such as minimum pensions or derived benefits 
may have redistributed income among the elderly in favour of the poor. Besides public 
policies, social partners or firms can also substitute or complement to the old-age provision 
of individuals. Particularly the role of private pensions is less studied in a comprehensive 
and cross-national perspective; occupational and personal pension’s effects on income 
inequalities among the elderly are controversial and need further clarification. One major 
feature is the regulatory power of corporatist actors; these actors may or may not be in 
charge to regulate complementary pension schemes. Thus the degree of participation of non-
state actors has created multiple paths of pension system design. 
In addition to the core earnings-related pension scheme, many states have implemented 
redistributive elements and/or derived pension claims to protect specific elderly risk groups, 
such as non-working spouses and survivors. Such redistributive elements and derived 
pension transfers across European countries have for example been documented by 
Monticone et al. (2008). The authors analysed minimum pension regulation, means testing, 
care credits and survivor benefits. In the sphere of care benefits, further sub-distinctions can 
be made into maternity and child-rearing, and credits for caring for disabled persons. In 
addition, survivor benefits can be regulated; entitlement criteria are e. g. duration of 
marriage and minimum age to claim such benefits. In general, old-age and survivor benefits 
can be income-tested and reduced depending on other household member’s income.  
These redistributive elements and derived benefit regulations concern mostly the public 
pension schemes; redistributive policies were implemented less in occupational and personal 
schemes. On the contrary, if not regulated-well, occupational schemes might not only relate 
to no contributions during periods of inactivity, but also result in a loss of entitlements, 
when an employee changes jobs or the employer goes into bankruptcy (Pedersen 1999). Thus 
periods of inactivity are expected to be more disadvantageous in pension systems, where 
public welfare state activity was substituted by occupational welfare policies. Nowadays, 
many advanced countries have addressed issues of portability and insolvency, and 
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introduced insolvency protection agencies (Ebbinghaus and Wiß 2011), but portability and 
insolvency could remain a central problem in developing countries. Pension systems that 
were lacking these redistributive elements and/or private pension protection, might leave 
more persons at risk, and also create more inequality across the elderly. 
(2) Individual labour market attachment 
Financial security of elderly individuals has to be understood as a result of a specific life 
course process before actual retirement. This process starts with education opportunities and 
policies strengthening equality of chances, and then continues with the individual working 
career and varying opportunities to be continuously included in particular occupations. 
Hereby, active labour market policies may help to (re)-integrate inactive persons such as the 
unemployed, mothers and homemakers.  
The new social risks theory argues that industrial change and its consequences cause high 
labour market risks and insufficient social security for specific groups of the population 
nowadays (Armingeon and Bonoli 2006; Bonoli 2006; Bonoli 2007; Taylor-Gooby 2004a). 
Staying in a secure job, which is also well paid, has become more problematic in recent 
decades (Taylor-Gooby 2004b); this specific risk faces the low-educated group, in particular. 
New social risks proponents argue that further adjustments are needed to protect various risk 
groups better as compared to the current pension system design. Therefore, Hinrichs and 
Jessoula (2012) propose a new analytical approach that brings together research on instability 
of employment and social protection, pension systems and its consequences for social 
protection in old age. Non-standard employed persons may find it hard to contribute to 
private pensions (Turner and Rajnes 1998), which in turn means, the more persons were 
affected by instable working conditions, the more under-secured they can be in old age. 
In the past, early labour market exit has been on the other hand rather important for older 
workers; early-retirement policies in public and private schemes were attractive means for 
employers and employees to retire early (OECD 2001). Such options were taken back more 
and more in the second half of the 1990s; also incentives to work longer than statutory 
retirement age were introduced (OECD 2001; Ebbinghaus 2006a). 
Particularly in systems where minimum benefits are paid only when reaching the statutory 
retirement age, occupational and personal pensions might work as a bridge for senior 
workers who were excluded from the labour market before reaching statutory retirement age 
(OECD 2001: 12; 35-37). Yamada and Casey (2002) identified such partial pension recipient 
patterns for example in Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. It is worth mentioning that partial early or partial retirement, most likely is 
accompanied with reduced pension system contributions and pension benefits. On the other 
hand, if workers choose belated retirement, they possibly will accumulate further 
entitlements to pensions. Recent reforms of the pension systems frequently reward 
prolonged working career decisions (OECD 2013a). 
Thus the individual period of contribution payments and the individual retirement decision 
has become more flexible. If a person for example chooses early exit, this person might 
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consider that an earlier exit and a potentially lower percentage of replacement of the 
previous earnings than the one at statutory retirement age might be as good for him/her as a 
continued employment and the higher replacement at statutory retirement age. However, in 
this example the person who retires early might not only expect a lower pension from the 
public system, but also from the occupational and personal systems.  
Similarly, the belated retirement decision could be linked to unaffected benefits in the public 
system (in the case of minimum pensions), but to longer contribution periods in private 
schemes that shift the public-private mix to a stronger relevance of private benefits.  
These simple considerations show, the more individual decisions shape the general pattern 
of retirement, the less might a pension income distribution reflect the intended ideal set up of 
the established pension system. This is particularly true, when flexible retirement age 
regulations exist. 
(3) Living arrangements 
The sphere living arrangements can be subdivided in two dimensions: the situation during 
the working career and the situation during retirement. The situation during the working 
career is closely tied to the argument of labour market attachment; couple households may 
show a shorter period of full-time labour market participation for one partner, particularly 
when raising children; thus also contributions to specific pension schemes differ by 
household type. 
The male-breadwinner model (Esping-Andersen 2002; Lewis 1992; Lewis 2001) supported the 
idea that the head’s provision in social security was sufficient for the whole family. Thus 
spouses were less secured on their own and frequently dependant on the partner’s social 
benefits. Although the male-breadwinner model is less pronounced in current societies due to 
increased labour market participation by women, in couple households men are more likely 
to have un-interrupted full-time labour market integration than women. Women in 
partnership are more engaged with homemaking and taking care of the children, elderly, 
and disabled than their partners; thus they are more likely to interrupt their working career 
and to be exposed to atypical/part-time work arrangements (Fagan and O’Reilly 1998; Fagan 
and Rubery 1996). As contributions are lower during phases of inactivity or part-time 
employment and other atypical employment contracts, pension entitlements in earnings-
related schemes can be expected to be lower as well. 
The situation during retirement describes the potential resource sharing with a partner 
and/or other household members (economies of scale). In many OECD countries it is common 
that the elderly are living on their own, either as single or couple household; more than 80-90 
per cent of the elderly live in single or couple households, exceptions being Italy and Japan 
where multiple generation patterns are more common (Yamada and Casey 2002). Related to 
the analysis of income packaging among elderly households this means that such analyses 
foremost relate to the study of single and couple households, where all members are elderly 
persons and potential pension recipients. 
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Pension systems and redistribution – a comprehensive perspective 
Figure 3 establishes a stylised model how to interpret pension system design, labour market 
attachment, and inequalities of pension outcomes jointly. The main focus of this 
comprehensive perspective is to show how contributions and entitlements during the 
working phase relate to pension income during the retirement phase. The various 
combinations of the features in the boxes either reveal a strong link between the three 
elements or limit the link between the boxes for a specific population group or group at risk. 
This conceptual framework broadens the scope for comparative studies explaining 
inequality of pension income. 
The first box (working phase) describes the stability of labour market participation during 
the working phase. The more this continuity is disrupted by instable working conditions and 
periods of unemployment, or periods of inactivity due to care obligations, or work injury, or 
disability, the stronger can be the repercussions for the accumulated contributions to 
earnings-related pension schemes and later entitlement to pension income. 
The second box (pension system) summarises the main characteristics of various pension 
schemes on which the entitlements to later benefits are built. Thus longer periods of 
inactivity might result in lower contributions and reduced pension entitlements. However, 
many public earnings-related schemes also foresee credits for periods of inactivity (for 
example unemployment and motherhood) that make up for the interrupted or reduced 
contributions during periods of inactivity. In private pension schemes inclusion can be 
strongly influenced by the obligation to participate in private pension plans offered by 
employers (second pillar) or financial institutes (third pillar).  
The third box (retirement phase) includes the main components that characterise incidence 
of poverty and inequality of pension outcomes during the retirement phase. In general the 
individual retirement decision might influence the generosity of pension annuities from 
various pension schemes. Each of the pension schemes may possibly secure a different part 
Figure 3: Stylised model of retirement income 
 
Source: Ebbinghaus and Neugschwender 2011: 392, adjusted. 
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of the population. For example the existence of a public residency-based basic pension 
entirely unlinks the working phase from the retirement phase, as it provides a minimum 
benefit as universal right to the whole population.  
The link between stability of employment, accumulated contributions, and later benefits 
remains much stronger in earnings-related schemes. Here defined-benefit or defined-
contribution plans structure the pension outcomes. Depending on their regulation, 
contributory pension schemes include further redistributive elements, or simply serve as 
savings schemes (World Bank 1994). In general, other income sources such as labour income, 
capital income, income from private sources, and also incomes of other household members 
further reduce pure dependency on individual pension rights.  
Individual labour market attachment and living arrangements during the working career and 
during retirement can have strong repercussions on pension system characteristics itself. 
Inequalities during the working phase and regulation of public and private pension schemes 
are expected to strongly affect poverty and inequality of retirement income.  
Different risk profiles require different pension system regulation to be protected in old age; 
this protection is organised in various ways depending on the national approach to take 
action securing the population against social risks and the strategy to set up comprehensive 
pension systems that prevent poverty and social exclusion.  
A specific risk group in public contribution-based schemes were mostly women that still 
showed a lower labour market attachment in the second half of the 20th century in most 
advanced societies. Therefore, in various states, specific regulations granted access to 
pensions of the former divorced or deceased spouse and/or take into account periods of 
inactivity (maternity, unemployment) when the final pension annuity was calculated. These 
redistributive policies might particularly favour women for two reasons: First, mostly 
women interrupt the working career for raising children. And second, women frequently 
outlive their spouse and thus might partially inherit the insurance-based pension of the 
deceased spouse.  
A cross-national study of past and current pension system legislation and the current public-
private mix will reveal how outcomes of pension systems compare and in how far these 
outcomes guaranteed a minimum living standard and/or maintained the previous income 
level. A key feature of this analysis is a detailed study of public, occupational, and private 
pension systems and their combined effects on the outcomes, as each component of the 
pension system can be expected to affect the income distribution in a quite particular way, 
which will be elaborated further in the research agenda (Chapter III.3). An over-time 
comparison that is studying pension outcomes by birth cohorts will clarify how far the 
pension income mix is changing, and which consequences this change has for the income 
distribution and inequality among the elderly. 
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Table 1 : Overview on pension systems around the world (Australia-Denmark) 
 
Sources: MISSOC, SSPTW, LIS (institutional files), OECD (2013a), Pension Funds Online (2015) 
 
 
 
Targeted/Basic Work-related Mandatory/quasi mandatory Voluntary
A
u
st
ra
li
a Age pension 
Eligibility: aged 65 or older, and 10 years 
of continuous residence or 5 years if the 
total residence period exceeds 10 years; 
income-tested; reduced if other pension 
income sources are received.
Financing: taxation.
Superannuation funds 
mostly defined contribution; employee is 
not required to contribute to the pension 
plan.
Frequently partly paid as lump sums.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
Superannuation funds
must be an employed person with a 
superannuation through your company or 
with a separate plan. 
Frequently partly paid as lump sums.
Financing: employer's and employee's 
contributions.
Retirement savings accounts (RSA's) 
provided by deposit-taking institutions or 
life insurance companies.
B
ra
zi
l Old-age benefit from LOAS (Lei Orgânica 
de Assistência Social)
Eligibility: aged 65 or older and without 
remunerated work, and with family 
monthly earnings less than 25% of the 
minimum monthly wage.
Financing: taxation.
Previdencia Rural (Rural Pension) 
Eligibility: men aged 60 / women aged 55 
who have at least 180 months of work in 
rural areas. Benefits are equal to the 
minimum wage.
Financing: taxation.
Regime geral de previdência
social (RGPS)
full pension paid when 35 years of 
contributions (men) or 30 years of 
contributions (women): 
Amount: 80% of monthly earnings since 
July 1994, multiplied by the Factor 
Previdenciario.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
C
an
ad
a Old age security (OAS) 
Eligibility: aged 65 or older and 10 years of 
residence; reduced amount if less than 40 
years of residence.
Financing: taxation.
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) 
Eligibility: must be receiving OAS; the GIS 
is reduced against income other than the 
basic pension at a 50% rate.
Financing: taxation.
Canada pension plan (CPP) and Quebec 
pension plan (QPP) 
Amount: replacement rate of 25% of 
earnings up to the Yearly Maximum 
Pensionable Earnings (YMPE), based on 
average lifetime salary (excluding the 15% 
of years with the lowest earnings).
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
Registered retirement income funds 
(RRIFs)
mostly defined benefit plans
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
Voluntary pension savings (RPPs)
D
e
n
m
ar
k Folkepension (basic amount)
Eligibility: aged 65 or older with at least 3 
years of residence between the ages of 15 
and 65 or older; reduced amount if less 
than 40 years of residence.
Financing: taxation.
Folkepension (supplement)
Eligibility: must be receiving 
folkepension; supplement is reduced 
based on the income of pensioner the 
spouse's/cohabiting partner's income.
Financing: taxation.
Arbejdsmarkedets tillægspension (ATP)
all wage-earners in Denmark with more 
than 9 hours of paid work per week pay 
low contributions to complement the 
national scheme.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions organised in industry-wide 
funds.
Labour market pensions
funded defined-contribution schemes 
agreed between the social partners (quasi 
mandatory;  more than 90 % coverage).
Lump sum withdrawal possible.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
 Special savings accounts
Regime de previdência complementar (RPC) 
Non profit-organisations offer open/closed private pension schemes which 
employers/labour unions can establish; not strictly linked to employment.
Financing: employer and employee contributions.
C
o
u
n
tr
y Second pillar (occupational) Third pillar (personal)First pillar (public)
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Table 1 (continued): Overview on pension systems around the world (Estonia-Greece) 
Sources: MISSOC, SSPTW, LIS (institutional files), OECD (2013a), Pension Funds Online (2015) 
 
 
 
 
Targeted/Basic Work-related Mandatory/quasi mandatory Voluntary
Es
to
n
ia Rahvapension
Eligibility:  aged 63 or older with at least 5 
years of residence, and not entitled to 
Vanaduspension.
Financing: taxation.
Vanaduspension
Amount: base amount plus amount 
depending on contributions/ years of 
service.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions 
Kogumispension
(born 1983 or after): additional 2 % of 
contributions are paid in funded 
mandatory individual plans managed by 
private institutions.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
Voluntary pension funds
Fi
n
la
n
d Kansaneläke
Eligibility: aged 65 or older with at least 3 
years residence after age 16; full pension 
paid when 80 % of time residing in Finland 
between the age of 16 and 65 or older; 
reduced by 50% of the difference 
between other pension income and a 
small disregard.
Financing: taxation.
Takuueläke (since 2011)
paid if national and earnings-related 
pension together remain under a certain 
threshold.
Financing: taxation.
Voluntary occupational pensions
mostly defined benefit plans with the 
same accrual rates as the Vanhuuseläke.
Group insurance schemes
G
e
rm
an
y Grundsicherung im Alter
Eligibility: aged 65 or older; part of the 
social assistance scheme with less strict 
rules for the income and asset-test.
Financing: taxation.
Altersrente (GKV/Beamtenversorgung)
PAYG system. 
Amount: based on pension points 
calculated on the average earning 
National Accounts average earnings.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions and government subsidies.
Betriebliche Altersversorgung
some groups of private sector employees 
are covered through mandatory collective 
agreements; various ways of funding.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
Betriebliche Altersversorgung
counterpart to the mandated plans.
Riester pension plans 
provided by the employer; inclusion 
increased through partially automatic 
enrollment.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
Riester pension plans 
provided by banks,
insurance companies or investment funds; 
subsidised by the government.
G
re
e
ce Old-age pension IKA-ETAM 
PAYG system.
Amount: 80% of pensionable income if 
insured before 1993; 2% of the income for 
the entitlement to the pension for each 
year of insurance if insured after 1993. 
Includes a minimum pension amount.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions and taxation.
Old-age pensions for rural areas from the 
Organisation for the Social Insurance of 
the Farmers (OGA)
Eligibility (After 1998): 65 years or older & 
15 years of contributions.
After 1998, partly financed through 
contributions and tax subsidies.
Supplementary pensions
additional mandated contributions.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
Pension funds
organised in single-employer or a 
profession-wide pension funds.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
Vanhuuseläke
Tripartite (state/employer/associations/trade unions)  system decentralised to 
pension providers such as insurance companies, organised in company pension funds 
and industry-wide pension funds.
Partly PAYG-systems and partly funded; 
Amount: calculated on accrual rate of annual earnings.
Financing: employer and employee contributions.
C
o
u
n
tr
y Second pillar (occupational) Third pillar (personal)First pillar (public)
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Table 1 (continued): Overview on pension systems around the world (Hungary-Italy) 
Sources: MISSOC, SSPTW, LIS (institutional files), OECD (2013a), Pension Funds Online (2015) 
 
 
Targeted/Basic Work-related Mandatory/quasi mandatory Voluntary
H
u
n
ga
ry Időskorúak járadéka
Eligibilty: aged 62; not entitled if the 
property of his/her family exceeds the 
limit defined by law.
Financing: taxation.
Öregségi nyugdíj
PAYG system.
Amount: 33% of the reference income for 
the first 10 years of insurance period, + 2% 
for each of the insurance years between 
11-25,+ 1% for each of the insurance years 
between 26-36, + 1.5% for each of the 
insurance years between 36-40,+ 2% for 
each of the insurance years after 40 years. 
Includes a minimum pension amount; 
contribution history of at least 20 years; a 
partial pension without a minimum is paid 
after 15 contribution years. 
In
d
ia National old age pension
Eligibility: aged 65 or older and have no 
viable source of subsistence either 
through own income or through financial 
help available from other family 
members.
Financing: taxation.
New pension system (since 2004)
defined contribution individual account 
system targeting at a replacement rate of 
50% of the final wage.
There exist mandatory and voluntary 
accounts.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
Pensions from the employees provident 
fund scheme (EPF)
defined contribution scheme;
provides lump-sum benefits at the time of 
retirement. 
Pensions from the employees pension 
scheme (EPS)
defined benefit scheme; in the case of 10 
years coverage, benefits are received as 
monthly pension based on the length of 
coverage and salary; with less than 10 
years coverage lump sums are paid.
Other specific funds for occupational 
groups
Superannuation funds
defined contribution plans.
Can be partly withdrawn as lump sum.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
Ir
e
la
n
d Non-contributory state pension
Eligibility: aged 66 or older; must not 
qualify for contributory state pension; 
income and asset-tested.
Financing: taxation.
Contributory state pension 
flat-rate scheme for persons who fulfill 
the eligibility.
Amount: average of 48 weeks 
contributions or credits per year 
throughout the working life; amount 
reduced for incomplete contributions.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
Occupational pensions
partly defined benefit plans, and partly 
defined contribution plans; employees 
are required to allow access to a PRSA 
arrangements.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
Personal retirement savings accounts 
(PRSAs) 
defined contribution plans provided by 
investment managers, insurance 
companies and credit institutions.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
Retirement Annuity Contracts (RAC) 
defined contribution plans for persons 
with no access to occupational pensions.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
It
al
y Assegno sociale
Eligibility: aged 65 or older; supplements 
pensione di vecchiaia if below a certain 
threshold.
Financing: taxation.
Pensione di vecchiaia
PAYG system.
Amount: based on total lifelong 
contributions and the transformation 
coefficient.
Includes Notional defined accounts 
(NDCs) for persons who got insured after 
1996.
Closed collectively agreed funds
defined contribution plans organised in 
single company or as industry-wide 
pension funds
Open pension funds 
defined contribution plans provided by 
insurance companies, banks or registered 
asset management companies.
Individual pension plans (PIPs) 
Voluntary pension funds (VPFs) 
defined contribution accounts managed by the employer's insurance companies or 
financial institutions.
C
o
u
n
tr
y Second pillar (occupational) Third pillar (personal)First pillar (public)
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Table 1 (continued): Overview on pension systems around the world (Japan-Netherlands) 
Sources: MISSOC, SSPTW, LIS (institutional files), OECD (2013a), Pension Funds Online (2015) 
 
 
 
Targeted/Basic Work-related Mandatory/quasi mandatory Voluntary
Ja
p
an National pension
Eligibility: aged 65 or older;
full basic pension requires
40 years of contributions,  reduced 
amounts if shorter
contribution period. Since Oct 2015, 10 
minimum years of contributions.
Financing: residents, employer 
contributions, and state subsidies.
Employee's pension
PAYG system.
Amount: based on the insured's average 
monthly wage over the full career 
multiplied by a coefficient determined by 
insured's date of birth multiplied by the 
number of months of coverage; 25 
minimum years of contributions.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
Contracting out (employee's pension 
funds)
employers with more than 1000 
employees can opt out of the employee's 
pension scheme, and cover their 
employees their self, if they offer 
pensions which provide more than 150% 
of the state system.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
Pension funds
defined contribution plans established by 
one or multiple employers.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
Contract type plans
defined contribution plans that require a 
pension contract between the sponsoring 
employer(s) and their employees.
Corporate/individual defined 
contribution plans
established by single employers 
implemented through a contract with a 
pension management organisation.
M
e
xi
co Social pension programs organised by 
states
12 out of 32 states operate such systems: 
eligibility age ranges between 65 and 70.
Financing: taxation.
Programa 70 y mas adultos mayores 
Eligibility: aged 70 or older and living in 
rural areas with less than 30,000 people.
Financing: taxation.
Pensión por vejez
currently transformed from a PAYG to a 
fully funded individual account system, 
mandatory for all workers entering the 
labor force since 1997. 
Amount (old system): percentage  of the 
insured's average earnings in the last 250 
weeks of contributions, plus an increment 
for each year of contributions exceeding 
500 weeks; the pension is increased by 
15% if the insured is assessed as requiring 
assistance. 
Amount (new system): based on the value 
of the accumulated capital plus accrued 
interest; annuity or withdrawals based on 
life expectancy.
Includes a guaranteed minimum pension.
Financing: employer and employee 
Occupational pension plans defined 
benefit, defined contribution, and hybrid 
plans.
rare, typically through automatic 
enrollment by employers offering such 
plans.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions. 
Individual retirement accounts
provided by authorized companies 
(Administradoras de Fondos para el 
Retiro, AFOREs)
N
e
th
e
rl
an
d
s Algemene ouderdomswet (AOW) 
Eligibility: aged 65 or older and years of 
residence in the Netherlands between 
the ages of 15 and 65; reduced by 2 % for 
each year abroad.
Joint amount calculation with 
occupational pension.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions and government subsidies.
Occupational pensions
mostly industry-wide funds with defined 
benefit (final salary) plans organised 
through compulsory enrollment via 
collective agreements (quasi mandatory); 
employers can opt out from the industry-
wide funds if they offer their own funds.
Joint amount calculation with public 
pension.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
C
o
u
n
tr
y Second pillar (occupational) Third pillar (personal)First pillar (public)
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Table 1 (continued): Overview on pension systems around the world (Poland-South Africa) 
Sources: MISSOC, SSPTW, LIS (institutional files), OECD (2013a), Pension Funds Online (2015) 
 
 
 
Targeted/Basic Work-related Mandatory/quasi mandatory Voluntary
P
o
la
n
d Emerytury
mixed PAYG and funded scheme based on 
a notional defined contribution (NDC) 
accounts and mandatory individual 
accounts; individual accounts are open 
pension funds (OPFs) managed by a 
pension fund society.
Amount: based on the total value of 
contributions to the NDC divided by 
average life expectancy at the age of 
retirement and the contributions to the 
individual account; 
Includes a minimum pension; minimum 20 
years (women) or 25 years (men) of 
insurance from full-time employment.
Financing: employer and employee 
Voluntary occupational pension plans 
(PPE)
defined contribution plans;
plans must be offered to more than 50% 
of employees in the company.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
Individual retirement accounts (IKE) 
defined contribution plans
R
u
ss
ia Old-age labour pensio  
mixed PAYG and funded scheme based on 
a notional defined contribution (NDC) 
accounts and mandatory individual 
accounts; individual accounts are 
organised in non-state pension funds 
(NPFs)/pension fund of the Russian 
Federation (PFR) ;
Amount: based on the total value of 
contributions to the NDC divided by 
average life expectancy at the age of 
retirement and the contributions to the 
individual account; must have a minimum 
of 5 years of insurance coverage. 
Includes a minimum pension.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions and government subsidies.
Voluntary occupational pension plans
mostly defined contribution plans; 
organised by non-state pension funds and 
insurance companies.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
So
u
th
 A
fr
ic
a State old-age pension
Eligibility: aged 60 (women)/aged 65 
(men) or older; income and asset-tested; 
reduced to 25 percent of the maximum 
amount if the pensioner resides in a care 
facility under contract to the state for 
more than 3 months. 
Financing: taxation.
Employer pension plans
defined benefit and defined contribution 
plans; when employers offer these plans 
employees must join them; provided 
through provident funds or a pension 
funds. provident funds allow one lump 
sum payment while pension funds are 
only allowed to provide one third of the 
total value as a lump sum.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
C
o
u
n
tr
y Second pillar (occupational) Third pillar (personal)First pillar (public)
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Table 1 (continued): Overview on pension systems around the world (Spain-United States) 
Sources: MISSOC, SSPTW, LIS (institutional files), OECD (2013a), Pension Funds Online (2015) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Targeted/Basic Work-related Mandatory/quasi mandatory Voluntary
Sp
ai
n Pensión de jubilación no contributiva
Eligibility: aged 65 or older, and who have 
not acquired enough pension 
contributions or are not entitled to a 
contributory old-age pension;  requires at 
least 10 years of residence after reaching 
the age of 16 and for five consecutive 
years just before claiming the pension.
Financing: taxation.
Pensión por jubilación
PAYG scheme.
Amount:  at least 15 years of earnings and 
contributions; after 15 years 
contributions, it is 50% of the earnings 
base; for years 16-25 3% is accrued, for 
years 26-35 2% is accrued. Full pension 
after 35 years of contributions (100% 
accrual reached).
Includes a minimum pension amount.
Financing: employer and employee 
Voluntary occupational pension plans
typically defined benefit plans sponsored 
by the employer.
Financing: mostly employer and partly 
employee contributions.
U
n
it
e
d
 K
in
gd
o
m State pension
Eligibility: aged 60(women)/65(men) or 
older, and 39(women)/44 (men) years of 
qualifying years of National Insurance 
contributions.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions and state subsidies.
Pension credit
Eligibility: aged 65 or older and whose 
income is below the standard
minimum guarantee amount.
Financing: taxation.
State second pension (S2P) that since 2002 
gradually replaces the state earnings-
related pension scheme (SERPS)
PAYG scheme.
Amount: based on the band of earnings 
each year between the 'lower earnings 
limit' and the 'upper earnings limit'. 
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
Contracting out to occupational plans
Note no type of occupational pension is 
mandatory, however if contracting out is 
chosen it requires a mandatory minimum 
contribution.
contracting out to an occupational pension 
plan instead of the contribution to 
S2P/SERPS (since Apr 2012 contracting out 
to defined contributions plans has been 
abolished).
Group personal pensions (GPPs)/Group 
stakeholder pension (GSHPs)    
defined contribution plans; employers 
negotiate special terms with a pension 
provider, and pay a regular contribution.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
Self administered plans (pension funds)
defined benefit of defined contribution 
plans mostly for self-employed 
individuals; investment managers have to 
be authorised.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
Contracting out to personal plans
requires that person provides through a 
personal saving plan instead of the 
contribution to S2P/SERPS (since Apr 2012 
contracting out to defined contributions 
plans has been abolished).
Personal pension plans/ Stakeholder 
pensions (SHPs)
defined contribution plans; provide by 
banks, life assurance companies, or 
building societies. 
U
n
it
e
d
 S
ta
te
s Supplemental social security (SSI)
Eligibility: aged 65 or older and income 
and asset-tested.
Financing: taxation.
Retirement benefits from old-age, 
survivors, and disability insurance 
(OASDI)
PAYG scheme.
Amount: calculated on a progressive 
formula based on the average of the 
insured's 35 highest years lifetime 
earnings.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions and state subsidies.
 401(k) plan / 403(b) plans / 457 plans / 
thrift savings plan / employer-sponsored 
IRAs / defined benefit plans
various pension funds covering specific 
occupational groups;
most of the occupational plans are 
defined contribution plans, but defined 
benefit is also common.
Financing: employer and employee 
contributions.
Individual retirement arrangements 
(IRAs)
defined contribution plans; provided by 
financial institutions.
C
o
u
n
tr
y Second pillar (occupational) Third pillar (personal)First pillar (public)
37 
 
III. Pensions and inequality: world-wide overview & research agenda 
III.1. Living arrangements, labour market participation, and income mix 
of the elderly around the world using the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) 
Database  
Living arrangements of older persons are part and parcel of the challenges that the ageing of populations 
are posing for Governments and families in the twenty-first century. Governmental policies need to 
include a combination of measures that promote self-reliance among older adults, provide services for 
those who are in need, and encourage continued involvement of family members in the care and well-
being of the older generations. (United Nations 2005: xvii) 
A study by the United Nations (2005) revealed that living arrangements of elderly persons 
aged 60 and over vary strongly around the world; in Europe and Northern America, elderly 
couple households were the most observed household type, whereas in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, Asia, and Africa elderly persons mostly were living in households with their 
children or grandchildren. The United Nations refer to variation in ‘cultural norms and 
values, and by economic and social conditions’ (United Nations 2005: 5) that help to explain 
these cross-national differences in living arrangements.  
The stronger independence of elderly households in the recent decades might be clearly 
linked to the establishment of welfare state systems, particularly through regular pension 
benefits. However, elderly women remained a major group at risk for various reasons: not 
only are they likely to outlive their partner and thus more likely to live alone, but they are 
also likely to accumulate less of their own pension entitlements, as they were less integrated 
in the labour market as compared to men in recent decades (Burtless 2008; Yamada and 
Casey 2002).  
This chapter will further investigate living arrangements, labour market participation, and 
inequalities in the income mix of the elderly around the world. Various statistics and 
indicators are evaluated in a cross-national comparative perspective to reflect inequalities 
across current societies. The main aim of this overview is to determine similarities and 
differences across countries to rationalise a specific country selection for in depth studies of 
pension systems and pension outcomes. This chapter is structured as follows. 
A first section will present the primary data of the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database 
that are used for the analyses and describe generic data preparation procedures that were 
applied to the data. The next section will analyse in how far the countries differ in terms of 
living standard of the elderly compared to society’s standard. Various figures will show the 
living arrangements of elderly persons, their poverty incidence, and the inequality of elderly 
households compared to total population. These household level measures address the 
following questions: Which countries show the highest income for the elderly? Are the 
elderly living alone, or are they also living with other household members that allow a 
sharing of the resources? Which income sources do elderly households have? Are these 
households poor? Is inequality among elderly households lower, or equal, or higher 
compared to total society’s inequality?  
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In a second step individual level measures are shown. This section on elderly persons also 
includes a section on cross-national differences in employment patterns by gender and age-
group. Are the elderly still working? And if they are not working, are there gender-specific 
differences? Another section raises questions which are more closely related to the structure 
of pension systems and its outcomes. Which type of pension income do the elderly receive? 
Are they receiving only old-age pensions or also disability and survivor pensions? From 
which provider do the elderly receive their pensions - the state, employers, or financial 
institutes? Thus these analyses of the income mix and recipient rates of the elderly will 
analyse variation in public, occupational and personal pension income across countries. 
Data and data preparation  
For the descriptive analyses of this chapter the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database 
was used. The database offers a broad range of countries that allow a worldwide comparison 
of countries that are at a varying stage of development, covering various geographic regions. 
For the analyses preferably the LIS Wave VIII (around 2010) datasets have been chosen, in 
order to have a unique reference point in time. In some cases the older points in time have 
been used to enrich the focus of the study. The analyses include primary data analyses for 34 
different countries from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database (see Table 1). 
For the following household level analyses an elderly household is defined as a household 
that contains at least one household member who is aged 65 or above. For individual level 
statistics all persons above age 65 were selected.  
Various generic data preparations were applied in order to provide better cross-national 
comparability of the figures. A specific treatment of negative values has been applied: The 
main income sources were bottom coded, and respectively the disposable income was 
increased by the negative income: By doing so no negative incomes were taken into account. 
From a cross-national perspective this allows better comparison of the distribution of 
positive incomes, which is a restriction by various datasets which do not capture losses from 
capital investments and/or self-employment activity. Thus the analyses capture the 
distribution of positive income. This procedure is also necessary to be able to calculate 
income shares of specific income sources in relation to total income. 
 
Table 1: Countries and datasets used from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database 
 
Nordic countries: Denmark (dk10), Finland (fi10), Iceland (is10), Norway (no10)
Middle European countries:  France (fr10), Germany (de10), Ireland (ie10), Luxembourg (lu10), 
  Netherlands (nl10), United Kingdom (uk10)
Eastern European countries:   Estonia (ee10), Hungary (hu09), Poland (pl10), Serbia (rs10), Slovak 
Republic (sk10), Slovenia (si10)
Mediterranean countries:        Greece (gr10), Italy (it10), Spain (es10)
Latin American countries:       Brazil (br10), Colombia (co10), Guatemala (gt06), Mexico (mx10), 
Peru (pe04), Uruguay (uy04)
Other countries: Australia (au10), Canada (ca10), Egypt (eg12), India (in04),Israel(il10), 
Japan (jp08), Russia (ru10), South Africa (za10), United States (us10)
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It is worth mentioning that this correction hardly affected the income distribution, in all 
countries under study it increased the mean income by less than 0.5 per cent, and 
implications for the sensitivity of the Gini were minimal (it only affected the third digit, at 
maximum by .002) 
Also disposable income values (LIS variable DHI) that were equal to zero income were 
excluded from the analyses; a standard approach also applied by LIS when calculating 
aggregate figures. This procedure typically excluded less than one per cent of the sample, 
slightly more for Russia 2010 and South Africa 2010. Therefore exclusion of zeros in DHI also 
hardly affected the results, as compared to keeping them in. 
In a last step, when age was not available for all household members, these households were 
deleted from the sample, as in these households it cannot be stated whether the household 
contained a person above 65 years or not. Also this generic preparation hardly had an effect 
on the country-specific samples, as age is commonly available for all household members 
with exception of Norway (43 households; 0.02 per cent), South Africa (12 households; 0.21 
per cent), and Japan (25 households; 0.74 per cent). Similarly, for the individual level 
analyses persons with missing age were excluded. 
Living arrangements and presence of other household members allow for a sharing of 
resources within the household. In this chapter the typically used approach of full sharing of 
income sources across all household members is assumed; the standard approach in 
inequality research (Jenkins and van Kerm 2009; Salverda et al. 2009). Thus each individual 
gets assigned a specific share of disposable household income, which is additionally 
equivalised. This means it is assumed that larger households can share resources better and 
need less resources compared to smaller households, they thus achieve economies of scale. In 
this chapter the common approach by LIS is applied, which divides the household income by 
the square root of number of household members. 
All amounts were expressed in ppp-adjusted values using the World Bank tables for 2010. 
Thus, some of the developed countries were excluded from the analyses as the income levels 
of the older datasets were not comparable to the newer ones. However, for the developing 
countries some older datasets were kept, as they ended up at a substantially lower level of 
income, anyway. Note the ranking of developing countries in Figure 1 should thus be 
interpreted with care.  
The results of the following figures are calculated on household level for the median 
incomes, the share of specific households, the income mix, whereas the inequality measures 
poverty and Gini coefficients are expressed at individual level. This means in the latter all 
household members are considered in the calculation, however taking the equivalised 
household income as the reference value.  
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Evaluation of household level indicators 
Figure 1 shows the median income level of equivalised ppp-adjusted disposable household 
income. Blue bars depict the amount for the total society, red bars show the amount for the 
65+ households. A major finding from this overview is that 65+ households were less well off 
in many countries. There were a few exceptions from this rule; Luxemburg, Brazil, Uruguay, 
and Egypt. In general, the differences between the living standards of the total population 
and the elderly population were smaller in developing countries than in developed 
countries. Particularly high differences could be observed in Denmark (22 per cent) and 
Australia (33 per cent). The highest ppp-adjusted median equivalised income existed in 
Luxembourg, followed by Norway, the United States, Canada, and the Netherlands. Among 
the group in the middle developed countries such as Germany, France, the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, and Ireland could be found. Slightly lower was the living standard of the elderly 
in the Mediterranean countries, followed by the Eastern European countries, of which 
Slovenian adjusted income already exceeded Spanish and Greek income. The living standard 
was far lower in Latin American countries; please note that the incomes in Uruguay, 
Guatemala, Peru, and India were comparatively low, as the values were calculated based on 
the LIS Wave VI (around 2004) data sets, whereas most of the other datasets were taken from 
the LIS Wave VIII (around 2010). The newer ppp-adjusted values particularly for Uruguay 
would most likely exceed the values of Brazil and Mexico. 
 
  
Figure 1: Median income of total population and 65+ households 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. 
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Figure 2 depicts two analyses. First, 65+ households were divided in three groups: single 
person households, two person households, and 3+ person households; bars show the 
percentages reflected by each group. The figure is sorted by the highest share of 3+ person 
households; the higher this share, the further on the right a country is placed.  
On the left-hand side is Germany (2.8 per cent) that had the lowest share, on the right-hand 
side is India that had the highest share (86 per cent). Besides Germany, it was also quite 
uncommon for elderly persons in the Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom, and the 
Nordic countries to live with other household members than their spouse/partner. 
A next set of countries ranged between 14 and 30 per cent of 3+ person households; this set of 
countries included mostly less rich countries of the developed world, among which were the 
Eastern European countries and the Mediterranean countries, but also Canada and the 
United States. In North America approximately one sixth of the households of the 65+ 
households were classified as 3+ person households. 
Considerably higher was the share of 3+ person households on the right-hand side of    
Figure 2. But also in this country group the order could be linked to the level of ppp-adjusted 
income. The lower the median income, the higher the share of 3+ person households among 
the 65+ households, with the high-income countries Russia and Uruguay on the left, the 
middle-income countries in the middle, and the low-income countries on the right (cf. Figure 
1 and 2). Quite unique was the pattern in Japan; the country had a rather high ppp-adjusted 
income, but also a rather high share of elderly persons living in households with more than 
two persons. 
 
Figure 2: Living arrangements of 65+ households and poverty rates by household size 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. 
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In the same figure poverty rates (defined as headcount ratio, i. e. the share of the elderly 
population living in households with income below 50 per cent of median income) are also 
plotted; each square shows the poverty rate for single, two, and 3+ person households 
separately. In general living in larger households tended to substantially lower the poverty 
rate. In some countries this finding was less pronounced (Brazil, Russia, Spain), whereas in 
others it showed even the opposite effect; poverty rates in 3+ person households were 
slightly higher in South Africa and Uruguay. 
Differences between single person and two person households can again be mostly clustered 
in two groups, developed and developing countries. Most developed countries showed 
substantially lower poverty rates for two person households as compared to single person 
households, with exceptions of Israel and Australia that showed with 20 per cent still rather 
high levels. In contrast to this, several middle and low-income countries (India, South Africa, 
Guatemala, Peru, and Mexico) also revealed considerable poverty for two person 
households.  
The next analyses focus on the income mix received by elderly households. Figures 
3.1/3.2/3.3 show again single, two, and 3+ person households separately. It keeps the same 
information that has been shown in Figure 2. The shares of one, two, and 3+ person 
households in a specific country are shown below the respective country. The squares within 
the figures reflect the poverty rates. For example in Guatemala almost 50 per cent of single 
person households were poor; however living in single person households was a rather rare 
situation, only 12 per cent of the 65+ households were living in single person households.  
The income mix is split in five major sources:2 labour income from dependent employment, 
labour income from self-employment, social security income, capital income, and private & 
other income (including also income nowhere else classified). The countries are sorted by the 
percentage of income from social security income, with the highest percentage on the right 
hand side.   
                                                          
2 The distinction by this five major income sources is taken from the main set of current incomes in the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database: labour income from dependent employment (HILE) 
includes basic wages as well as all supplements and the value of non-monetary fringe benefits; 
labour income from self-employment (HILS, in this chapter bottom coded at 0) includes all 
profits/losses minus expenses from any self-employment activity, as well as the value of goods and 
services produced for own consumption. Capital income (HIC, in this chapter bottom coded at 0) 
includes interests and dividends, rental income, royalties, and also individual pension plans. Social 
security income includes all monetary transfers received through an institutional arrangement 
between the recipient and the government and/or the employer and the value of respective non-
monetary goods and services. Thus occupational pensions are included here. Private & other income 
includes all incomes of a private nature that do not involve any institutional arrangement between 
the individual and the government or the employer and the value of respective non-monetary goods 
and services. Such transfers are for example received from non-profit institutions and inter-
household transfers (remittances and alimony). To the category private & other income also some 
remainders were added that in the LIS data were directly allocated to the LIS variables HI,HIL,HIT.  
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Notes: numbers below the country abbreviation refer to the percentage of single, two person, 3+ person 
households in the respective 65+ household sample as shown in Figure 2; income sources were reported net of 
social security contributions and income taxes in eg12, hu09, in04, mx10, ru10, rs10, si10, uy04, net of 
contributions and gross of income taxes in fr10, and gross of social security contributions and income taxes in 
all other datasets. 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. 
  Figure 3.1: Income sources and poverty rate (single households 65+)
  Figure 3.2: Income sources and poverty rate (two person households 65+)
  Figure 3.3: Income sources and poverty rate (3+person households 65+)
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Among single person households of the 65+ households (Figure 3.1) the highest percentage 
of social security income existed in the Eastern European countries, where other income 
sources besides social security income were negligible (less than five per cent). An exception 
from the Eastern European countries was Estonia, where labour income accounted for 10 per 
cent of the income mix, which can be explained by a comparatively high share of postponed 
retirement in the Eastern European country group (see Appendix 1).  
All other European countries showed a slightly lower percentage. Mostly the higher share of 
capital income distinguishes them from the Eastern European countries. Also South Africa, 
Brazil, and Uruguay had a similar income mix. A bit further left on the chart ended up a 
group of countries that had yet a higher share of capital income: the United States, Canada, 
Australia, but also Israel and Egypt. Note in Canada and Australia the share of capital 
income is underestimated, as in the original data individual and occupational pensions were 
not separable, and hence in the LIS data both sources were included in occupational pension 
income among social security income. 
Besides Estonia, also Japan, Iceland, the United States, and Mexico moved further left on the 
chart due to their comparatively high relevance of labour income from dependent 
employment. Similarly, Serbia, Israel, Peru, and Colombia moved to the left due to their 
comparatively high share of labour income from self-employment. In India and Guatemala 
both types of labour income strongly contributed to the income mix.  
The position of each country in Figure 3.2 and the income mix did not substantially change 
among two person households compared to the single person households. The major 
observed difference can be seen in greater importance of labour income from dependent 
employment, which may indicate that one partner of the couple was still working. In 
Estonia, Iceland, and the United States, the share of income from dependent employment 
was the highest. Denmark, Estonia, Brazil, and South Africa moved further to the left as 
compared to the results in Figure 3.1 due to a higher relevance of self-employment income 
and/or dependent employment income. In contrast to this, the share of social security income 
became relatively more important in particularly in Uruguay.  
The situation for 3+ person households is less clear (Figure 3.3), showing a rather 
heterogeneous picture in cross-national perspective. The income mix of these households 
was even more influenced by the relevance of labour income in these households. In 3+ 
person households, in many of the countries the income received by pensioners only 
contributed to the total income. Labour income was the main income source in many 
countries. However, this overview reveals that in the broad majority of countries still a quite 
substantial part of the income mix came from social security benefits. For half of the 
countries the share was larger than 40 per cent. Only in six countries, Japan, Egypt, Peru, 
Mexico, India, and Guatemala, the share of social security income was below 30 per cent. 
In 3+ person households, the Eastern European countries could no longer be distinguished 
from the rest of the world. As discussed earlier in several of the countries the elderly were 
living typically alone or with their partner only; thus in these countries the 3+ person 
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household group is rather rare and reflect very particular family structures. The 
measurement of social security income is quite broad for this group as it not only includes 
pensions, but also unemployment benefits, family related benefits, and any other social 
assistance benefits.  
It is evident from this balanced income mix from work income and social security benefits 
that inequality of the income distribution was much less influenced by the structure of the 
pension system as compared to single and two person households. The higher the share of 3+ 
person households is in the country, the higher is the complementary influence of labour 
income and other income sources besides pensions for the income distribution of the elderly. 
Consequently, it is much more problematic to link the structure of the pension system to 
income inequality in the developing countries than in the developed countries, where most 
of the elderly live independently. 
In terms of poverty evaluation one can conclude the following (cf. Figures 3.1/3.2/3.3): For 
one and two person households a high relevance of social security income protected these 
households rather well against poverty, whereas countries with lower shares of social 
security benefits showed comparatively high poverty rates above 35 per cent in single person 
households and above 25 per cent in two person households. Also the high relevance of self-
employment income and private income sources did not effectively reduce the risk of 
poverty. This might indicate that these countries were lacking a comprehensive social 
security system.  
Quite interesting are also the findings for the relevance of capital income in the income mix. 
In many of the countries with a higher share of capital income this was not connected with a 
lower poverty rate. On the contrary, these countries showed even comparatively higher 
poverty rates. This shows a rather insufficient protection by the social security system. 
However, capital income, which includes also individual pensions, favoured only the non-
poor part of the population and at the same time may have increased inequalities. In general, 
at least for the OECD countries, work income and capital income were mostly linked to a 
higher rank in the income distribution, whereas the low income quintile was mostly 
dependent on the generosity of the public social security system (OECD 2013a). 
Figure 4 focuses on the comparison of Gini coefficients for total population against Gini 
coefficients for 65+ households. Gini coefficients were calculated on the individual level 
taking equivalised household income as a reference. The diagonal reflects the situation 
where inequality of total population is equal to inequality of 65+ households. Countries 
above the diagonal show a higher inequality among the elderly, whereas countries below 
show a lower inequality. In order to provide a better overview, the selected countries have 
been grouped in lower middle-income economies, upper middle-income economies, and 
high-income economies, following the World Bank (2015) grouping that calculates level of 
GNI per capita for 2015.  
46 
 
 
Figure 4: Gini coefficients of total population and 65+ households    Figure 5: Gini coefficients and poverty rates of 65+ households   
 Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database.    Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database 
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First of all income inequality for both groups remained at a rather similar level, reflecting the 
idea that market income inequalities were also transferred to the retirement phase. Countries 
with low inequality might show low income inequality for the elderly as well, as the 
retirement income might replace a certain percentage of the previous labour income. 
However, this cannot be shown clearly by this graph, as ideally the inequalities of the 
current elderly population would need to be compared against the inequality during their 
working career, and not against the market income inequalities of the current society. Still 
the current inequality is considered a good approximation of these inequalities before.  
In most of the countries inequality for elderly households was slightly lower than inequality 
for total population. This was particularly true for European countries, with exception of 
Slovenia. Within European countries the strongest differences existed in the Eastern 
European countries, where considerably lower market income inequality during the 
communist period might explain the magnitude of these differences. 
The most unequal countries in the developed world were the United States and Israel. Both 
countries had shown in Figures 3.1/3.2/3.3 substantially lower shares of social security 
income complemented by a comparatively high share of labour and capital income which 
also resulted in rather high poverty rates.  
Among countries with high inequality two country groups could be identified. One group of 
developing countries where inequality of the elderly households was even higher: 
Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, Egypt, and India. This group had in common that social 
security income played a minor role in the income mix. In another group of countries, Brazil, 
Uruguay, and South Africa, social security income was far more important in the income 
mix. This seems to be linked to a lower inequality among elderly households. Particularly 
single person households were much better secured against poverty in these countries as 
compared to the other group of developing countries, where social security income was less 
relevant (cf. also Figures 3.1/3.2/3.3).  
From the previous analyses one would expect a clear link between level of income inequality 
and magnitude of poverty. This bivariate relation is plotted in Figure 5. For European 
countries this relation by and large seemed to exist, it can less clearly be observed in 
countries with higher levels of inequality. Outliers in this graph on the one hand seem to be 
Brazil and Egypt where poverty was rather low given their high level of inequality. On the 
other hand also Australia showed a relatively high poverty incidence for the moderate level 
of inequality.  
Evaluation of person level indicators 
Up to now inequalities have been mostly evaluated at the household level. As could be 
shown, particularly in the 3+ person elderly households a substantial share from other 
household member’s income could be observed. It has been assumed that financial resources 
were pooled within the household and then equally redistributed among the household 
members. Thus household level statistics cannot sufficiently depict elderly’s individual 
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income mix. Therefore, the following analyses will further evaluate measures at the 
individual level, such as employment participation, pension income by function (old age, 
disability, survivors) and type (public work-related pensions, public targeted/basic pensions, 
occupational, personal pensions). 
Table 1 in the Annex depicts employment rates of specific age groups 60 to 64, 65 to 69, and 
70 to 74 split by gender. The columns on the right hand side show the gap of women’s 
employment rate in comparison to men’s; expressed in per cent. Table 2 in the Annex shows 
for the same breakdown the importance of pensions in the personal income mix.3 Thus, one 
would expect a high percentage of pension income in those countries, where the share of 
employed persons is low and vice versa. Figure 6 plots the employment rates and income 
shares by the three age groups and gender. The more on the right-hand side a country point 
is in each figure the more this specific male/ female age-group relied on pension income. The 
closer a country point to the y-axis is the lower was the share of employed persons. 
For age group 60 to 64 clear gender differences could be observed. Employment rates for 
women were particularly lower in the Eastern-European countries, with exception of Estonia 
and Hungary, where employment rates were similarly high (Estonia) respectively similarly 
low (Hungary). The highest differences (around 70 per cent lower employment rate for 
women) were observed in Serbia, Slovak Republic and Slovenia; in all three countries 
employment rates were rather low with rates below 10 per cent or slightly above. A similar 
structure showed also South Africa, and at a somewhat higher level of employment also 
Egypt. 
Women in the Latin American countries showed higher employment rates (26 per cent in 
Brazil up to 61 per cent in Peru). Again in this country group gender differences were 
strongly pronounced, women’s employment was around 50 per cent lower, with exception 
of Peru. The Mediterranean countries showed similarly high gender differences, but with a 
slightly lower level of employment. 
In the remaining set of countries there were countries with high employment (Japan, Iceland, 
Norway, and India), moderate employment (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Ireland, the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Canada, Russia, and 
Israel), and low employment (France and Luxembourg).   
                                                          
3 For data comparability reasons not all personal level incomes that were available have been taken 
into account at the individual level. Only labour income (dependent and self-employment income) 
and pensions were treated as personal incomes. Thus the income mix shows a partial picture that at 
the same time deliberately has been restricted to these three income sources. It is argued that other 
social security income, capital income (except pensions) and private income sources were 
redistributed to all household members. Since not in all countries all self-employment incomes were 
available at the individual level, the self-employment income has been reallocated to the individual 
level. 
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Figure6: Employment rates and income share of pension income by gender and age group 
 
Note: the income sources were reported net of social security contributions and income taxes in eg12, hu09, 
in04, mx10, ru10, rs10, si10, uy04, net of contributions and gross of income taxes in fr10, and gross of social 
security contributions and income taxes in all other datasets. 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. 
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As shown in Figure 6, the lower employment activity was linked to a higher relevance of 
pension income for the respective age group. This is true for men and women. By moving 
from the age-group 60 - 64 to 65 - 69 and similarly also from 65 - 69 to 70 - 74, all countries 
move down and to the bottom right in the graphs for women and men. This signals that 
persons were less employed with increasing age and vice versa pensions became more 
important as an income source. 
Although employment rates of women were already at a lower level, employment activity 
dropped for the average of the 34 countries stronger for women than for men (55 per cent for 
women and 48 per cent for men (from 60 - 64 to 65 - 69); 54 per cent for women and 51 per 
cent for men (from 65 - 69 to 70 - 74)). At the same time, the share of pension income 
increased more for men than for women (104 per cent for men and 70 per cent for women 
(from 60 - 64 to 65 - 69); 29 per cent for men and 21 per cent for women (from 65 - 69 to 70 - 
74)).4 This signifies that men were exposed to a more structured transition from work to 
retirement, which can most likely be linked to statutory retirement age.  
The magnitude of this transition differs across the countries; most advanced societies 
showed a rather clear age-related transition for both men and women, whereas the Latin 
American countries revealed a less clear transition; employment rates remained relatively 
high in this comparison. To some extent a less clear transition existed also in the United 
States and Iceland for both sexes, but also for Japanese women. In Iceland this situation can 
be linked to a substantially higher employment rate for age group 65 to 69. In the United 
States and Japan, employment income remained a relevant income source also for age group 
70 to 74. Especially in this age group, differences could be observed between Latin American 
and all other countries. Additionally, differences within the Latin American group became 
more apparent.  
The next sections will more closely focus on the structure of old-age security systems. For a 
descriptive overview of the pension systems see Chapter II.2. In the following the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database is evaluated comparatively based on its 
availability of information on pension income, and different types of pension income. First, it 
will be shown which function (old age, disability, survivor) pensions fulfil among the 65+ 
persons. Then similarly, the type of pension income (targeted/basic, work-related, 
occupational, personal) will be analysed.  
Table 2 reports for each country’s elderly sample the respective income share received by the 
65+ population as a percentage of total social security income by the 65+ population. Thus 
the reported percentages add up to 100 per cent. The income sources are distinguished in the 
various functions they cover: old age, disability, survivors, and other social security. Note 
not all income sources are received at the individual level in all countries, for consistency of 
the presented figures, family benefits and social assistance transfers were not considered at 
                                                          
4 From the average excluded is India that showed due to the marginal share of the income groups an 
increase of more than 1000 per cent. Also excluded are Egypt and Israel for which no data on 
pensions were available on the individual level. 
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the individual level, even when available in various countries. In all countries under study 
from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, pensions were entirely reported at the 
individual level. 
By far the main function covered by social security was old age. In all countries pensions for 
old age exceeded a percentage of more than 80 per cent of total social security transfers; in 7 
out of the 19 countries the share was even larger than 90 per cent. Less important were 
disability pension transfers, which can be explained by the fact that eligibility frequently 
expires as soon individuals become eligible for old-age pensions; only the United Kingdom 
(5.6 per cent) and Russia (14.7 per cent) had a share higher than five per cent. A series of 
countries allocated also reasonable share of benefits to survivors (Germany, Greece, 
Luxembourg, Poland, Slovak Republic, Spain). All these six countries have an old-age 
pension system in common that is strongly based on a public work-related component. 
Table 3 evaluates for the 65+ population the type of pension income received, distinguished 
in targeted/basic, work-related, occupational, personal, and other pension income. For each 
component the income share as a percentage of the total pension income was calculated. 
Unfortunately, in various countries no distinction in occupational and personal pensions can 
be made; in these cases the income share is reported in the column private pensions. Figure 7 
Table 2: Structure of pension income mix by function 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. 
country dataset
old-age transfers / 
social security 
benefits in %
disability transfers / 
social security 
benefits in %
survivor transfers / 
social security 
benefits in %
other social security 
transfers / social 
security benefits in %
Nordic countries
Denmark dk10 95.3 0.2 -- 4.5
Finland fi10 89.4 0.9 6.9 2.8
Iceland is10 97 1.6 0.8 0.5
Norway no10 94.6 3.8 0.2 1.5
Middle European countries
Germany de10 -- -- 12.2 --
Ireland ie10 86.7 0.7 9.7 2.9
Luxembourg lu10 81.2 1 16.6 1.2
Netherlands nl10 99.9 0 0 0.1
United Kingdom uk10 91.7 5.6 0.2 2.5
Eastern European countries
Estonia ee10 98.4 1.3 0.2 0.1
Hungary hu09 88.2 0.9 1.4 9.6
Poland pl10 87.5 1.8 10.4 0.3
Slovak Republic sk10 88.6 0.4 10.9 0.1
Mediterranean countries
Greece gr10 83.1 0.4 13.6 2.9
Italy it10 81.7 0 15 3.4
Spain es10 81.4 1.9 16.4 0.3
Other countries
Australia au10 93.1 0.9 4.5 1.5
Russia ru10 82.3 14.7 0.6 2.4
United States us10 88 3.9 5 3.1
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reports the three columns targeted/basic, work-related, and private pensions in a trilinear-
diagram; unfortunately without the Japanese and Norwegian data, for which the two types 
of public pensions could not be distinguished. The data point in the upper corner (pl10) does 
represent not only Poland, but also the whole Eastern-European country cluster and the 
Luxembourgish situation.  
The analyses by pension income type reveal a large cross-national variation. By and large the 
main income source was public pension income. It was still almost the only source in Russia 
and the Eastern-European country group. Public pensions accounted for almost 99 per cent 
of the total pension income also in Luxembourg. Also the Brazilian complementary private 
pensions hardly characterised the pension income (2.5 per cent). In this overview the hybrid 
work-related pensions in Finland are classified as first-pillar pensions; they were also by far 
the main income source.  
Table 3: Structure of pension income mix by type 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. 
country dataset
work-related occupational personal
Nordic countries
Denmark dk10 67.7 91.3 8.7 32.3 . . 0
Finland fi10 96.2 10.7 89.3 2.0 . . 1.8
Middle European countries
Germany de10 86.3 0.8 99.2 8.5 83.5 16.5 5.5
Ireland ie10 66.1 19.8 80.2 33.9 93.8 6.2 0
Luxembourg lu10 98.9 1.6 98.4 0.9 66.7 33.3 0.2
Netherlands nl10 52.1 100 0.0 47.9 99.8 0.2 0
Norway no10 75.9 . . 24.0 . . 0
United Kingdom uk10 55.9 6.1 93.9 44.2 86.9 13.1 0
Eastern European countries
Hungary hu09 100 0.3 99.7 0.0 . . 0
Poland pl10 99.7 0.0 100 0.0 . . 0.2
Serbia rs10 100 0.0 100 0.0 . . 0
Slovak Republic sk10 99.9 0.0 100 0.1 . . 0
Mediterranean countries
Greece gr10 92.2 24.4 75.6 5.8 . . 1.9
Italy it10 97 3.4 96.6 2.7 88.9 11.1 0.3
Spain es10 91.8 2.3 97.7 8.2 85.4 14.6 0
Latin American countries
Brazil br11 97.5 3.0 97.0 2.6 . . 0
Other countries
Australia au10 67.6 100 0.0 24.4 . . 8
Canada ca10 55.6 54.7 45.3 44.3 . . 0
India in04 4.3 100 0.0 95.7 100 0.0 0
Japan jp08 88.2 . . 11.8 100 . 0
Russia ru10 100 6.5 93.5 0.0 . . 0
South Africa za10 42.6 100 0.0 57.4 100 0.0 0
United States us10 78.7 3.3 96.7 20.3 90.1 9.9 1
* the column other pensions includes pension income for which its nature is unknown; for example foreign pensions and unspecified other 
other     
pensions*       public pensions (1st pillar)            private pensions (2nd+3rd pillar)
of which of which
targeted/basic
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In the Mediterranean countries the share of private pensions was slightly higher (Italy: 2.7 
per cent, Greece: 5.8 per cent, Spain: 8.2 per cent). The Italian and Spanish figures show that 
financial outcomes among current pensioners were mostly driven by the development of 
occupational pensions (more than 85 per cent of the private pensions). 
Slightly lower was the importance of public pensions in Japan (88.8 per cent), Germany (86.3 
per cent), and the United States (78.7 per cent). Again, it is mostly occupational pension 
schemes that explain the more diverse public-private mix. All above mentioned countries 
ended up in the upper part of the diagram, reflecting the major importance of the public 
(first) pillar. Countries that were more on the right-hand side contained a larger share of 
targeted/basic pension schemes. For example in Finland 10.7 per cent of the public pensions 
were received by targeted schemes; for Greece 24.4 per cent came from basic schemes mostly 
covering farmers. In all of these countries the work-related component accounted for more 
than 70 per cent of the elderly’s pension income. 
A little bit lower, approximately 55 per cent was the share of work-related pensions in 
Ireland and the United Kingdom. In Ireland the other half of the income mix was received by 
targeted schemes and occupational schemes, in the United Kingdom mostly by a higher 
share of occupational schemes, but partly also by personal schemes. The most diverse public- 
private mix in this overview existed in Canada; approximately 45 per cent were received 
from occupational pensions, 30 per cent from targeted/basic schemes, and 25 per cent from 
public work-related schemes. 
The countries on the bottom of the graph have in common that public work-related pensions 
were either non-existent, or in the case of Denmark negligible in the income mix due to low 
Figure 7: Structure of pension income mix by type 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database (Table 3). 
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contributions to this scheme (Andersen 2011). Again, the further on the right-hand side a 
country ended up in the diagram, the more important was the targeted/basic income 
component. In Denmark and Australia targeted/basic income was the major pension income 
source. In the Netherlands such transfers were as relevant as occupational pensions, and in 
South Africa they were slightly less relevant than occupational/personal pensions. In India 
the split of public and private pensions was reversed; occupational pensions were the major 
pension income source. 
It is worth mentioning that targeted/basic pension income is particularly relevant for the 
low-income group. Therefore analyses by income quintile/decile would generate quite 
different clustering of countries (which is not shown in this here). Also since amounts 
received from targeted/basic protection schemes are relatively small as compared to total 
pension income, evaluation of income shares seemingly diminishes the high relevance of 
these incomes for poverty prevention. Therefore it is beneficial to also study recipient rates of 
the various different income sources to understand if certain schemes are covering the 
majority of the population or only a small fraction.  
Figure 8 evaluates recipient rates of different types of pension income, again distinguished in 
transfers from targeted/basic, work-related, occupational, and personal schemes. The 
country-specific graphs reflect cross-national differences with regard to gradual age-related 
transition to retirement; for each age from 60 to 80 recipient rates were calculated. The lines 
are plotted separately by gender; as shown before there existed strong cross-national 
differences in labour market participation, thus recipient rates are expected to considerably 
differ by sex. In those countries, where occupational and personal pensions were not 
available in the LIS data, a line ‘private pensions’ is included that contains both types. 
Various countries reveal a clear age-related transition to retirement respectively show a 
specific age, when individuals become recipients of targeted/basic schemes. In Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, and the Netherlands this eligibility age has been 65, whereas in South 
Africa it was 60 and hence note visible in this graph.  
Nearly universal coverage of basic/targeted schemes existed in Canada, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands, followed by high recipient rates also in Australia (ca.70 per cent for men and 
ca. 80 per cent for women) and South Africa (ca.60 per cent for men and ca. 70 per cent for 
women). In Finland recipient rates at retirement age were much lower (ca. 30per cent). Yet 
again lower was coverage in Greece (ca. 15 per cent).  
In Australia, Finland, and South Africa one higher recipient rates for the oldest age groups 
were observed, reflecting the nature of an income tested pension. As older age-cohorts were 
not as well secured through work-related schemes as younger ones, they become more easily 
eligible for income-tested pensions. But also the share of single women households gets 
larger in older age groups, who can be expected to be the main group of recipients of 
income-tested pensions (Behrendt and Woodall 2015; Zaidi 2007). 
In general, throughout the entire selection of countries and age groups, women showed in 
fact higher recipient rates in targeted/basic protection schemes. As women tend to have 
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Figure 8: Recipient rates of pension income types by gender and age 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. 
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Figure 8 (continued): Recipient rates of pension income types by gender and age 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. 
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lower benefits from the work-related schemes, targeted schemes become more easily 
accessible for women. These gender-specific differences were most pronounced in Finland, 
Greece, Ireland, South Africa, and Australia. They might also exist for the targeted pension 
schemes in Denmark and Canada; however this could not be observed due to already higher 
coverage through basic schemes in the mixed targeted/basic pensions category. 
For the public work-related schemes only two countries showed a rather fixed age-related 
transition to retirement respectively a clear age for receiving work-related pensions, Ireland 
and the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom early retirement is not possible before the 
statutory retirement age (60 for women and 65 for men). In Ireland early retirement seems 
not to be considered an attractive option, as only a small percentage of the elderly received 
pensions before the age of 65. Also Canadian and Danish retirees seem to link their 
retirement decision more structurally to their eligibility to basic pensions; like the basic 
pension also the work-related pension jumped to nearly universal coverage at the age of 65. 
In the other countries there existed not such a clear transition to receiving work-related 
pensions, reflecting a much more flexible retirement decision. 
Notable are also extensive gender-specific differences in recipient rates of work-related 
pensions. Particularly in the Mediterranean countries recipient rates were substantially lower 
for women. In Spain the differences were most pronounced (above 90 per cent for men and 
ca. 50 per cent for women), followed by Greece (ca. 75 per cent for men and ca. 40 per cent 
for women) and Italy (ca. 95 per cent for men and ca. 70 per cent for women). This can be 
linked to low labour market attachment of women in the past, and their low contribution 
period, which partly excluded women entirely from eligibility to work-related pensions. In 
contrast to this pattern, Brazilian figures revealed much less gender-specific outcomes with 
regard to recipient patterns; currently retired women needed to accumulate only five years 
of contribution payments in order to become eligible to the work-related pension. 
In contrast to public pensions, private pensions showed much lower recipient rates in most 
countries. Coverage of 50 per cent and above existed only for men and women in the 
Netherlands and Canada, and for men in the United Kingdom and Denmark. Recipient rates 
between 30 and 50 per cent were observed for men in Ireland, Greece, and South Africa, and 
for women in the United Kingdom and Denmark. In Australia, Germany, the United States, 
and India pensions only selectively covered the population (recipient rates around 20 per 
cent). Gender-specific patterns could be identified particularly in those countries, where 
inclusion to occupational schemes remained entirely a voluntary decision: Ireland, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. The Netherlands reflects a quite particular situation 
of unequal gender-specific outcomes. This situation was created by two circumstances (cf. 
Anderson 2011). First, until the 1980s, married women and part-time workers have been 
excluded from occupational pension contributions. Second occupational benefits are fully 
substituted by the basic pension component, if contribution payments were not resulting in 
occupational pensions above the minimum pension.   
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Conclusion 
This worldwide perspective on living arrangements, labour market participation, and 
inequalities in the income mix of the elderly revealed remarkable differences around the 
world. The short study showed that the major factors (pension systems, labour market 
attachment and living arrangements) which might explain cross-national differences in the 
elderly’s financial resources were of varying importance in specific country clusters.  
In Latin American countries, but also in other developing countries, particularly living arran-
gements differed as compared to European and Anglo-Saxon countries. In less developed 
countries the elderly were frequently not living independently, but living with other family 
members. Consequently, in multi-generational households elderly’s income mix not only 
contained pension transfers; income was substantially complemented by labour income, 
other social security transfers, and private transfers by other household members. Thus, 
inequality in Latin American countries and other developing countries was much less 
influenced by the pension system as compared to the European countries, where the elderly 
were mostly living independently. Also in North America, Japan, and the Mediterranean 
countries multi-generational households could be more frequently observed; consequently, 
the share of pension income in the income mix was also lower as compared to the European 
countries.  
More generalised, the higher the share of non-elderly persons in 65 + households, the more 
relevant might be other sources of income, particularly labour income, in explaining financial 
inequality between elderly households. However, this argument is problematic, as it rests on 
the assumption that elderly persons benefit from intra-household redistribution of pooled 
income resources. This also signifies limitations in measurement of poverty risk and 
inequality among elderly persons living in multigenerational households, and among the 
elderly population in general.  
It is worth mentioning that the comparison of developed and developing countries differs 
also with regard to two other aspects which strongly impact on inequalities: First, the income 
poor in developing countries rely in general more on non-monetary transfers and 
consumption of self-produced goods; this has by and large been accounted for with the LIS 
data, as most surveys specifically include non-monetary transfers as well. Second, many 
developing countries have large informal sectors, which means that many workers are 
excluded from mandatory pension system contributions (World Bank 1994). Thus, in old age 
they may become eligible to basic pensions, however with low contribution periods to 
contributory systems; this pension package may not be enough to lift them out of poverty.        
However, it was revealed that in countries, where the importance of social security income 
was comparatively high, this essentially limited observed inequality among elderly 
households. Elderly households in Brazil and Uruguay were better off as compared to total 
society, which resulted also in comparatively low poverty incidence and decreased income 
inequality for elderly persons in these countries. More developed social security systems 
may have also influenced comparatively high shares of independently living (single and 
couple) elderly households as compared to other Latin American countries. 
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Also labour market participation of the elderly differed in cross-national perspective. 
Particularly in European countries, the majority of elderly persons were already retired 
before reaching the age of 65, which again created a stronger relevance of pension system 
characteristics primarily explaining inequality between elderly households. In contrast to 
this, prolonged employment after statutory retirement age was particularly common in Latin 
American countries, India, Japan, and the United States. Again, those countries showed 
lower importance of pension income in their income mix. 
The observed gender-specific differences in recipient rates of various types of pension 
income point to different insurance profiles during the labour market career. Low labour 
market attachment restricted particularly in the Mediterranean countries eligibility to public 
work-related pension schemes. In general, throughout all countries, particularly private 
second-tier pensions showed a strong gender divide. Pronounced gender-specific 
inequalities were found for the purely voluntary occupational schemes in the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and Ireland that mostly benefitted men. Additionally, occupational 
and personal pensions can due to their close link between contributions and later benefits be 
expected to foster labour market inequalities, as these schemes may particularly favour 
middle-to-high income earners.  
In general, the transition to retirement was more flexible with the existence of a pension 
system that mostly focused on work-related contributory or and/or occupational schemes. In 
contrast the existence of basic pensions created a retirement pattern that was closely linked 
to the eligibility age to the basic pension; this could be observed in Canada and Denmark. 
Summing up, this study revealed that comparative analyses of inequalities of income of 
elderly households need to capture various dimensions that altogether explain the outcomes. 
Income inequalities among the elderly were shaped by a mixture of past labour market 
attachment, current labour market inequalities and pension system characteristics. Labour 
market inequalities might work in two ways; first through prolonged working careers 
beyond statutory retirement age, and second, through other household member’s work 
income from which elderly persons might profit in multi-generation households. Past labour 
market attachment influenced the contribution period to public and private pensions, and 
therefore structured primarily work-related pension income of the income mix. Contributory 
pension systems might be considered the main source explaining inequalities in most 
advanced societies such as Western Europe, and the United States. Additionally, targeted 
and basic pensions might offer specific risk protection or complementary non-work-related 
financial resources; such incomes reached comparatively high relevance for example in 
Canada, Denmark, and the Netherlands.  
III.2. Research questions 
The previous Chapters I, II, and III.1 introduced the fundamentals for the study of pension 
systems and income packaging by elderly households. In a cross-national perspective there is 
broad variation in terms of pension system regulation and coverage through various 
established public and private schemes (see literature review in Chapter II and data 
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evaluations in Chapter III.1). In most countries, various providers were involved in 
regulating individual pension schemes that cover groups of the active and/or non-active 
population, leading to quite diverse saving profiles within and between countries. Although 
the comprehensive framework also stressed the importance of labour market attachment and 
living arrangements for explaining cross-national differences in old-age income, this study 
will particularly concentrate on pension system characteristics. As will be further explained 
in the research agenda (Chapter III.3), the comparative studies are restricted to advanced 
European societies. The main institutional differences in pension system arrangements can 
be summarised as follows.  
Public pension policies should protect individuals against permanent loss of work income 
and prevent poverty. Accordingly, there are two main types of public social security 
programmes: poverty prevention and income maintenance programmes (European Commission 
2003; OECD 2005; Myles 1989; World Bank 1994). 
Poverty prevention might typically be achieved with a first-tier Beveridge type system that 
provides minimum pension benefits to either a targeted group or to the whole population. 
Public basic pensions and/or targeted pensions, as well as minimum pensions embedded in 
earnings-related Bismarckian pension system could set up a minimum living standard. The 
public minimum pension approach substantially unlinks financial security of the elderly 
strongly from previous labour market attachment. At the same time, at least for the low-
income group, it shifts regulatory power to current regulation rather than regulation in the 
past. 
Income maintenance is expected to be achieved through a first and second-tier Bismarckian 
social insurance system. In contrast to minimum pension legislation, in public contribution-
based schemes the final pension income is usually strongly tied to accumulated contributions 
during the working phase. Generosity of pension income strongly depends on the stability of 
previous work income, insurance coverage and contribution payments. Thus a strong labour 
market attachment, combined with no or only short periods of inactivity during the working 
phase, typically increase pension claims.  
As long as a Bismarckian system does not contain contribution and/or income ceilings, all 
workers are secured by the social insurance system. If such ceilings existed a crowding in of 
selective additional private schemes for high-income earners could be observed (Ebbinghaus 
and Gronwald 2011). Bismarckian social insurance systems for the dependent employed 
were in many countries either extended to the self-employed or separate counterparts for the 
self-employed were introduced. 
The more a state focuses on a public pension system that provides only minimum pensions, 
the more this system concentrates to redistribute only to the income poor (Zaidi et al. 2006). 
As mentioned by Korpi and Palme (1998) this public approach might favour a paradox of 
redistribution, as it might result in even less unequal pension outcomes.  
The public emphasis on basic/targeted schemes created a crowding in of well-established 
comprehensive occupational schemes in many European countries, which led to a balanced 
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public-private mix of pension income. On the contrary, the existence of well-established 
Bismarckian social insurance hampered the development of private pension counterparts 
(Ebbinghaus and Gronwald 2011; Ebbinghaus and Neugschwender 2011, Hinrichs 2009). 
Various complementary second and third-tier schemes by employers and/or financial 
institutes typically supplement pension income received by the state. Depending on the 
country-specific institutions, private pension schemes function either as second and/or third 
tier of pension income. Like the earnings-related public scheme, these non-public/private 
(occupational and personal) pension schemes similarly aim at income maintenance during old 
age (World Bank 1994). When mandated by law their structure may be similarly 
comprehensive for the working population like in the public Bismarckian social insurance 
system; though, the non-existence of income and/or contribution ceilings might even more 
closely reproduce labour market inequalities.  
However, various private (occupational and personal) complementary schemes do not imply 
comprehensive coverage; collective agreements and legislated schemes can also leave 
persons uncovered (for example the Swiss system enforces mandatory contributions only 
above a certain income threshold (Bonoli and Häusermann 2011). Also various occupational 
second-tier schemes were structured on voluntary basis (for example in the United Kingdom 
and the United States); thus coverage with such voluntary schemes can be very selective and 
drive inequality of pension income, particularly leaving the low-income group uncovered. 
Most personal pensions with financial institutes were in the past rarely mandated by law, 
and thus might show very selective recipient patterns. Manifold reforms in Latin American 
countries and Eastern Europe, and Sweden which utilised mandated personal savings 
accounts show that this selectivity of third-pillar arrangements will be reduced in the future.  
An interesting research endeavour arises with the co-existence of public and private schemes 
in multi-pillar pension systems; alternative options in the private sphere may possibly again 
limit state efforts in providing benefits. But also the balanced public-private structure might 
enhance income security (cf. Goodin and Rein 2001).  
Given this variation of pension system regulation, my main research interest in this 
monograph is to evaluate and explain inequalities in pension income of the elderly. There 
exist various interdependencies between pension incomes from public and private pension 
schemes. Rein and Turner (2001) for example refer to the potential substitution of public 
benefits by occupational ones, and emphasis the need for studies that focus on studying the 
interdependencies between public and private pensions.  
This comparative study emphasizes the importance of past and current pension system 
legislation for the current public-private income mix received by the elderly. Each pillar of 
the pension system affects the income distribution in a quite particular way. Cross-national 
comparisons of pension outcomes help clarifying in how far the national pension system 
guaranteed a minimum living standard and/or maintained the previous income level. The 
key feature of this comparison is a detailed study of public, occupational, and private 
pension schemes and their combined effect on the current income package received by the 
elderly. Four major research questions (RQs) will be addressed: 
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o RQ 1: Why is there cross-national variation of income received by the elderly?  
In high-income countries pension income has by and large replaced the importance of 
market income and private income; in most of the high-income countries, nowadays pension 
income is the major income source (above 80 per cent, see Figure 6 in Chapter III.1) among 
the elderly population. However, national institutions and cultural differences may create 
cross-national differences in the importance of other incomes in the income mix: for example 
labour income resulting from belated retirement, importance of capital income through 
rental income and investments, and other social security income for example disability-
related transfers for the disabled or housing benefits for low-income households.  
Pension income of the elderly is affected by past and current regulation. In public 
contribution-based Bismarckian pension schemes, the contribution rules in place when the 
individuals entered the working phase and subsequent reforms, set up jointly the conditions 
for the later pension income; personal and/or employer’s contributions were accumulated 
during the whole working phase (for example Germany, Italy, Spain, the United States, 
Brazil). Ultimately, these contributions serve to replace a certain share of the previous work 
income before retirement. 
In addition, many countries have considered the elderly population as a particular group at 
risk, and embedded specific minimum protection programmes for the elderly in their social 
security system. Such poverty prevention policies (non-contributory pensions) primarily 
secure the financial well-being of the income poorest elderly, these benefits are be paid based 
on years of residence (Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands), or on years of employment 
(Japan and the United Kingdom), or targeted to the poor. Eligibility to such targeted schemes 
could be restricted when pension income, or other income, or other income and assets 
(Autralia, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, Brazil, India, South Africa,) are above a certain threshold. Generosity and eligibility 
criteria for receiving such universal or targeted assistance transfers differ strongly in cross-
national perspective (see for cross-national variation of pension systems around the world 
also Chapter II.2.), and thus also recipient rates show broad variation across countries (see 
also Figure 8 in Chapter III.1). 
Consequently the research agenda in this monograph includes a theoretical discussion on the 
variety of approaches to pension system regulation and its evolvement over time. 
o RQ 2: What implications do different institutional pathways of pension systems have for the 
income situation?  
A detailed study of national pension system arrangements might further explain the 
observed variation in the income mix; it should be explained in how far redistributive 
elements of pension schemes effectively reduced poverty and inequality. Analogously, 
unregulated private pension systems are expected to exacerbate market income inequalities 
as compared to the working age population.  
Arza and Kohli (2008b) pointed out that old-age security may ‘produce new social and 
political cleavages by creating actual and potential beneficiaries’ (Arza and Kohli 2008b: 2); it 
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is the corporatist arena that opens up various regulatory alternatives. But also the state can 
foresee second-tier schemes besides the universal and/or targeted minimum protection 
schemes (for example S2P in the United Kingdom, or ATP in Denmark). Thus in order to 
analyse the income mix of the elderly it is crucial to analyse both public and occupational 
second-tier pension schemes, and in how far these schemes provide comprehensive 
respectively selective coverage. 
The mix of earnings-related/contributory income maintenance schemes and non-
contributory poverty prevention schemes both structure the income and income inequality 
within a society. Strong attachment to the labour market and therefore stable contributions to 
pension schemes reduce the likelihood of dependency on social assistance transfers or 
minimum pensions in old age. However, much depends on the amount of overall 
contributions made to different pension schemes, and how these amounts/contribution years 
are valued in the final calculation of the pension annuity. At the same time, this also means 
that a poor contribution history (for example through low paid jobs, or contribution free job 
contracts, or long periods of inactivity) increases the risk of poverty in old age, and creates 
the need of poverty prevention schemes securing a minimum living standard in old age, a 
scenario that is particularly relevant for women, who throughout the world still show 
essentially lower labour market attachment as compared to men (Arza 2015).   
Rein and Behrendt (2004) emphasised that both types of public approaches (Bismarck and 
Beveridge) can provide satisfactory or insufficient poverty prevention; the authors argue that 
effective poverty prevention does not need to be necessarily linked to a strong public 
pension, but alternatively can also be explained by the institutional arrangement of public 
and private pensions. Particularly the implications of different pathways for the adequacy of 
pension incomes for the middle and high-income group need to be further addressed. 
o RQ 3: What role do non-public pension systems play in the income-mix and for the 
development of inequalities?  
Besides public social security, employers and financial institutes offer manifold alternative 
options for additional contributions to individual pension plans. Their institutionalised 
structure depends strongly on the nature of the public pension scheme but also on other 
factors, such as the self-perception of employers and unions as alternative providers of 
pension transfers, the relations between the government, employers, and trade unions, 
setting up the regulatory framework for occupational pensions, and the incentives by the 
state to encourage take up of private pension plans. Altogether these factors affect the 
potential and actual contributions to complementary pension schemes. An interesting case is 
the Finnish pension system that offers a tripartite hybrid public-private solution between the 
state, employers, and trade unions; the mandatory contributions are frequently made to 
pension funds run by financial institutes. 
A well-established public pension system may have already crowded out a general need of 
complementary pensions, and limited the role of private pensions to fringe benefits for the 
high-income group (see Chapter II.2). This concentration of private pensions on the upper 
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end of the income distribution might exacerbate market income inequalities as compared to 
the working age population. But also advanced multi-pillar pension systems can more 
strongly replicate market income inequalities as compared to mostly public pension 
dominant systems, as in the private pension systems redistributive elements are less 
pronounced. Also recent reform trends towards strengthened incentives for belated 
retirement and a stronger reliance on private pension plans can increase inequalities (OECD 
2013a). 
o RQ 4: Which developments can be observed in the public-private income mix and generosity 
of the pension system? 
In many countries the structure of the public-private income mix is developing towards a 
more balanced pension income from public and private sources. This development can be 
expected from the maturing of multi-pillar pension systems. Whereas many public pension 
schemes had already been extended in the 1950 and 1960s, particularly in the second half of 
the twentieth century, occupational and personal pension schemes have also become more 
regulated and structured as complementary component of the public-private old-age 
provision mix (for example in Finland and Sweden since the 1960s, in Denmark since the 
1990s, and in Germany since the early 2000s) (cf. Ebbinghaus and Gronwald 2011). Thus, 
younger birth cohorts are expected to show broader and longer coverage with private 
pensions, affecting the income mix and inequality of outcomes. At the same time, in the 
1990s and 2000s many public pension systems have been reformed and adjusted to the needs 
of demographic ageing, which resulted in an expected decrease in future public pension 
replacement rates (see Chapter 1 in OECD 2013a). Thus, the perspective of birth cohorts and 
their respective income mix can bring additional insight in the development of poverty and 
income inequality trends.  
III.3. Research agenda, country selection, and data 
In order to interpret current inequality of pension income, a detailed study of historical path-
developments of various country-specific pension schemes from each pillar is a pre-
condition to interpret empirical findings on income received by the elderly. Old-age income 
partly results from individual decisions based on the regulations that had been in place 50 
years before actual retirement when a person entered the working phase. Thus individual 
saving profiles differ by birth cohorts and need to be analysed in light of the maturing phase 
of contributory pension schemes. Particularly the broad cross-national variation of second-
tier schemes provides a promising field of study.  
Cross-national comparative studies on institutional differences and its outcomes provide an 
essential understanding about consequences of specific pension system regulation in the past 
and future reform needs. Such evidence based policy advice is beneficial for future pension 
policy. In this vein I will embed national findings on pension outcomes in a comparative 
cross-national perspective. The following studies will also point to the achievement of the 
two main goals of old-age systems: income maintenance and poverty prevention. In the 
following these two goals are measured by comparing income replacement and pension 
adequacy across countries.  
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Income replacement is primarily reached via horizontal redistribution5 over time; this concept is 
in line with the idea of a replacement ratio, i.e. pension annuities maintain a certain percentage 
of the average life-time earnings. In principle it is assumed that old-age income inequality 
mirrors pre-retirement income inequalities. Income replacement is expected to be higher for the 
low-income group than for the middle and high-income group, as the low-income group 
might additionally be protected by vertical redistribution in order to prevent poverty, for 
example through minimum pensions or credits for periods of inactivity.  
A second criterion can be best described as pension adequacy. This dimension describes that 
the income of the elderly should meet a certain income standard in relation to society’s living 
standard. Pension adequacy is expressed as the income level of a certain income group in 
relation to median earnings of the respective society. For the low-income group this means 
that, although the criterion income replacement is met, these groups can be still considered as 
poor or threatened by poverty due to their low pension adequacy. Similarly, the high-income 
group still may be adequately protected in terms of their pension adequacy, although they did 
not achieve a reasonably high income replacement.  
Rein and Behrendt (2004) summarised various difficulties that arise when studying the 
public-private pension income mix, poverty and income inequality: Among these difficulties 
are issues of classification between public and private schemes that not only arise from the 
fact that the state serves as pension system regulator and employer, but also from the 
institutional arrangements of various schemes that become hybrid in nature, as they are the 
result of state, employers and unions (the most prominent case is Finland, where partly 
funded systems were introduced based on a tripartite solution). Additionally the state may 
shift over the funding and administration of private pensions to the private financial sector; 
nevertheless, such privatised pension schemes can involve major public regulations, for 
example investment rules and/or minimum rate-of-return conditions. Also take up of 
personal pension accounts is frequently strongly incentivized by the state through 
favourable tax treatment and direct subsidies for personal pension accounts. The authors 
conclude: ‘[S]ince it is not possible to unambiguously identify the private domain, then it is 
difficult to establish a plausible causal analysis of the interplay between public and private 
spheres’ (Rein and Behrendt 2004: 190). 
This concern is similarly shared by the author, and thus the establishment of causal 
interpretations between the interplay of public and private pensions, labour market 
attachment, and inequality is not the primary objective of the following cross-country studies 
in this monograph. Nevertheless, by studying different pension system paths in a 
comparative cross-national perspective, various consequences of different country scenarios 
can be compared; thus a comparative study allows much more interpretation than a single 
                                                          
5
 In the following horizontal redistribution is conceptualised by (public and occupational) contributory 
earnings-related schemes and personal pension plans with financial institutes; vertical redistribution 
is conceptualised by non-contributory minimum pension schemes that foremost are provided by the 
state or in some countries by the local government (cf. Esping-Andersen and Myles 2009; Palme 
2006). 
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country case study focused on one cross-section or time-series. Although other countries’ 
scenarios do not serve as direct counterfactual cases, these country comparisons mirror a 
counterfactual scenario, when they share similar characteristics except for one, for example 
compulsion to occupational pension schemes.  
In order to reflect this idea, the following studies will concentrate on studying different 
systems within a similar set of countries focusing on European societies. This pre-selection 
by area follows the idea of a most similar design with regard to living arrangements. The data 
evaluation in Chapter III.1 had shown that most European countries have in common a 
strong pattern of elderly households living on their own. Also pension income was the one 
and almost only source of income. Thus differences and inequality of old-age income can be 
best explained within this similar group of countries.  
Within this group of European countries a most different system design combined with Mill’s 
method of agreement is pursued (cf. Levi-Faur 2006); the most different system design reflects 
‘variation in aspects of the system’ (Levi-Faur 2006: 58), whereas Mill’s method of agreement 
considers a ‘comparison of similar aspects of different cases that differ in outcomes’ (Levi-
Faur 2006: 58). Applied to pension policy this means that quite different public approaches to 
protect the elderly can be revealed. This variation (different system design) can be determined 
even in seemingly similar Beveridge tradition countries; universal, income-tested, and 
insurance based minimum pensions describe three alternative pathways. Agreement can be 
seen in the regulation and development of important second-tier pensions. This agreement is 
coherent also in the public Bismarckian tradition, where second-tier pensions are embedded 
in the earnings-related insurance system. At the same time, Bismarckian pension systems 
constitute another important case in the most different system design. Thus by selecting on the 
variation of public pension policies, it can be detected best which differences in second-tier 
pension arrangements can explain differences in outcomes. 
In this monograph it is argued that country-specific patterns of income replacement and 
pension adequacy can be best analysed by a cross-national comparative study that puts 
country-specific outcomes in perspective to other countries. During the empirical analyses 
the inequality of pension income will be linked back to the regulation of first and second-tier 
benefits. By particularly clarifying the role of second-tier pension schemes in the income mix 
of the elderly, this study can shed light on the potential implications of an implementation or 
extension of complementary second-tier schemes.  
The following empirical Chapters IV to VI in this monograph will consist of three separate 
chapters/studies. The common aim of each cross-national comparative comparison is to 
study pension outcomes; sections on specific pension system regulations from the past will 
help to explain these national outcomes. Thus I will approach the study of pension outcomes 
from a comparative historical welfare state tradition perspective. Two of the studies will be 
structured in two main parts: a historical overview of the development of country-specific 
pension systems and an evaluation of inequality patterns across the elderly, applying 
standardised inequality measures across the countries. The third study will primarily focus 
on the over-time development of inequality patterns that will be linked to the pension 
systems in place.  
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Primary data analyses with the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database will analyse the 
income distribution of the elderly and present various income inequality indicators. These 
standardised indicators facilitate the direct cross-country comparison, explaining the cross-
national differences in poverty prevention and income maintenance through the various 
combinations of public and private respectively first, second, and third-tier schemes.  
It is argued that pension outcomes can be best studied when combined with an analysis that 
breaks down the group of elderly in population subgroups, particularly income percentiles 
(for example quintiles or deciles). The breakdown of the elderly in income percentiles might 
clarify which income groups are mostly affected by the recipient patterns of complementary 
private pensions.  
Research agenda 
In order to analyse cross-national variation in income (RQ 1) and the implications of different 
institutional pathways of pension systems for the income mix (RQ 2), the following sub-
questions emerge: 
o Which pension schemes are provided simultaneously? 
o How should these nation-specific schemes be classified? 
o Which group of beneficiaries does each pension scheme cover? 
The theoretical institutionalist overviews in Chapters IV and V clarify the historical 
development of various country-specific pensions systems. It will be shown which pension 
schemes were introduced to cover potential contributors. The individual schemes will be 
classified with the pillars and tiers approaches. It will be studied if and when second-
tier/pillar pension were implemented and in how far a comprehensive coverage can be 
expected. Lastly, current implications for the income distribution will also be discussed.  
In a second step the actual redistributive consequences among the already retired population 
will be studied. In order to study the role of non-public pensions in the income mix (RQ 3) 
and on-going developments (RQ4), the following sub-questions will be addressed: 
Related to the coverage: 
o Who benefits from second-tier pension schemes?  
Related to the income replacement and pension adequacy: 
o How well are the elderly secured against poverty?  
o How do the elderly fare in terms of income level? 
Related to the national developments: 
o Can there be shifts in the public-private mix observed? 
o Are the on-going developments increasing or decreasing inequalities?  
Related to the cross-national comparative view: 
o In how far are differences in pension scheme regulation also transferred to differences in the 
pension income distribution?  
68 
 
Each of the three empirical studies will contain a specific focus, addressing these research 
questions. The first study (Chapter IV) concentrates on presenting countries from the 
Beveridge type public pension tradition, i.e. minimum pension schemes that offered a broad 
scope for various second-tier schemes to develop. This study analyses in how far countries 
from the Beveridge tradition reveal different outcomes, which primarily can be linked back 
to cross-national variety in second-tier regulation. The analyses include an evaluation of 
recipient rates and income shares of private pensions in the income mix along various socio-
demographic characteristics (sex, age, and household size) and along the income distribution 
by income deciles. The study also clarifies in how far individuals benefit from intra-
household redistribution; therefore recipient rates and income shares are evaluated on 
individual and household level. Also for each decile of the elderly population the income-
mix is first compared relatively to society’s median disposable income, and second to income 
received by each decile in the total population in order to interpret relative income levels of 
the elderly.  
The second study (Chapter V) aims at contrasting the outcomes of Bismarckian and 
Beveridge type systems. Different outcomes can be expected, as Bismarckian systems offer 
first and second-tier benefits, whereas in Beveridge type systems two separate schemes 
developed side by side, which provide first and second-tier benefits separately. Similarly as 
in Chapter IV recipient rates and income shares of private pensions in the income mix along 
various socio-demographic characteristics (sex, age, and household size) and along the 
income distribution are evaluated. A special focus is placed on the development of various 
indicators between two points in time. Evaluated indicators are poverty rates, poverty gap, 
Gini coefficient, and relative income level of the low, middle, and high-income group of the 
elderly in comparison to society’s median disposable income split by various income 
sources. 
In contrast to the repeated cross-sectional designs of the first two studies, the third study 
(Chapter VI) will apply a longitudinal data design, which is motivated due to measurement 
problems embedded in the cross-sectional design when analysing over time development. 
Disney and Whitehouse’s (2002) study exemplifies these various measurement inaccuracies:  
• It is likely that younger birth cohorts received a higher real income during their life 
career than older cohorts, thus pension income can also be expected to be higher.  
• Younger pensioner cohorts may still receive labour income. These incomes are either 
received in addition to pensions or refer to belated retirement; in both situations labour 
income increases younger birth cohort’s income. In addition to this, it the early 
retirement trend of the 1980s and 1990s is currently reversed; therefore a prolonged 
labour market participation of elderly workers might have also increased the pension 
income of the younger cohorts compared to the older cohorts. 
• The socio-demographic composition in older cohorts shifts towards single women 
households, as women tend to outlive their partners. Thus, average earnings of older 
age cohorts can also be lower due to the increased share of women and single person 
household and their lower pension benefits compared to men and two person households.  
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• Maturity of pension systems developed only slowly over time in contribution-based 
pension schemes. Thus if individuals accumulated pension entitlements five years 
longer under a newly introduced scheme this group receives higher benefits from this 
pension scheme. 
• Pension income may only be indexed partially to inflation; this is particularly relevant 
for private pension benefits.  
Therefore the main focus of the third study (Chapter VI) is analysing the current shifts in the 
income mix and the income distribution by birth cohorts. First recipient rates and income 
shares of private pensions in the income mix are presented. Then absolute income levels 
from public and private pensions are compared by deciles and over the cohorts; these 
national findings are compared cross-nationally. An evaluation of two specific birth cohorts 
of the elderly that are ten years apart, clarifies the development of the income mix over time. 
In a last step, a specific birth cohort is studied in order to assess pension adequacy of pension 
income along the income distribution by deciles; similar as in the earlier chapters pension 
income is shown in relative terms in comparison to each society’s median income; the 
analyses focus on comparing the ranking of countries by income deciles before and after 
taxes. 
Country selection 
The country selection slightly varies with the research question to be analysed in each of the 
three studies. In the following a quick overview of the country selection for each study will 
be provided, clarifying its motivation for the cross-national comparisons within each study.  
The first study (Chapter IV) includes a comparison of three Beveridge type countries: 
Denmark, Finland, and the United Kingdom. Although all three countries introduced a 
Beveridge type first tier, focusing on poverty prevention, the country-specific schemes differ 
strongly regarding their eligibility rules: Denmark introduced a universal basic pension 
based on years of residency in Denmark. Also Finnish minimum pensions used to be 
universal until the reformation in 1996 to an income-tested benefit. In the United Kingdom 
entitlement to a full basic pension is tied to sufficient years in employment. But more 
importantly, all countries show also strong variation regarding their second-tier schemes. 
Denmark’s private pension schemes have been mostly based on voluntary plans; only since 
the beginning of the 1990s various collective agreements were introduced that enforced 
broadly mandatory coverage with occupational plans. Current pension outcomes will 
therefore capture a system which is currently under transition with a strongly increasing 
importance of occupational schemes. In Finland, already in the 1960s administration of 
occupational schemes was early on shifted to the various social partners; compulsory 
enrolment ensures comprehensive coverage. The United Kingdom foresees a second tier that 
contains a mixed structure of public and private pension benefits. A contracting-out option of 
the state earnings-related system (SERPS) favoured the development of various occupational 
and personal pension plans; the contracting out structure is considered as a partly 
mandatory inclusion to occupational schemes.  
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The second study (Chapter V) aims at capturing broad variation in terms of pension system 
design in order to contrast the Beveridge minimum protection approach from the 
Bismarckian social insurance approach. This study analyses Denmark, Germany, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom. The Danish and the British systems are proponents of the 
Beveridge path as presented in the previous paragraph. The analyses are extended by 
Germany and Sweden. The German social insurance system is the prototype of the 
contribution-based Bismarckian approach; the public social insurance system was broadly 
extended in the late 1950s, securing also the living standard up to a certain income ceiling. 
As a consequence, occupational schemes were only relevant for selective occupational 
groups. The Swedish system can be considered as a hybrid system incorporating both a 
Beveridge type scheme and a limited Bismarckian scheme. Besides minimum pensions, the 
Swedish state also regulates contributions to earnings-related public schemes. Due to the low 
contribution ceiling in the public scheme, private pension schemes might be important for 
the high-income group. Already in the 1960s and 1970s various universal industry-wide 
collective agreements were implemented, which emphasised the general role of private 
pensions in the Swedish pension system. 
The third study (Chapter VI) extends the broad institutional variation in terms of pension 
system design from Chapter V by adding the Finnish and Italian systems. Thus the study 
incorporates analyses of six Western European countries: Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The Finnish system had already been studied extensively 
in Chapter IV; Finland exemplifies a regulatory approach that focused on tripartist solutions, 
which formalised various occupational schemes that contain a strong link between 
contributions and later benefits. In contrast to this, the Italian system represents a pure 
Bismarckian system that almost exclusively provides rather generous public benefits. Both 
countries Finland and Italy are interesting study cases, as they contain in the case of Finland 
no income ceiling and in the case of Italy a comparatively high income ceiling (OECD 2013a). 
Table 3 summarises the main pension system characteristics of the countries that will be 
studied in the following; this overview focuses also on the importance of public vs. private 
pensions in the income mix among elderly households. Particularly the Nordic countries 
have substantially reformed their pension systems in the 1990s (cf. Kangas et al. 2010), thus 
they are interesting study cases for the development across time (cohort studies in Chapter 
VI). Additionally, the Nordic countries provide alternate scenarios that had not been studied 
by Disney and Johnson’s (2001) edited volume on pension policies and outcomes. The 
German system underwent a major reform in the early 2000s; however, the introduction of 
Riester pensions will hardly be relevant for the observed elderly population in this study.  
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Table 3: Main characteristics of the pension system and public-private income mix 
 
Sources: Behrendt 2000; Ebbinghaus and Gronwald 2011; Rein and Turner 2004; OECD 2007; Figure 1 in Chapter II.1.
Denmark Finland Germany Italy Sweden United Kingdom
by pension pillar
tradition of public 
pension pillar
Beveridge Beveridge Bismarck Bismarck Beveridge + 
Bismarck
Beveridge
structure of 
occupational pillar
labour contracting mandatory by law voluntary +
(labour contracting)
voluntary labour contracting contracting out
by income tier
poverty prevention 
(first tier)
basic MP targeted MP none; SA income-tested MP guaranteed MP targeted MP
status maitenance 
(second+third tier)
(public)+
occupational
occupational public+
(occupational)
public public+
occupational+
(personal)
public + 
occupational+
personal
by income source
share of public 
pension
medium-high low high high high medium
share of occupational  
+ personal pension
low-medium high low marginal low medium
recipient rate of 
occupational + 
personal pension
low-medium high low marginal high high
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Data, comparability, and limitations 
For the comparative cross-national analyses in each of the empirical sections of the three 
studies various datasets from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database by LIS have 
been utilised. LIS is a data provider that transforms national survey/register data to a 
common data template. In this role LIS applies a unified definition of annual disposable 
household income based on regular income transfers, enforcing standardisation of income 
data for comparative cross-national research; contents and definitions of individual incomes 
are closely linked to the international recommendations by the Canberra Group (Canberra 
Group 2001, UNECE 2012).  
Since 2011, LIS has extended its focus capturing systematically also counterparts to purely 
monetary transfers such as values of goods and services received, and own consumption of 
self-produced goods. However, due to data comparability the applied analyses will be 
restricted to monetary components only. Therefore the studies may particularly 
underestimate the living standard of households that for example benefit from consumption 
of own-produced goods or home ownership. The exclusion of values of non-monetary 
transfers and imputed rent is a clear restriction in this study, which can be considered a 
worthwhile attempt to add in later studies.  
All LIS datasets provide annualised income data for a specific cross-section in time. Due to 
the missing panel structure and data availability for each year, it is not possible to analyse 
work-to-retirement transitions. This restriction is not problematic for the analyses in this 
monograph; instead of analysing individual replacement rates, income levels are evaluated 
relative to the median living standard of the society.  
It is worth mentioning that the direct study of individual replacement rates would offer also 
an interesting insight for the study of pension outcomes, however this approach would 
require at best detailed information on individual working careers; the study of work-to-
retirement transitions from a panel design might capture only final salary policies but not the 
benefits from contributory schemes which are linked to contributions over the whole 
working career.  
Since the evaluation of individual working careers would have required detailed and 
accurate data preparation of various comparable national datasets, it has not been pursued in 
this monograph. Again this individualised perspective can be a valuable extension to the 
studies in this monograph, as inequality of pension income could be better linked to 
individual risk profiles and insufficient protection. 
In the following, the samples are always weighted with the weight provided by LIS that 
inflates the sample to the total population. The creation of weights is done by the original 
data provider, and it has not been adjusted further for the selected subsamples. Therefore, 
depending on the accuracy of the construction of the weights, the provided figures might not 
accurately capture the income position and income distribution of the elderly samples. 
Adjustments of the weight are not done in this study, as it is a very technical study by itself. 
However, it is argued that weighting in general yields better results, as specific data 
collection biases are accounted for. 
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For Chapter IV the following datasets were used (see Table 4): Denmark (1995, 2000, 2004), 
Finland (1995, 2000, 2004), the United Kingdom (1994, 1999, 2004). Chapter V is based on 
datasets for two points in time: Denmark (2000, 2004), Germany (2000, 2004), Sweden (2000, 
2005), the United Kingdom (1999, 2004). Chapter VI includes various datasets for Denmark 
(1992, 1995, 2000, 2004), Finland (1995, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2010), Germany (1994, 2000, 2004, 
2007, 2010), Italy (1995, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2010), Sweden (1995, 2000, 2005), and the 
United Kingdom (1994, 1999, 2004, 2007, 2010). 
 
 
  
Table 4: Datasets used from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database 
 
Chapter IV Chapter V Chapter VI
Denmark dk95,dk00,dk04 dk00,dk04 dk92,dk95,dk00,
dk04
Finland fi95,fi00,fi04 - fi95,fi00,fi04,fi07,
fi10
Germany - de00,de04 de94,de00,de04,
de07,de10
Italy - - it95,it98,it00,it04,
it08,it10
Sweden - se00,se05 se95,se00,se05
United Kingdom uk94,uk99,uk04 uk99,uk04 uk94,uk99,uk04,
uk07,uk10
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Appendix (Chapter III) 
Table 1: Employment rate by gender and age group (in %) 
 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database 
Missing information in the employment section was recovered by using the income information. Thus if a person did not indicate the 
employment status, and had no personal labour income from dependent employment or self-employment activity, and did receive 
personal pension income, that person was considered as not employed. Vice versa if a person did not indicate the employment status, and 
received personal labour income from dependent employment or self-employment activity, and had no personal pension income, this 
person was considered as still employed. Persons for whom the employment status still was not defined after applying these two 
conditions were excluded. Unfortunately, in Canada employment characteristics were only available for persons up to age 69; the 
employment status could not be proxied well enough by using the income information, as a substantial share of persons received both 
pension and labour income.  
 
 
country dataset men women gap men/women in %
age group age group age group
60-64 65-69 70-74 60-64 65-69 70-74 60-64 65-69 70-74
Nordic countries
Denmark dk10 55.2 26.6 14.8 38.6 12.0 4.8 -30 -55 -68
Finland fi10 37.2 7.6 1.0 34.2 3.8 0.8 -8 / /
Iceland is10 77.8 49.8 19.6 68.0 42.0 4.6 -13 -16 -77
Norway no10 62.8 23.4 2.2 50.6 16.2 1.2 -19 -31 /
Middle European countries
France fr10 18.6 5.6 2.8 16.4 4.2 2.0 -12 / /
Germany de10 51.2 18.8 9.8 32.0 12.2 6.0 -38 -35 -39
Ireland ie10 43.0 19.2 10.0 28.4 7.4 3.0 -34 -61 -70
Luxembourg lu10 19.0 7.2 0.4 13.2 1.0 0.4 -31 / /
Netherlands nl10 37.8 12.6 3.2 22.8 2.4 1.6 -40 -81 /
United Kingdom uk10 54.2 20.4 9.2 34.6 14.0 6.0 -36 -31 /
Eastern European countries
Estonia ee10 44.8 23.2 9.2 46.8 15.4 10.8 4 -34 17
Hungary hu09 7.2 3.8 1.2 8.0 2.8 0.4 11 / /
Poland pl10 27.6 14.0 7.4 12.6 5.8 3.2 -54 -59 /
Serbia rs10 35.6 12.4 8.4 10.0 7.0 3.8 -72 -44 /
Slovak Republic sk10 35.6 6.0 4.6 10.6 4.8 0.2 -70 / /
Slovenia si10 18.2 8.6 4.0 5.2 3.0 1.4 -71 / /
Mediterranean countries
Greece gr10 36.2 11.2 2.0 16.8 3.6 0.8 -54 -68 /
Italy it10 31.8 18.0 6.2 16.6 4.6 1.4 -48 -74 /
Spain es10 36.6 4.6 1.4 20.4 2.6 0.2 -44 / /
Latin American countries
Brazil br11 61.2 40.2 30.6 26.2 16.4 10.4 -57 -59 -66
Colombia co10 71.0 61.2 45.8 34.6 21.2 16.8 -51 -65 -63
Guatemala gt06 89.8 81.0 70.6 38.0 33.4 29.2 -58 -59 -59
Mexico mx10 67.8 58.4 45.2 27.2 21.0 14.6 -60 -64 -68
Peru pe04 82.0 69.2 61.8 61.0 54.2 43.2 -26 -22 -30
Uruguay uy04 55.4 30.4 14.4 29.6 16.6 5.6 -47 -45 -61
Other countries
Australia au10 57.2 33.0 9.0 37.6 17.0 7.0 -34 -48 /
Canada ca10 51.6 25.6 1.0 38.2 15.4 0.0 -26 -40 /
Egypt eg12 48.6 31.8 26.8 19.4 3.8 4.6 -60 -88 -83
India in04 64.2 59.6 45.8 40.8 23.8 18.0 -36 -60 -61
Israel il10 61.2 36.4 20.0 40.8 18.0 5.6 -33 -51 -72
Japan jp08 77.2 52.2 31.6 51.2 28.4 18.8 -34 -46 -41
Russia ru10 40.2 24.4 12.2 30.0 17.0 7.6 -25 -30 -38
South Africa za10 32.0 13.2 7.4 9.4 7.6 2.6 -71 -42 /
United States us10 54.2 36.4 21.8 48.0 27.0 13.4 -11 -26 -39
75 
 
Appendix (Chapter III) 
Table 2: Income share of pension income by gender and age group (in %) 
 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database 
  
country dataset men women
age group age group
60-64 65-69 70-74 60-64 65-69 70-74
Nordic countries
Denmark dk10 22.2 60.6 82.5 36.8 81.4 94.0
Finland fi10 33.4 84.2 96.1 35.9 89.4 97.9
Iceland is10 15.3 33.8 73.9 20.1 42.3 86.7
Norway no10 21.0 59.3 88.8 30.5 68.5 94.1
Middle European countries
France fr10 58.7 88.0 95.1 64.6 85.1 91.0
Germany de10 16.4 81.8 93.6 34.6 90.2 97.0
Ireland ie10 29.2 77.2 88.5 31.8 80.7 96.6
Luxembourg lu10 68.6 81.2 99.0 61.7 95.1 98.3
Netherlands nl10 40.7 88.9 95.4 42.7 93.3 93.0
United Kingdom uk10 28.2 79.5 94.3 58.2 81.5 96.7
Eastern European countries
Estonia ee10 28.5 62.4 79.4 39.6 79.0 86.7
Hungary hu09 89.1 98.5 99.0 90.1 99.8 100.0
Poland pl10 65.0 87.1 90.1 83.4 91.5 95.7
Serbia rs10 59.9 91.6 97.1 93.6 98.6 99.6
Slovak Republic sk10 33.7 86.5 88.1 79.2 92.3 99.4
Slovenia si10 63.3 85.9 93.8 84.5 91.1 93.1
Mediterranean countries
Greece gr10 43.1 61.4 87.9 61.5 91.4 99.7
Italy it10 59.9 77.8 92.6 65.4 88.6 98.2
Spain es10 41.2 84.6 97.3 40.2 89.2 98.7
Latin American countries
Brazil br11 41.4 63.9 76.4 70.4 85.4 94.5
Colombia co10 40.3 49.4 67.9 50.9 85.0 93.9
Guatemala gt06 9.8 12.6 21.9 27.3 16.4 37.8
Mexico mx10 25.3 38.9 56.9 43.4 59.2 76.0
Peru pe04 24.4 41.0 56.2 45.2 55.7 72.7
Uruguay uy04 39.8 63.9 86.7 59.2 81.4 95.1
Other countries
Australia au10 21.5 51.3 83.7 30.6 72.4 93.6
Canada ca10 29.5 67.8 85.6 37.5 81.2 93.7
Egypt eg12 . . . . . .
India in04 0.6 39.7 42.2 4.5 55.1 69.7
Israel il10 . . . . . .
Japan jp08* 13.1 55.8 71.8 26.2 65.3 87.2
Russia ru10 62.5 68.4 88.9 72.0 82.6 92.1
South Africa za10 54.3 81.0 86.8 74.0 96.6 94.7
United States us10 19.8 45.1 64.6 22.6 54.7 74.7
*The Japanese data refer only to elderly which were classified as head or spouse.
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IV. The Beveridge path: occupational welfare policies in Denmark, 
Finland, and the United Kingdom 
IV.1.  Introduction6  
Pension policies fulfil two main goals: poverty prevention and income maintenance. Particularly 
in the 1950s two ideal typical paths of public-private mix designs emerged. Several nation 
states followed the Bismarckian path (e. g. Germany, Italy, Belgium). These countries 
extended their group-oriented earnings-related security systems further, guaranteeing a 
certain replacement rate of previous incomes for the majority of contributors to these 
schemes. Thus income maintenance was primarily achieved by public pensions. 
Occupational and private provision had been crowded out subsequently.  
Another group of countries maintained or extended their Beveridge type minimum pension 
schemes (e. g. Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom). 
Eligibility criteria to basic pensions were made less restrictive, and levels of guaranteed 
(income-tested) pensions were increased. Income maintenance policies developed as a 
second tier of provision. Regulations were set up by various constellations of actors such as 
the state, social partners, and firms. These schemes were crowded in to replace the income of 
middle-to-high income earners.  
The broad variation of implemented policies for second-tier benefits provides a multiple 
field of study in comparative cross-national research. Different combinations of the public-
private provision mix might generate various social inequalities within and between nation 
states. Therefore, I will analyse the income mix of the elderly in each of these countries to 
clarify what role private pension income plays for the public-private mix of income and in 
how far private pensions can be linked to income inequalities across the elderly. 
In this chapter, I will take a closer look at the public-private mixes of the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, and Finland. The three welfare states show a commonality in their public first-tier 
programme to poverty prevention – all countries introduced a minimum pension according 
to the Beveridge tradition. However, the eligibility criteria differ: Denmark organised the 
pension as a social right to the whole population based on residency in Denmark. The United 
Kingdom has linked the basic pension to years in employment. In Finland the minimum 
pension used to be provided to the whole population, but it was transformed in 1996 to a 
pension income tested transfer. 
Strong differences occurred in the country’s approaches to provide income replacement 
(second tier) of retirement income. The Finnish occupational pillar is strongly influenced by 
its corporatist nature. Administration was early on shifted to the various social partners in 
the 1960s. Their decision for compulsory enrolment based on employment yielded to one of 
the highest private pension expenditures among the OECD (2009a: 42). In the United 
Kingdom broad compulsion was reached through contracting out of the State Earnings 
                                                          
6 Chapter IV is a further development of Neugschwender (2011), LIS Working Paper No. 561. 
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Related Pension System (SERPS). The second-tier scheme came into effect in 1978. SERPS 
was compulsory as long as someone did not contract out in favourable occupational 
pensions or since 1986 also personal pensions. Denmark’s private pension regulation has 
been based traditionally on voluntary solutions. Tripartite negotiation between the state and 
the social partners proved to be difficult at first, but since the beginning of the 1990s 
occupational plans became influential. Various mandatory collective agreements were 
introduced since then, yielding to a high coverage among current workers. The delayed 
maturing in Denmark allows an evaluation of a purely voluntary private pension path that 
only recently shifted to a quasi-mandatory occupational scheme. This three country 
comparison will analyse these different approaches to occupational pension regulation and 
analyse the consequences for income inequalities of the elderly.  
This chapter is structured as follows. First, the reform processes in the three countries will be 
documented in order to derive hypotheses about the development and spread of private 
pensions. In the empirical part of the chapter, I will analyse the on-going developments in 
the public-private mixes. A selection of descriptive figures will be presented, exemplifying 
the differences in inequality. A first set of figures include recipient rates of private pensions 
and the income shares of private pensions in the public-private mix. Then the income sources 
will be analysed by income deciles. Most of these estimates will be presented for men and 
women separately to account for differences in employment careers of men and women. The 
analyses are based on personal and household level data in order to signify how these 
differences are mitigated by living arrangements. The last empirical section concentrates on 
the income distribution of the elderly in relation to the total population’s income 
distribution. The findings will be summarised in a conclusion. 
IV.2. Historical pension system development 
Denmark 
Danish old-age assistance started off with liberal residual policies in 1891 which only in 1956 
became universal; however, also these transfers remained means-tested (Andersen 2011). In 
1964 a part of the universal national pension scheme was transformed to a basic pension 
(people’s pension). The other part of the first tier was designed as a complementary income-
tested amount. As a public second tier, the arbejdsmarkedets tillægspension (ATP) was 
introduced. This scheme is based on working hours and reached broad coverage, but is less 
important in terms of contributions and benefits (Green-Pedersen 2007; Davies 1996). ATP is 
a funded scheme that is enforced by law, but administered by the social partners. It is at the 
edge of first and second-pillar classification. Due to data limitations in the LIS data ATP will 
be treated as part of the public scheme. National pensions and ATP together provided 
around 60 per cent of replacement for the low-income earners, therefore satisfying the need 
for additional private pensions for the low-income group almost completely, but leaving a 
higher gap for the high-income group (Kangas et al. 2010; Kangas and Palme 1991). As a 
result of the reforms in the 1960s, poverty across pensioners decreased strongly during the 
second half of the 1980s (Pedersen and Smith 2000). 
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In the following, the complementary public pensions were designed more income-tested in 
the 90s. Benefits were cut as soon as other personal pension income (also including ATP and 
occupational pensions) exceeded an income threshold, however, still in favour for 
occupational pension recipients (Kangas et al. 2010; OECD 2009b). Second-pillar pensions 
remained broadly unregulated and scattered at first. The major reason was unsuccessful 
negotiations between the Labour Organisations (LOs) and the government on the question 
who should regulate occupational pensions. In this unregulated scenario almost exclusively 
civil servants and a small group of white collar employees were protected with occupational 
pensions (von Nordheim Nielsen 1996). Until the beginning of the 90s, Danish tripartite 
bargaining remained unresolved. But then policies shifted to self-administered collective 
agreements. It became obvious that the primary goal of universal occupational pension could 
not be reached through tripartism (Green-Pedersen 2007). Fixed temporary regulations in the 
public sector finally guided the way for further sector-based collective agreements, initiated 
by the Danish metal industry (Andersen 2011; Kangas et al. 2010).  
Due to broad extension of compulsory enrolment in occupational schemes, future 
generations will benefit strongly from additional occupational pension benefits. Thus 
income-tested national pensions might lose their important role in counterpart of a earnings-
related labour-contracted occupational schemes for the middle-to-high income earners. 
Stunning from an institutionalist point of view is that, although the Danish labour relations 
system is well developed and influential (Green-Pedersen 2007), social partners failed for a 
long time to structure occupational pension agreements. This issue has been viewed as a 
matter of public decision making. The LO’s priority of a universal solution was transferred to 
industry-wide plans, however the goal of general extension over the whole workforce was 
still upheld (Davies 1996). During this reallocation of power, industrial relations gained in 
power in the political arena. The process also led to an increase in earnings-related 
occupational pensions as a substitute of and complement to public benefits.  
Finland 
Finland redesigned its pre-existent national pension in 1956. The reformation entailed a 
citizenship-based basic pension benefit (National Pension) and an income-tested supplement. 
In addition two major reforms were enacted in the public scheme (Kangas 2007). Since 1985 
the complementary part of the national pension was only tested against other legislated 
pension income. Thus the income test was restricted. Ten years later, in 1995, tremendous 
cuts were decided. Taking back universalistic policies, the national basic pension was 
abolished. Hence, the entire national pension became targeted security, tested against other 
pension income. Basic pensions are already effectively cut for moderate levels of other 
pension income (OECD 2009b), diminishing the role of these benefits further. Whereas the 
replacement rate until the 1970s first increased, wage-development overwhelmed basic 
pension levels in the following, hence leading to a less important role in old-age income 
(Jäntti and Ritakallio 2000). 
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The development of the public first tier was accompanied by an increasing role of several 
hybrid earnings-related second-tier pensions which were introduced during the 1960s and 
1970s. The various schemes that are organized across occupational and sectoral lines (TeL, 
LeL, KvTEL, VeL, YeL, and MyEL) will be interpreted as occupational pensions according to 
the definition of Goodin and Rein (2001), as these schemes are administered by the social 
partners and run by financial institutes. The strong corporatist structure in Finland is a key 
element of pension policy design. This contrasts Finland from other countries in terms of 
bargaining influence through statutory regulations: Finnish social partners were directly 
involved in the design of occupational pensions and their reformation (Kangas 2007; Kangas 
and Luna 2011). The majority of these negotiated schemes were organized as pay-as-you-go 
schemes, thus yielding a strong linkage of earnings-related contributions and benefits. The 
schemes aimed at a replacement of 60 per cent of previous earnings for private sector 
employees respectively 66 per cent for public employees. Since there is no income ceiling, the 
need for further private pensions was crowded out for decades by these rather generous 
schemes for all income groups (Barr 2012). This scenario is changed through various reforms 
that will decrease the replacement level in the future (Kangas and Luna 2011). However in 
2011, the Finnish government also introduced a guaranteed minimum pension that is tested 
only against other pension income (Barr 2012). 
Summing up, the Finnish case can be interpreted in two ways: First, as a system almost 
exclusively based on hybrid public-occupational welfare regulation combined with a meager 
targeted first-tier public pension. Second, if earnings-related pensions are considered as 
public transfers, as a system where occupational and personal pensions have been effectively 
crowded out due to the non-existence of contribution ceilings. This interpretation has been 
applied by Korpi and Palme (1998) by referring to an encompassing system. This 
understanding reflects the Finnish pension system design as an arrangement similar to a 
Bismarckian social insurance type in an idealised shape. The main difference occurs in the 
administration by social partners instead of the state. During the last decades, the balance in 
the pension income mix was shifted gradually towards a higher importance of the various 
earnings-related pensions. Given that guaranteed replacement will decrease, Finnish 
providers may successively need additional private savings plans to attain adequate 
pensions. These additional demands could be satisfied again by coordinated political 
influence via industrial relations (Kangas and Luna 2011). 
The United Kingdom  
The British pension system is one of the most discussed systems in nation-based studies on 
inequality and poverty across the aged and political insufficiencies of restructuring the 
individual pension scheme components (Bridgen and Meyer 2007a). The introduction of the 
first basic pension occurred 1946 coming into effect in 1948. The design was strongly inspired 
by the Beveridge report. Pension entitlement was calculated on the basis of the male working 
career, treating married women as dependants irrespective if working or not (Bridgen and 
Meyer 2011). Full benefits were paid if 90 per cent of potential employment records (16-65) 
were documented; phases of unemployment and maternity were taken into account. In the 
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area of occupational pensions the various British governments followed first a liberal path, 
keeping occupational pensions fairly unregulated based on voluntary employer’s decisions 
to offer such schemes and voluntary employees’ choice to provide in such plans. The low 
level of the public basic pension left a broad scope for the maturation of occupational and 
private pension schemes (Bridgen and Meyer 2007a). Occupational schemes provide besides 
annuities, also lump sums and benefits for widows/widowers covering also dependent 
children (ABI 2000). 
The introduction of the State Earnings Related Pensions Scheme (SERPS) in 1975 envisaged a 
paradigmatic reform in British public pension saving. This scheme tied public and 
occupational pension components closely together. First of all SERPS was introduced in 
efforts to construct a second-tier public pension related partially to previous earnings. As the 
government feared a crowding out of existent occupational pension plans, the contracting out 
option was introduced. Thus second-tier entitlements can be either accumulated in the 
SERPS or in occupational plans if these non-public plans were favourable for the individual. 
In principle, inclusion to the British second-tier scheme was mandatory for all employees, 
however, those earning below the lower earnings limit (LEL) stayed excluded. The scheme 
came into being in 1978. The full effect of the SERPS was intended to come in effect twenty 
years later offering around 25 per cent of national average earnings by the re-valued 
calculation of the best 20 years of employment earnings (Blake 2003; Blundell and Johnson 
1998). Since the implementation of occupational pension plans remained a decision by the 
employers, contracting out was not a real option for a part of the society until 1986. 
The Social Security Act 1986 dealt with the various consequences initiated by the 
introduction of the SERPS. Beginning from 1988 all individuals gained a contracting out 
option as long as they held Approved Personal Pensions. This meant that providers had to pay 
at least a minimum contribution to private pensions, the contracted-out rebate which had been 
already a feature of occupational contracting out from the SERPS (Dilnot et al. 1994). 
Furthermore, the SERPS benefits were withdrawn to 20 per cent of average earnings based 
on lifetime earnings. As a result the SERPS became less attractive for low-income earners and 
workers with interrupted careers (Schulze and Moran 2007). 
Given the fixed criteria on public pensions, the public benefits from the basic pension and 
the SERPS were expected to be still meagre for most employees without supplementary 
plans. The SERPS excluded persons below the LEL; low-income earners and disabled 
persons were not covered with private pensions, which created an everlasting discussion on 
further necessary reforms of the SERPS (Schulze and Moran 2007; Taylor-Gooby 2005). 
Coverage with occupational pensions decreased from 53 per cent to 46 per cent the late 1960s 
to 2000 revealing opposite trends for men and women; whereas men were less covered in 
2000, women were more frequently covered (The Association of British Insurers (ABI) 2000). 
Since 2003, a means-tested Pension Credit was introduced. This scheme not only increased 
the public minimum income, but also rewarded to a certain degree modest savings in the 
occupational schemes (Blake 2003). Also the newly introduced Stakeholder Pensions aimed 
at increasing the savings of those with low occupational savings. However, take-up rates 
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remained low in the early 2000s. In order to prevent an increasing share of persons with 
incomes at the bottom level of the Pension Credit, the government decided a gradual 
transformation of the SERPS to the State Second Pension (S2P) (Bridgen and Meyer 2011; 
Disney and Emmerson 2005). This means that starting from 2002 over the next 50 years a 
transformation takes place that will result in a stronger flat-rate character of the second tier. 
The UK’s complex pension system in a nutshell: Besides the public schemes (basic pension 
and SERPS), two major ways of private provision coexisted since the introduction of SERPS. 
First, private pension plans that resulted from an approved contracting out either on 
occupational or individual level, including also Stakeholder pensions. Second, private 
pension plans that were not approved, the important market for life insurances included. 
Government policies can be best described as ‘exhausted voluntarism’ (Bridgen and Meyer 
2011), where voluntary mechanisms were pursued to its limits and the SERPS introduction 
was soon regretted as a means of interference in the liberal tradition. Interest group influence 
on collective solutions in private pensions has been low due to the decentralized and 
fragmented landscape of union involvement. The Trade Union Congress, the umbrella 
organisation of the unions, has been solely an advisor in the stately reform process (Schulze 
and Moran 2007). This low influence was accompanied by a majority of employer 
representatives in the governing private pension authorities (Davies 1996).  
Summing up, we can detect various institutional linkages between public and occupational 
schemes among the three countries under study. The timing of reforms in the pension 
schemes have affected the crowding in/out of private pension schemes differently. The 
British and the Finnish system have developed a mature multipillar structure; the Danish 
system is a latecomer with respect to occupational pension policies. Whereas British 
occupational pensions are mostly voluntary, Finnish occupational pensions are highly 
regulated and are the major source of income. In Denmark, quite generous basic pensions 
and the introduction of ATP partially satisfied the demand for occupational pensions at first, 
however also kept the middle-to-high income earners in a highly unregulated private 
pension market. In this scenario portability of occupational pensions in the case of job change 
might be highly disadvantageous.   
Social partners fulfilled different regulatory functions in cross-national perspective. In British 
politics consultation was the main channel, whereas in the coordinated economies in Finland 
and Denmark collectively self-administered and self-regulated second-pillar solutions were 
implemented. In Finland the involvement of social partners early on became an important 
veto point in politics (Kangas 2007). The Danish system only recently shifted to self-
administered collective agreements, when it was recognised that Danish tripartite solutions 
had failed to govern occupational pensions.  
Therefore British social partners are by far less influential and less involved in the current 
occupational scheme regulation than in both Nordic countries. Consequently coverage with 
occupational pension plans across the current work force is by far higher in the Coordinated 
market economies Finland and Denmark (both above 90 per cent) than in the Liberal market 
economy United Kingdom (ca. 60 per cent) (OECD 2009b: 141). 
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IV.3. Inequalities in recipient rates and private income shares  
The following analyses will analyse the current recipient rates of private (occupational and 
personal) pensions across the elderly population; defined as elderly persons are those who 
are aged 65 or older. Partners and household members below age 65 were excluded from the 
sample population; however since the analyses are based on household level income, the 
income of partners below age 65 and/or other household members is taken into account. 
Previous studies primarily evaluated one cross-section (Behrendt 2000 and 2007; Callegaro 
and Wilke 2008; Casey and Yamada 2004; Ebbinghaus and Neugschwender 2011; Pedersen 
2004; Yamada and Casey 2002); in the following repeated cross-sections will be presented. 
This proceeding allows an additional interpretation of current shifts in the public-private 
mix across the elderly. 
The data source for the analyses is the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. LIS 
provides a harmonised database that transforms national survey or register data to a 
common variable template; the datasets have a repeated cross-section structure. For the 
analyses the following datasets were evaluated: Denmark (1995, 2000, 2004), Finland (1995, 
2000, 2004), and the United Kingdom (1994, 1999, 2004).  
Total pension income includes payments for all three functions old age, disability, and 
survivors. It is worth mentioning that all three systems hardly implemented systems for 
survivorship, therefore entitlement is mostly individualised, and less influenced by derived 
transfers. Due to data restrictions, occupational and personal pensions were combined to 
private pensions; if a split had been possible it would have made a clear difference only in 
the United Kingdom, whereas in both Nordic countries the importance of the third pillar is 
negligible.  
The LIS data evaluations in Table 1 and 2 document private pension recipient rates and the 
importance of private pensions in the public-private mix at three points in time: mid 1990s, 
around 2000s, and mid 2000s. Recipient rates are calculated on the personal and household 
level. Private income shares are presented at the household level, as this is the common 
measurement for living standards. All household income statistics are equivalised by 
dividing the household income by the number of household members. Full intra-household 
redistribution of income is assumed; this is the standard approach in income inequality 
research (Jenkins and van Kerm 2009; Salverda et al. 2009).  
Intra-household redistribution increases recipient rates among couples. Partners/spouses 
who personally do not receive private pensions might profit indirectly from other private 
pension beneficiaries in the household. Due to the lower labour market attachment of 
women, primarily female spouses might be affected by this indirect recipient pattern. 
The Finnish private pension recipient rates were by far the highest in this comparison (see 
Table 1). The recipient rates were fairly stable over time signifying the maturity of the 
system; even women’s recipient rates reached values close to 80 per cent on the individual 
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level. The lowest recipient rates existed in the age group 85 or older, but even this group 
received nearly half of their household income from private schemes (see Table 2).  
In the United Kingdom, especially women were more and more also receiving private 
pensions, whereas men’s recipient rate slightly decreased. However, there remained a 
positive development on the household level: three quarter of the households received 
private pensions, the recipient rate increased by 7 percentage points over the 10 year period. 
The increase was mostly driven by higher recipient rates of elderly persons aged 75 or older; 
in contrast to this, the recipient rate of persons aged 65 to 74 increased only slightly. 
Denmark’s most recent data of the mid 2000s showed that the recipient rate strongly 
increased. However, the occupational schemes were still far away from comprehensive 
recipient rates; the outcomes of the quasi-mandatory collective agreements need to mature 
further to depict a clear shift towards a higher importance of occupational pensions. During 
the 1990s, shortly after the implementation of negotiated pension plans, the total recipient 
rate was rather low (ca. 21 per cent). This number increased in the following 10 years on 
average by approximately 40 per cent. But still, on the individual level, only 30 per cent of 
the elderly population were receiving private pensions. On the household level this 
accumulated to almost 50 per cent. 
Table 1: Recipient rate of private pension income by socio-demographic characteristics (65+) 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. 
United Kingdom Finland Denmark
mid90s around 00 mid00s mid90s around 00* mid00s* mid90s around 00 mid00s
Individual level total 50.7 49.7 52.3 80.6 79.4 80.3 20.8 25.2 28.9
gender men 70.9 65.9 66.0 85.2 84.7 85.1 23.7 27.9 32.1
women 36.1 38.5 42.0 77.0 75.3 76.5 18.9 23.3 26.7
age-group 65-74 54.5 51.3 52.0 81.5 81.1 81.3 23.1 27.6 31.6
75-84 47.8 51.4 54.6 80.8 78.1 80.7 20.5 25.4 28.9
85+ 36.1 39.1 48.2 69.7 69.2 68.4 11.9 15.0 18.6
household size 1 52.5 54.9 55.7 79.1 75.5 78.0 18.6 22.8 26.2
2 50.7 48.2 51.7 79.9 79.8 80.1 23.1 27.9 31.6
> 2 43.0 41.0 43.3 85.3 83.4 83.9 19.4 19.0 25.7
Household level total 68.0 69.9 75.2 97.8 96.4 97.5 38.3 42.6 48.0
gender men 74.4 74.8 79.8 99.2 98.5 99.0 38.9 43.6 49.4
women 62.9 65.9 71.3 96.9 94.8 96.3 37.8 41.8 46.8
age-group 65-74 73.1 73.0 77.8 98.9 98.4 98.7 41.3 45.3 51.0
75-84 61.7 68.4 74.0 96.8 93.5 96.7 37.0 42.1 47.2
85+ 50.7 53.5 64.2 93.2 92.6 91.5 24.7 29.3 33.3
household size 1 52.5 57.2 60.8 94.6 90.3 93.3 29.2 33.0 35.9
2 75.4 77.0 82.1 98.8 98.7 99.1 43.4 48.2 54.2
>2 61.3 60.9 65.5 98.9 96.8 97.3 33.7 34.8 42.1
income decile 1st(lowest) 25.2 29.3 31.9 87.9 86.5 85.9 18.2 20.5 24.0
2nd 27.4 31.8 46.5 95.3 89.1 96.1 8.5 4.0 6.0
3rd 50.3 61.0 62.6 97.5 96.5 96.5 3.6 4.6 7.2
4th 65.6 62.4 74.7 97.5 96.5 99.0 5.9 7.4 13.3
5th 71.3 72.3 81.5 100.0 97.5 98.9 8.3 17.4 24.5
6th 77.6 79.9 80.1 100.0 99.6 100.0 36.6 51.0 65.1
7th 82.3 82.1 87.7 100.0 98.4 99.6 56.0 57.9 65.2
8th 88.3 86.8 91.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 65.0 76.4 82.0
9th 92.4 96.0 96.4 100.0 100.0 99.2 86.7 90.5 94.1
10th(highest) 98.4 97.5 99.3 100.0 100.0 99.7 94.1 96.3 98.1
Notes: *LIS coding for the public and private pensions was changed in Finland in wave 5, on the household level 
employment-related pensions were considered private pensions; this information was not available on the individual level, 
values for 2000 and mid 2000s were calculated on the household level.
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The developments in the United Kingdom and Denmark were generated by diverging shifts 
in the old-age income mixes. First, there could be a similar development observed across the 
oldest group of the elderly. In Demark particularly the coverage of the elderly aged 75 or 
more increased due to the increasing inclusion to voluntary plans. For this age-group the 
reforms in the beginning of the 1990s had almost no effect; most of them were already 
claiming pension benefits when the new legislation became effective. Therefore the strong 
increases in these age groups exemplify an increasing self selection into private schemes over 
time. This situation could be observed similarly in the United Kingdom.  
The situation was quite different for the younger group of the elderly. The increased 
recipient rate for the younger group of the Danish elderly can be related to the mandatory 
inclusion to occupational pensions. Recipient rates increased by nearly 40 per cent, although 
the importance for the income was still rather low. This differentiates the Danish 
development quite strongly from the British situation, where recipient rate patterns 
remained rather stable for the more recent generations of retirees.  
In terms of the income share of private pensions in the total pension income mix, the same 
ranking between the countries could be observed (see Table 2): In the mid 2000s, the highest 
importance in the public-private mix created the Finnish schemes (ca. 70 per cent), followed 
by the British (ca. 30 per cent), and the Danish (ca. 20 per cent). Alternatively, the income 
share can be calculated for the private pension income recipients only; this view refers to the 
idea how important are the private pensions for those who are receiving them.  
Table 2: Share of private pension income in the public-private pension income mix by socio-
demographic characteristics (65+) 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. 
United Kingdom Finland Denmark
mid90s around 00 mid00s mid90s around 00* mid00s* mid90s around 00 mid00s
Household level total 25.2 26.4 30.5 63.5 64.3 69.6 16.1 17.8 19.6
37.0 37.6 40.3 64.8 66.7 71.3 41.9 41.7 40.7
gender men 28.1 28.8 33.0 69.1 71.7 75.9 16.5 18.5 20.2
women 22.9 24.4 28.2 59.5 58.6 64.4 15.8 17.2 19.1
age-group 65-74 28.0 29.0 33.2 70.4 71.2 75.8 18.0 19.1 20.5
75-84 21.6 23.6 28.1 55.8 57.6 63.3 14.8 17.3 19.7
85+ 17.0 18.8 23.3 38.5 40.1 49.9 9.2 12.1 14.2
household 1 19.0 21.0 23.4 60.1 52.8 56.8 12.4 14.3 15.5
2 29.4 30.0 34.4 68.8 72.1 77.0 18.5 20.1 21.9
>2 19.0 20.4 22.9 50.8 52.7 56.7 12.4 12.9 16.5
income decile 1st(lowest) 6.0 8.4 8.1 33.1 31.6 41.2 5.2 6.0 6.9
2nd 4.9 5.2 8.9 37.6 39.6 46.7 1.6 1.2 1.4
3rd 8.9 11.6 12.4 41.9 50.4 53.8 0.8 0.9 1.1
4th 13.1 13.2 18.9 49.7 57.8 59.6 0.8 0.9 2.2
5th 18.7 16.9 23.8 63.6 64.3 72.1 1.2 2.3 4.0
6th 21.3 23.9 26.7 66.6 70.8 79.4 6.2 9.6 14.6
7th 26.6 28.2 34.4 79.5 73.0 81.4 15.6 15.7 18.6
8th 36.0 36.7 42.3 82.8 80.7 84.3 24.7 29.1 32.0
9th 47.7 51.1 55.1 87.0 82.1 86.1 42.4 45.6 47.1
10th(highest) 68.3 68.1 73.1 92.6 92.8 90.9 62.2 66.5 67.7
Notes: Share calculated on the gross income amounts.
*LIS coding for the public and private pensions was changed in Finland in wave 5, on the household level employment-
related pensions were considered private pensions, this information was not available on the individual level, values for 2000
and mid 2000s were calculated on the household level.
among private 
pension recipients
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For private pension recipients it could be observed that these incomes were similarly 
important in the income mix for British and Danish pensioners (ca. 40 per cent). Therefore in 
both countries private pensions were strongly complementing the income for those who 
receive them.  
Similarly to recipient rate patterns, the private income share of pensioners aged 75 or older 
increased substantially in all three countries. This increase could be observed even in 
Finland, where recipient rates were already stable over time. This indicates that the 
abolishment of Finnish basic pensions limited the role of public pensions. Additionally, the 
younger birth cohorts had longer contribution period to the various mandatory occupational 
schemes that had been introduced only in the 1960s and 1970s. Thus the older cohorts 
entered the working phase already before the introduction of the mandatory occupational 
schemes. However, the cut of the public basic pension seems to have affected particularly 
two-person households, where the private pension share increased from approximately 69 to 
77 per cent; due to their combined higher pension income they were less likely to be eligible 
to the pension-income tested targeted pension. The British data show that private pensions 
still increased in importance in the public-private pension mix, particularly across men, 
although recipient rates even slightly declined.  
The findings support that being in a two person household strongly increased the private 
income share; most of these households might be couples. The higher share of elderly 
women among single person households decreased the importance of private pensions. 
Larger households that mostly relate to multigenerational households showed in general 
lower importance of private pensions, as in these households the incomes of other household 
members below age 65 become more relevant. 
IV.4. Inequalities in benefit levels  
As documented in the historical overview of the three pension systems, this cross-national 
comparison shows a broad institutional variation in terms of minimum pension policies. The 
British system ties entitlement to the basic pension to a minimum period of labour-market 
inclusion, whereas the Danish and Finnish basic and targeted schemes are based on 
residency and income tests that are unlinked from employment. Whereas the Danish scheme 
upheld a combination of basic amount and targeted supplement, the recent reformation in 
Finland in 1996 transformed the old universal minimum pension scheme to a purely targeted 
minimum pension. OECD estimations mirror that Danish low-income earners might profit 
from a strong increase in the minimum claims since the 1970s. The level of income-tested 
pension can amount to approximately double the amount of the basic national basic pension, 
guaranteeing an income of 36 (18 + 18) per cent of Danish average earnings (OECD 2009b 
158-60). The Danish system provides much higher minimum pensions than in the United 
Kingdom (28 (14 + 14)) and Finland (18).  
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Figure 1 depicts the disposable income of the elderly in relation to national median 
disposable income across the whole society split by income deciles. Individuals are 
distributed to each decile with respect to their total net disposable income.7 The first income 
decile refers the individuals living in the households with the lowest disposable income. Two 
additional curves are plotted for the same decile: total pension income (net) and public 
pension income (net). Thus for each decile the distance between the y axis and the public 
pension curve reflects the importance of public pension, the distance between public 
pensions and total pensions signifies the importance of private pensions, and the distance 
between total pensions and disposable income clarifies the role of other income sources such 
as work and capital income.  
The shape of the curves demonstrates that allocation of the individuals occurred via two 
effects: a higher share of private pensions, but also a higher share of other income sources in 
the income mix. In comparison to the Nordic countries the British income distribution looks 
much more unequal at the upper end of the income distribution. 
In all three countries public pensions are relatively equally distributed across the income 
deciles. This is in line with the assumed distributional consequences of a public Beveridge 
type minimum pension policy. In all countries, these schemes mainly provide the first tier, 
preventing poverty. With regard to generosity of minimum pension benefits, we find the 
following country order: the low-income group in Denmark was better off than in Finland, 
whereas British retirees were worst off. The diverging characteristics of the public pension 
curves document the contrasting redistribution logic in each country. The highest public 
pensions were paid on average in the sixth income decile in the United Kingdom, in the fifth 
income decile in Denmark, while in Finland the highest benefits were paid to the first income 
decile. This highlights that the Finnish system more strongly concentrates on vertical 
                                                          
7 In order to be able to show net pension income levels, the gross pension incomes were transformed 
to net values. 
Figure 1: Income distribution of net disposable income, total pensions, and public pensions (65+, mid 00s) 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. 
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redistribution, whereas in Denmark and the United Kingdom public schemes provide also 
an essential part of income for the middle-income group: in the United Kingdom primarily 
via SERPS benefits, in Denmark via income-tested supplements of the national pension and 
ATP-benefits.  
In Finland private pensions are by far the most important income source, as reflected by the 
distance between the public and total pension income lines. Even in the lowest income 
deciles basic pension income is complemented with occupational pensions by 40 percent. 
The long maturing process of the occupational schemes generated a high relevance for the 
entire elderly population. The evaluation over the three points in time (see Table 2) signifies 
that the importance of public pensions decreased primarily for the low-income group as an 
effect of shifting to entirely targeted pension benefits since 1996. Private pensions were the 
most important income source for the middle-income group – on average 70 per cent came 
from second and third-pillar schemes. The relative importance of private pensions was lower 
again in the high-income group. In turn labour and capital income increased in importance. 
However, as can be seen in Figure 1, in absolute terms also higher private pensions were 
paid, reflecting that the high-income group had either rather high private pensions, or rather 
high other income, or a mix of both. 
In the United Kingdom the share of private pensions was below 10 per cent for the lowest 
income decile. Increasing with income more and more persons may have substituted the 
SERPS benefits with favourable contracting out to private pensions, this effect gets stronger 
the longer persons decided to contract out of the SERPS. Voluntary occupational pensions 
were widely spread across the society even across low-income group, however particularly 
in the upper half of the elderly population, private pensions were more relevant. Previous 
studies showed that the SERPS lead to a segmented occupational provision along gender and 
occupational lines (Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby 1987: 119-130), particularly leaving part-
time workers in the SERPS (Ginn and Arber 2000). As these risk groups consequently had 
low SERPS benefits and hardly any private pensions, they barely escape poverty (less than 50 
per cent of median disposable income, reflected by the 0.5 line in Figure 1). The high-income 
group had stronger incentives to contract out, as pension replacement by basic pensions and 
SERPS can be considered too low in order to maintain previous living standards. Therefore, a 
notable increase in the private pension income share could be observed already in the low 
and middle-income group. From the distribution of public benefits we can conclude that 
from the seventh decile to the highest decile the effect of contracting out of SERPS outmatched 
the increase in SERPS benefits. As more and more people in the high-income group were 
likely to have contracted out permanently, SERPS benefits only marginally contributed to the 
average disposable income of the high-income group. On the other hand due to the higher 
contributions to the occupational and personal plans, the income share received by private 
pensions strongly increased by income. Due to the strong labour market inequality in the 
United Kingdom, high inequalities are partly transferred to the elderly through higher 
private pension promises (DB schemes) and higher capital accumulation (DC schemes). In 
terms of disposable income, the British high-income group are much better off than the 
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middle-income group, but also than the Danish and Finnish high-income group. Again this 
is only partly an effect of higher pensions, but even more other income sources are adding 
up to the overall inequality across the elderly population. But also the private pension share 
in the pension income mix increased strongly from the seventh (40 per cent) to the highest 
income decile (73 per cent).  
The Danish figures demonstrate that the population below the median was almost 
exclusively receiving public pensions. Consequently, the lines of public and total pensions 
almost match each other. However, this group profited from the generous basic amount and 
the income-tested supplement that lifted their income above 50 per cent of Danish median 
income earnings, thus poverty could by and large prevented. Also the slope of disposable 
income only slightly increased until the seventh income decile, illustrating that there existed 
a lack of provision for the middle-income group. Pension income levels of the middle and 
high-income group are by far the lowest in this three country comparison. As income levels 
are still primarily influenced by the past institutions that kept occupational pensions highly 
unregulated, we might conclude that the Danish voluntary private schemes failed to provide 
adequate replacement. Two effects can be linked to this situation. First, the low-income 
group could expect relatively high targeted pensions, which may have hindered the 
development of private second-tier schemes. Second, the higher private pensions were, the 
more cut were public benefits. This is reflected by the decreasing income level of public 
pensions for the high-income group. Consequently, the income-tested public pensions 
decreased inequality of pension benefits partly. Private pensions were much more relevant 
in the public-private pension mix in the high-income group. From the seventh (32 per cent) 
to the highest income decile (68 per cent) the income share of private pensions more than 
doubles. Thus the high-income group seems very likely to have been included in traditional 
voluntary occupational plans over a longer period of time.  
Lastly, I will now evaluate the disposable household income levels received by the median 
elderly person. The median elderly person aged 65 or above (see Table 3) was worst off in 
Denmark (69 per cent of equivalised disposable household of the total population) due to the 
historical lack of provision. The median elderly person was better off in the United Kingdom 
(78 per cent) mainly through other income sources besides pension income. Similarly well off 
was the median elderly person in Finland (78 per cent), mostly due to the highly regulated 
occupational schemes. These statistics were rather stable in Denmark and the United 
Kingdom. The Finnish number dropped quite strongly between the observations from 1995 
to 2000 from 84 to 79 per cent. This can be linked again to the general abolishment of basic 
pensions.  
IV.5. Inequalities among the elderly in relation to the whole society 
The previous evaluation of income showed that particularly the British system generated 
high inequalities through the income level on the upper end. However, this finding does not 
support that the high-income group also received a high replacement rate. The high income 
values in relation to the median need to be considered as a by-product of high labour market 
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inequalities. In contrast, income inequalities of the elderly tended to be lower in the Nordic 
countries due to more equal labour market income distributions. I will put the income of the 
elderly in relation to the income of the total population in order to receive a better 
understanding about the relative income levels of the income groups.   
In the following, I will analyse inequalities of the total population and the 65 and above 
population simultaneously.8 For each population the mean equivalised income level for each 
income decile was calculated. The division of each decile for the 65 and over population by 
the respective decile for the total population curve leads to a relative income level of each 
income decile group. I will depict two curves in Figure 2: The first curve (Figure 2a) shows 
equivalised net disposable income of the elderly in relation to equivalised net disposable 
income by the total population. The second curve (Figure 2b) illustrates net total pension 
income of the elderly in relation to equivalised net disposable income by the total 
population; this procedure proxies the idea of income replacement and reproduced market 
income inequalities along the income distribution. 
If income inequality is similarly reproduced for all income groups, we would expect a stable 
income level over all income groups. However, this measurement technique has some 
limitations. First, the sorting in the income groups occurs very differently across the elderly 
population than it does in the pre-retirement group, as the household structures are very 
different in both groups. Second, also other income sources besides earnings respectively 
pensions could be quite different. Still, this technique might clarify the generic cross-national 
differences in the income distribution of the elderly that originated from country-specific 
pension systems.  
Two additional refinements in addition to the data preparation for Figure 1 have been made. 
First, a standard technique has been applied to top code the incomes of the highest one per 
cent percentile to the value of the 99th percentile to limit measurement bias of mean income 
in the highest income decile. For Figure 2b only households whose pension income share 
was at least 60 per cent were kept. This procedure allows a more precise measurement of 
inequality caused by the pension system, and reduces the bias by employment income.  
There are three notable circumstances that need further attention. First, earnings-related 
insurance schemes typically aim at replacing only a certain percentage of previous earnings; 
thus the ratio is expected to be below one. Second, minimum pension regulations 
particularly detach the low-income group from this scenario; due to minimum pension the 
low-income group may eventually show ratios above one. Otherwise the low-income group 
would fall below their already poor income level. These income levels could be higher than 
their former disposable income level, when minimum pensions are rather generous. Third, 
several persons aged 65 and above received a high share of earnings or other income, either 
personally or through intra-household redistribution. As shown in Figure 1, these persons 
ended up mostly in the high income deciles; therefore higher ratios might be also likely for 
the high-income group; Figure 2b tried to separate out this effect.  
                                                          
8 A similar technique has been applied by the OECD before (OECD 2001). 
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The ratios in Figure 2 show various interesting results. First, a clear positive effect of the 
minimum pension schemes for the low-income group could be observed in all three 
countries. The elderly in the first income decile were as well off as those in the first decile of 
the total population. In the United Kingdom they were even slightly better off (Figure 2a). 
This effect vanished when analysing the pension income (Figure 2b). However, the income 
level was comparatively low for the working-age population and the elderly population. 
Although the British elderly were not more affected by poverty than the total British 
population, they were still affected most by poverty in this cross-national comparison. 
In Denmark relative income levels for the elderly declined fast from the low-income group to 
the median; the ratios declined more moderate in the United Kingdom and decrease rather 
slow in Finland. This fits quite well to the findings before. In Denmark, minimum pensions 
were by far the most important income source for the elderly persons below median income. 
Minimum benefits were only marginally complemented by the earnings-related ATP 
benefits or any forms of private pensions. As a result, income groups below the median 
received similar pensions (Figure 1). Figure 2b supports that inequality among the total 
population was much higher than among pensioners. Pensioners below and around the 
median seem to have lacked to save adequately for their old age; their income level dropped 
down below 55 per cent.  
This situation was less pronounced in the United Kingdom, but similarly inadequate. The 
low to middle-income group provided rather less for their retirement, as a result of low 
SERPS contributions, and low obligations for contributions to complementary private 
pensions.  
The legislation in Finland created a different scenario. A small group of pensioners fared less 
well compared to both other countries. This may be linked to the abolished basic pension 
entitlement. In contrast to Denmark and the United Kingdom, almost all elderly received an 
important share of their income from mandatory occupational schemes. These benefits were 
Figure 2: Income level of the elderly in relation to total population (mid 2000s) 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. 
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in general strongly linked to the previous earnings history. Thus the Finnish elderly 
population received more individualised pensions that aligned the income distribution of the 
elderly more closely to labour market inequality.  
In the upper income deciles the findings also differ quite strongly. The Finnish income levels 
remained rather stable also for the high-income group due to the employment linkage. The 
mandated occupational schemes seem to reproduce income inequality of the labour market 
also for the high-income group, as these schemes did not foresee contribution ceilings.  
In the British case basic pensions diminished in importance for replacing income for the 
middle to high-income group. It seems that the middle to high-income earners did not adjust 
their savings behaviour in order to receive similar high income levels like the low-income 
group. As a result the income levels dropped further in the high-income group. However, as 
shown in Figure 1, their income level was still rather high compared to median earnings of 
the total population. 
In the Danish scenario it can be concluded that if a person received private pension income, 
this pension was rather important for the household’s income mix. This signifies the still 
high relevance of fringe benefits in the form of occupational pension schemes. Therefore the 
curve showed slightly higher values on the upper end. 
IV.6. Conclusion: Different paths to private pensions – different societal 
inequalities?  
This three country case study brought further insights in the distribution of pension income 
among the elderly population in three advanced European societies: Finland, Denmark, and 
the United Kingdom. The three countries implemented their second-tier pension schemes 
very differently. Finnish tripartism early on introduced occupational schemes in the 1960s. In 
Denmark similar solutions regulated by binding collective agreements were only introduced 
in the 1990s. Thus the Danish elderly currently received pension income mostly from 
historically voluntary occupational schemes. Income-tested supplements to the basic 
pensions yield to a close connection between public and private benefits. The British second-
tier scheme was only partly mandatory on a low level; it also partly excluded the low and 
high-income group. The contracting out of the SERPS was particularly attractive for the 
middle and high-income groups.   
Consequently, occupational pensions were an important income source even for the low-
income group in Finland, whereas British and particularly the Danish low-income group 
were receiving primarily public pensions. The breaking down in income deciles made it 
possible to observe the pension income level of each group in relation to the population’s 
median equivalised disposable income. By applying this standard technique, income levels 
can be compared cross-nationally. In a second step the income distribution of the elderly can 
be compared also to the total population’s income inequality. The different paths that have 
developed in second-tier provision led to substantial differences in income inequalities 
among the elderly across the three countries.  
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Finnish second-tier schemes reached by far the highest importance in this comparison. The 
maturing of mandatory contributory schemes since the 1960s allowed the state to substitute 
public pension partially with occupational pensions. First, high importance of occupational 
pension benefits was reached, and then as a consequence public basic pensions were 
abolished so that the remaining income-tested scheme is now targeted to the poor only. 
Finnish median pensioners were much better off due to their inclusion to mandated 
contributory schemes. 
The Danish middle-income group showed rather low income levels. This situation occurred 
as a by-product of the former voluntary second-tier benefits and the rather generous basic 
pension plus targeted supplements. As this Danish public scheme guaranteed relatively high 
pensions, private pensions were crowded out for the middle-income group. As a 
consequence the middle-income group of the elderly received rather inadequate pensions in 
comparison to the respective total population’s income decile. Collective agreements will 
enhance a comprehensive coverage with occupational pensions and a stronger importance of 
occupational pensions in the income mix in the future.  
British pensions yielded a quite different redistribution. Income inequality among the elderly 
population was essentially reduced in comparison to the total population. However, this 
result was primarily caused by the insufficiencies of the pension system to attract voluntary 
savings behaviour. The low-income group had a high risk of poverty in general. The middle-
to-high income group received rather low pension income due to low public pensions and 
selective coverage with private schemes. Thus vertical and horizontal redistribution worked 
insufficiently. 
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V. Bismarck vs. Beveridge: pension income inequality developments 
in Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and the United Kingdom 
V.1.  Introduction9 
Social security of the elderly is a major concern of the welfare state. In post-industrialist 
societies, a major juncture of pension system design took place in the 1950s (Ebbinghaus and 
Gronwald 2011; Hinrichs 2000). These reforms affect income inequalities in various ways. 
Particularly earnings-related schemes developed over a long time period to provide full 
benefits; workers who started their employment career in the 1950s have retired by majority 
only in the 1990s. Thus, the oldest retirees in the current societies have not been fully affected 
by pension reform outcomes. On the other hand, the retired population is only affected by 
reforms that have a direct effect on pension income levels, such as adjustments to consumer 
prices or minimum income regulation. 
Analyses of reform processes in each nation state help clarify which interactions exist 
between specific schemes of public and private actors and how they have developed over 
time (see, for example, edited volumes by Arza and Kohli 2008a; Ebbinghaus 2011a; 
Immergut et al. 2007). However, important questions have remained insufficiently answered. 
These questions include: Do nation-specific paths provide adequacy of benefits for current 
pensioners? Does the shift towards a stronger role of private pension schemes exacerbate 
inequalities?  
The division of power between the government, social partners, and firms can be decisive for 
income inequalities among the elderly. Specific regulations of second-pillar schemes 
structure the public-private mix of provision. In turn these varying approaches to pension 
regulation affect the financial well-being of the aged, as different types of pension schemes 
induce manifold redistributive effects. Particularly private pension income is less studied 
and its effect on income inequalities among the elderly is less clear. 
In this chapter I will analyse inequalities in pension income and its on-going transformation 
among the elderly, taking into account its institutional reform path. I will analyse the 
interplay of public pensions and private pension components in four advanced European 
welfare states: Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. These nation states 
show a broad variation in their complementary design of public and private pension 
regulation and welfare state ideology.  
The Danish and the British systems are proponents of the Beveridge path of pension 
provision, primarily preventing poverty within the public scheme. In both countries, supple-
mentary provision had been designed in a liberal fashion primarily based on voluntarism. 
Only in the 1990s collective agreements became the Danish way of mandatory inclusion to 
private schemes. The strong, but decentralized social partners neglected to take action on a 
industry-wide level, as they were expecting the government to take action in a universal 
approach (Green-Pedersen 2007). This delineates the Danish situation from the Swedish one. 
                                                          
9 Chapter V is a further development of Neugschwender (2015), LIS Working Paper No. 627. 
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The Swedish actors pursued a mixed strategy based on tripartism. Besides minimum 
pensions, the Swedish state also regulates contributions to earnings-related public schemes. 
In addition, occupational pensions have become an important component of the savings 
structure since the 1960s and 1970s, where various universal industry-wide collective 
agreements were decided.  
In Germany, the public social insurance system was broadly extended in the late 1950s, 
securing also the living standard up to a certain income ceiling. Occupational schemes were 
only marginally important for income security, concentrated on specific occupational 
groups. 
The structure of this chapter is the following. First, an introductory section describes the 
main institutional arrangements in each of the country-specific pension systems. Secondly, 
and based on this framework, I will analyse nation-specific profiles of public-private 
regulation. This will include an empirical evaluation of private pension recipient rates and 
private pension income shares using the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. In doing 
so, it will include evaluations by income deciles that describe inequalities of income. I will 
use relative income levels, which measure overall adequacy of pension income in relation to 
society’s income standards. In addition to inequality profiles, I will use common inequality 
indicators like poverty rates and Gini coefficients. The repeated cross-sections cover the 
development that has occurred between 2000 and mid 2000s.  
V.2. Historical pension system development 
This section will focus on the major nation-specific policies which were implemented to 
provide social security to the elderly, and which mostly affected the current pension income 
of the currently retired population. 
Germany is frequently referred to the ideal-typical case of a social insurance system. German 
Reich’s chancellor Bismarck introduced this scheme in 1889. In the beginning, rather selective 
public first-pillar schemes for high-qualified employees were step-by-step extended to a 
broader group of employees. Major extensions of the public scheme (GRV) took place in 
1957. A general replacement rate of 70 per cent of previous earnings was envisaged (Schmähl 
1997). The GRV scheme is based on the principle of equivalence, where benefits should 
closely match paid contributions. Occupational pensions diminished in importance during 
the maturation of the public pension scheme, but never eroded completely due to two 
peculiarities (Schmähl 1994; Schmähl 1997): First, self-employed persons were not 
compulsorily included. Second, contributions involved an upper limit, so that high-income 
earners needed to provide outside the state scheme if they expected to maintain a high 
replacement of their earnings. Various reform initiatives in the 2000s will lead to a slow 
decrease in public pension income levels, while on the other hand; occupational and 
personal pension provision has been favoured by the state. State allowances or favourable 
tax deductions make private pensions more attractive for all income groups (Ebbinghaus et 
al. 2011; Hinrichs 2005; Schmähl 2004). Researchers in the field are concerned that old-age 
poverty will rise, as the restructuring of the scheme kept private pensions on a voluntary 
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basis. Therefore, temporarily employed or low-qualified persons might frequently stay 
uncovered by private pension savings (Hauser 2008; Hinrichs 2008; Neugschwender 2008). 
Since the German system provides only minimum benefits in the form of extended social 
assistance claims for the elderly, this scenario is non-negligible under current regulation.  
The Swedish combination of public minimum benefits and public earnings-related pensions 
(ATP) appears to be most similar to the German system in this cross-country comparison. 
But still, essential differences exist. First of all, the Swedish system is characterized as an 
encompassing system based on universal inclusion (Korpi and Palme 1998). However, the 
former system is going through a major transformation since the reformation during the 
1990s (Kangas et al. 2010; Lindquist and Wadensjö 2011): Initially, the Swedish system 
implemented generous first-tier universal basic pension and now it has been replaced by an 
income-tested guaranteed minimum pension on a lower level. Therefore, the new system 
might reduce benefits particularly to those with low inclusion to the labour market. In favour 
of occupational pensions, the guaranteed pension is not tested against earnings and 
occupational pension income. Also the former earnings-related component of the public 
scheme (ATP) was replaced by a new scheme. ATP faced several problems since its 
introduction in 1960. It was not financially sustainable, and the defined benefits were 
expected to turn into a flat-rate pension for the majority of male providers (Green-Pedersen 
and Lindbom 2006). Thus the earnings-related ATP is currently being transformed to a 
notional defined contribution scheme that is based on a pay-as-you-go basis, containing an 
income ceiling (OECD 2013a). The scheme is topped up by a funded premium pension 
(Engström and Westerberg 2003; Palmer 2008). However, in contrast to Germany and also in 
the United Kingdom and for a long time in Denmark, occupational pensions were early on 
set up to complement public pensions. At the same time when ATP was implemented, social 
partners negotiated collective agreements, first for white-collar workers and the public sector 
(1960), and then later for blue-collar workers in the private sector (1973) (Lindquist and 
Wadensjö 2011). Given the limited public scheme benefits, they should be particularly 
relevant for the high-income group (Green-Pedersen and Lindbom 2006). Although 
occupational pension schemes covered the whole workforce on a mandatory basis for a long 
period, the role of private pensions for the income package was still minor in the mid 1990s 
(Behrendt 2000). The major reason is the low level for mandatory contributions of 
approximately two per cent of earnings (Palmer 2008). 
Danish and Swedish pension policies were rather similar before the critical juncture around 
1950. In the following years, the social actor’s regulatory approach developed in rather 
different paths (Ebbinghaus and Gronwald 2011; Green-Pedersen and Lindbom 2006; Kangas 
et al. 2010). In Sweden, social partners and the state introduced an earnings-related 
component of the first pillar (ATP) and collective agreements made occupational pensions 
quasi-mandatory for the public and private sector since the 1960-70s. On the contrary, the 
Danish government primarily increased the minimum pension level, and introduced an 
earnings-related second-tier scheme based on working hours (ATP). Thereafter, since 1964, 
the public minimum pension involves two parts: a basic amount (people’s pension) and an 
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income-tested amount that is pension payments twice the basic amount. The ATP 
complements only marginally contribute to the income package of the elderly (Andersen 
2011; Green-Pedersen 2007). The rather generous minimum pension regulation secured 
income replacement for low-income earners quite well, but left a high gap for middle and 
high-income groups (Kangas et al. 2010). Private pensions, on the other hand, were kept 
mostly unregulated until the 1990s. Take-up-rates of voluntary private pension plans 
remained fairly low with exceptions of public and white-collar employees (von Nordheim 
Nielsen 1996). Social partners aimed at better protection. In contrast to other Nordic 
countries tripartite negotiations fizzled out, as both the state and social partners demanded 
the opposite actor to take action (Green-Pedersen 2007). However, scarce benefits for better 
paid blue-collar workers in the metal industry became a major concern of the respective 
unions (Green-Pedersen and Lindbom 2006). As a result, in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
policies shifted extensively towards self-administered social partner agreements. More and 
more sector-based binding regulations were decided, following the initiatives in the public 
and metal sector. Current coverage among the Danish workforce is now equally high as in 
Sweden, exceeding 90 per cent (OECD 2009b). The future public-private mix will clearly shift 
towards a stronger role of private elements. As a consequence of compulsory enrolment to 
private plans, the public income-tested minimum pension will decline in importance in the 
future. Kangas et al. (2010) argue that these developments lead to an essential convergence of 
Nordic pension regimes again, where earnings-related private second-tier pensions will 
maintain a part of previous earnings. As these pensions are more strongly linked to earnings, 
inequalities may shift towards previous labour market inequalities and rebalance the public-
private mix. 
Building on the liberal tradition, the British system seems to pay less attention to state 
regulation in general. In comparison to Continental European and Nordic countries, the 
British state left social welfare issues more to the private area (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
Indeed, first-tier basic pensions introduced in 1948, concentrated mostly on vertical 
redistribution. Since reformation in 1975, public benefits were backed up with contributions 
to the State Earnings Related Pensions Scheme (SERPS). Through the SERPS, public and 
occupational pension components were directly linked together and should provide the 
second tier. The regulation allowed a contracting out of the SERPS if a person already had 
favourable occupational pensions, and since 1986 also personal pensions allowed a 
contracting out. This solution was also backed up by stately tax deductions. This meant that 
persons who were obligated to contribution payments had either to contribute to the SERPS 
or private schemes. At the same time, this can be described as the crux of the system – the 
public schemes leave low-income earners and workers with interrupted careers inadequately 
protected. Persons below the lower earnings limit were excluded from the SERPS, and the 
same group frequently had also no private pensions (Schulze and Moran 2007). British 
private pension protection remained mainly dependent on individual employer-employee 
negotiations. Consequently, not all employers offered occupational schemes for their 
employees. Moreover, due to taking back a part of the initial extension through the 1986 
reforms, both public schemes together provide only meagre pension income benefits 
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(Schulze and Moran 2007; Taylor-Gooby 2005). Since 2003, a Guaranteed Minimum Pension 
provides another social first-tier benefit for those poorly protected by other pension income 
(Blake 2003; Taylor-Gooby 2005). Similarly, targeted at the poorest income groups, over the 
next 50 years, SERPS will gradually be modified to the State Second Pension (S2P), 
transforming the second-tier public component to a second flat-rate (Bridgen and Meyer 
2011; Disney and Emmerson 2005). Effects yielded by this reform are still marginally 
observable in the income mix of current retirees. 
V.3. Labour market attachment and pension system inclusion  
The institutionalist perspective revealed various properties of each country’s old-age security 
systems. Besides these differences in pension system regulation there are also labour market 
and gender role differences when comparing the financial situation of the elderly in a cross-
national perspective.  
The male-breadwinner model describes gender differences in labour market participation 
(Esping-Andersen 2002; Lewis 1992; Lewis 2001; Taylor-Gooby 2001). This traditional model 
assumes a male as the permanent full-time earner in a typical household situation, whereas 
the female spouse is mainly engaged in the household responsibilities such as caring for the 
children, elderly, and disabled household members. The male-breadwinner model assumes that 
the head of the household’s social security is sufficient enough for the entire family. Thus, 
the system is designed to provide more security to the household head and less security to 
the spouses. During retirement female spouses may receive minimum pension benefits and 
profit from intra-household redistribution or take on the pension of a deceased partner. 
In Germany and in the United Kingdom, women were largely excluded from the labour 
market over the last decades. Thus they may be more dependent on derived benefits or 
redistribution within the family. In Germany the GRV scheme also redistributes derived 
benefits to risk groups, whereas redistribution is rather less present in the British public 
schemes. Thus it is likely that many women end up with rather low basic pension benefits 
complemented by rather low SERPS respective private pension benefits. It is more difficult to 
expect clear patterns for individual pension benefits in Germany due to the various 
redistribution mechanisms in the public scheme. However, in terms of own individual 
benefits, spouses may not be eligible to personal social assistance benefits since these are 
calculated on the household’s income. 
Women in the United Kingdom and the two Nordic countries receive personal basic pension 
benefits. Additional income from second-tier schemes can lift old-age income above 
minimum benefits. However as women’s earnings were rather low for the current group of 
women, a high share may end up with income close to the minimum amount. As the Nordic 
countries also provide less survivor pensions, elderly single households are at high risk of 
poverty because they lack the essential share of benefits from their deceased spouses. 
Occupational schemes have developed in quite different directions. Thus inclusion to 
second-pillar schemes might vary strongly in relation to sector of employment and occupa-
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tional status. In general, the Nordic countries and Germany are undergoing a transformation 
towards a stronger role of occupational and private pension plans. In the United Kingdom 
occupational pensions have always been an important component of old-age provision. Most 
recent reforms mainly aimed to strengthen vertical public redistribution to the poor. 
In Denmark, more and more groups will retire with additional occupational benefits from 
the collectively agreed schemes from the 1990s. In contrast income-tested benefits of the 
targeted scheme will decrease in importance. Although employees contributed various years 
to collective schemes, a certain group of the elderly is no longer affected by this regulation. 
Age cohorts born 1930 or earlier either have already retired before the regulation became 
effective, or have retired shortly after its implementation. The working hours based scheme 
ATP is less important for the income mix and not directly linked to the earnings-level. 
In Sweden and Germany public schemes have been cut, so that future retirees are in need to 
mix their provision more than before. In Sweden, complementary schemes in the 
occupational sphere have been already highly regulated since the 1960s. The current retirees 
are broadly covered by additional income from these schemes. However, contributions were 
fixed on a rather low level around two per cent of earnings, limiting a broad importance of 
occupational pensions. 
In Germany, only some occupational groups were protected by mandated schemes. Social 
partners did not focus to strengthen occupational pension for all employees, as the earnings-
related GRV scheme provided reasonably high replacement rates. This protection made 
additional income sources mostly obsolete. However, as a result of the major cuts during the 
1990s reforms, the replacement rate will decrease in future. Therefore, German future retirees 
are neither universally protected by minimum pension entitlements nor by highly regulated 
complementary pensions besides the earnings-related public pension. In this scheme, retirees 
are subject to market forces and thereby must seek resources outside the public scheme to 
have secure retirement income. As not all individuals will contract additional private 
pension plans, the decreased generosity of GRV benefits may lead to inadequate saving 
profiles. 
The British case seems to be even more selective. Poverty and inequality has ever been high 
due to poor benefits for the low-income group and selective benefits for the high-income 
group. Several groups stayed excluded from additional voluntary private schemes, and only 
circa half of the working-age population contributed to such schemes. Furthermore, the 
public schemes envisaged no meaningful replacement rate like in Germany. Instead, British 
government directly linked public and private second-tier benefits to each other. Persons had 
to stay either in SERPS or could contract out if they already had approved personal plans in the 
private area. Thus persons accumulated years contracted out of SERPS, years in the SERPS, 
and years excluded from the SERPS. Many British retirees may have neglected the 
importance to save adequately for their retirement phase. Previous analyses seem to confirm 
that strong inequalities were determining the savings profiles, and strong inequalities 
consequently shape the British elderly population (Disney and Whitehouse 2001; Ebbinghaus 
and Neugschwender 2011; Ginn and Arber 1999). 
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V.4. Inequalities in recipient rates and private income shares 
The following descriptive statistics show inequalities and current developments among the 
elderly in nation-specific perspective. Socio-demographic and socio-economic distinctions 
are accounted for to evaluate and interpret these inequalities. All analyses are based on the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. The data provider LIS prepared income data 
from national income surveys to gain cross-national comparability. The following datasets 
were used: Denmark (2000, 2004), Germany (2000, 2004), Sweden (2000, 2005), the United 
Kingdom (1999, 2004). 
In this study the elderly are defined as the population aged 65 or above. However, all 
statistics are based on the respective household’s net income position.10 It is assumed that all 
income is redistributed equally to all household members, a standard technique applied in 
income inequality and poverty research (Jenkins and van Kerm 2009; Salverda et al. 2009).  
Figure 1 shows the income mix of pensioners by income deciles. The lowest income decile 
(first) describes the situation of the elderly’s poorest 10 per cent. Income is subdivided in 
‘public pensions’, ‘private pensions’, ‘earnings’, and ‘other income’. 11  The results 
demonstrate that in all countries public income was by far the most important income 
source; circa 80 per cent of income was provided by the state, in Denmark even more than 90 
per cent. Also in the second to sixth income deciles public transfers remained the major 
income source over market related income. However, all four figures indicate that market 
related income from earnings or private pensions tended to raise the income position of 
these households, so that they were likely to end up in the upper half of the population. In 
the highest income deciles these two income sources together were most important for the 
income position, replacing public transfers’ importance.  
In line with the mixed British savings structure, occupational and personal pensions were 
particularly important in the United Kingdom. Private pensions contributed on average circa 
40 per cent to the income mix, followed by almost 30 per cent in Denmark, 20 per cent in 
Sweden, and only 8 per cent in Germany (see Table 1). Importance of private pensions 
increased in all countries. Recipient rates are highest in Sweden due to the long tradition of 
mandated occupational pensions. Between the two points in time coverage still increased 
from 85 to 90 per cent (see Table 1). Similar increases in private pension recipient patterns 
were also visible in the other countries. Whereas around 2005 three out of four elderly in the 
United Kingdom received benefits from private pensions in the household, only around half 
of the Danish and one quarter of German households were covered. This signifies again that 
various older birth cohorts have no longer been affected by the more recent reforms.  
                                                          
10 All evaluated LIS datasets involve gross and net (disposable) household income. Disposable income 
is derived by subtraction of payroll and income taxes from gross income. Specific income sources 
were only available in gross amounts. Therefore, in order to evaluate living standards based on 
actual disposable income, by breaking it down to income sources, a simple netting down procedure 
has been applied, deducting the observed average tax rate by each income decile. 
11 The category other income involves, e. g. health insurance.  
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Figure 2 evaluates private pension recipient rate and income share patterns by gender. All 
figures exemplify the increasing importance of private pensions in the public-private mix. 
Between the two points in time coverage and income share increased in general. Gender 
differences were diminishing in Germany and Sweden, were rather stable in the United 
Kingdom, and were slightly increasing in Denmark. However, Danish discrepancy was 
already on a very low level in 2000. Furthermore, Danish coverage was strongly on the rise 
due to the broad introduction of collective schemes in the 1990s. Indicated by the data, male 
pensioners may have benefited more from this institutional change, as the inequalities 
between genders slightly increased again. British inequalities remained fairly pronounced 
and stable over time; the distance between women and men’s coverage slightly decreased. In 
Germany women increasingly received additional benefits due to two developments. First, 
younger birth cohorts were personally better protected, as reflected by increasing coverage 
Figure 1: Income mix of the elderly population (65+) 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database.  
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Table 1: Recipient rate of private pensions and income share of private pensions in the public-private 
mix by socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics (65+) 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database.  
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database.  
a) Recipient rates of private pensions
all men women 65-74 75+ 1 2 low middle high
Denmark around '00 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.46 0.39 0.33 0.48 0.08 0.46 0.74
around '05 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.51 0.44 0.36 0.55 0.13 0.54 0.78
Germany around '00 0.20 0.23 0.18 0.22 0.17 0.15 0.23 0.09 0.24 0.27
around '05 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.29 0.22 0.19 0.30 0.17 0.26 0.35
Sweden around '00 0.85 0.89 0.81 0.90 0.79 0.71 0.91 0.63 0.94 0.97
around '05 0.90 0.93 0.88 0.95 0.85 0.80 0.95 0.76 0.97 0.98
around '00 0.70 0.75 0.66 0.73 0.66 0.57 0.77 0.53 0.73 0.84
around '05 0.75 0.79 0.71 0.77 0.72 0.61 0.81 0.59 0.78 0.86
United 
Kingdom
income grouphousehold-sizeagegender
b) Share of private pension income in the public-private mix
all men women 65-74 75+ 1 2 low middle high
Denmark around '00 26.8 28.0 25.7 28.3 24.7 22.1 29.4 1.4 15.7 51.4
around '05 28.6 29.4 27.8 29.4 27.4 23.9 30.8 2.5 17.9 53.0
Germany around '00 6.7 7.3 6.2 7.3 5.7 5.1 7.5 2.3 4.6 10.5
around '05 8.3 8.8 7.9 9.1 6.9 5.9 9.1 3.5 4.7 13.4
Sweden around '00 20.0 21.6 18.4 23.3 15.6 15.5 21.5 8.6 13.7 30.4
around '05 21.5 23.0 20.0 25.2 16.7 18.3 22.4 9.7 15.2 32.6
around '00 37.9 40.7 35.0 40.8 32.9 31.2 41.1 13.5 28.5 55.9
around '05 42.3 44.6 40.0 44.8 38.7 33.9 45.6 18.0 33.1 59.6
income group
United 
Kingdom
gender age household-size
Figure 2: Recipient rate of private pensions and income share by gender 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database.  
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among single households and the elderly aged 75 and above; these groups by majority 
replicate living arrangements of single women households at the same time. Second, as 
men’s recipient rate also increased, elderly women benefit indirectly through intra-
household redistribution of private pension income. Nevertheless, recipient rate discrepancy 
with regard to age and household size was still the largest in Germany (see Table 1), 
indicating a strong increase in recipient rates among younger birth cohorts. Gender 
inequalities were also markedly pronounced in Sweden. However, Swedish women seem to 
catch up with men’s coverage. On the other hand private pensions’ income share of women 
remained far below those of men.  
A distinction in low, middle and high-income groups reveals strong variation across the 
nation state’s income mixes (Figure 3). Whereas the Swedish recipient rate of private 
pensions was by far the highest in all three groups, their importance was rather low for the 
income mix in general. This relates to the social insurance system structure of public 
pensions, which led to a high relevance of public pension provision. In addition, only low 
mandatory contributions to occupational schemes were set up in the collective schemes, 
keeping the accumulated benefits rather low for the majority of providers. Low-income 
pensioners particularly showed an increase in recipient rate, which also reflects an 
increasingly strong importance for the income mix; however, still on a low level of 
approximately 10 per cent. Since coverage was rather selective in Germany, relevance of 
private pensions is rather negligible as an income source for all income groups’ pension 
income mix. Neither recipient rate nor relevance for the income mix does strongly diverge 
across income groups. However the low relevance should not obscure that private pensions 
strongly increased for the low and high-income group between 2000 and 2005. 
 
Figure 3: Private pension recipient rate and income share by income group (65+) 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database.  
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Furthermore, private pensions were contributing round about 22 per cent for beneficiaries of 
supplementary private pensions (Ebbinghaus and Neugschwender 2011: 415). Pension 
income in the United Kingdom was more mixed and selective across income groups. On the 
one hand, the low and middle-income groups also received an essential share of pensions 
from private sources, as many have partially contracted out of SERPS. On the other hand, 
coverage remained selective even for the high-income group. Nonetheless, private pensions 
contributed more than 60 per cent to pension income. Private pensions in Denmark were 
very unequally spread, coverage and income share increase strongly with income. This can 
be linked back to voluntarism of private pension regulation and other institutional features. 
Since public minimum pensions are cut, when there is other pension income, public pension 
benefits decrease strongly in importance for high-income pensioners. Therefore we can 
identify a clear substitution of income-tested public pensions in favour of higher income for 
private pension recipients. Universal basic pensions and the working hour based scheme 
ATP maintained a minimum relevance among high-income groups. However, importance of 
private pensions was almost as high as in the United Kingdom, where coverage was still 
slightly higher. The case of Danish private pensions shows that supplementary plans have 
mainly worked very selectively as fringe benefits. 
V.5.  Adequacy of income and developments 
Figure 4 depicts a relative income level by each income decile in relation to national median 
disposable income across the entire society; the respective points for each decile were 
connected to a line. The graphs refer to the situation in the mid-2000s. In addition, disposable 
income is subdivided in three income sources: public pensions, private pensions, and other 
income such as work and capital income. The distance between the x-axis and public 
pensions illustrates the importance of public pensions, the distance between public pensions 
and total pensions shows the importance of private pensions, and the distance between total 
pensions and disposable income demonstrates the importance of other income sources (see 
Figure 1). To exemplify these findings, a British elderly who receives an income at the 
twentieth percentile (P20) had an income that was approximately equal to 55 per cent of the 
national median income of the entire British society. The major income source for such a 
pensioner was on average public pensions, equal to 40 per cent of national median income. 
On top, similar persons also received 5 per cent of median income each from private 
pensions and other income sources. According to the conventional definition of at-risk-of 
poverty (disposable income is lower than 60 per cent of median income) the elderly faced a 
risk of poverty that exceeded 20 per cent. 
The figures indicate that the relative income level at the P20 value was similarly low in 
Denmark and the United Kingdom (.55), it was a bit higher in Sweden (.62), and it was 
highest in Germany (.66). However, the slopes of the curves for the lowest income groups  
(first and second income deciles) reveal a broad variation. In both Nordic countries the slope 
was low, reflecting the beneficial situation of lowest income groups that were almost equally 
well protected through minimum benefits, with exception of some migrants that faced some 
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cuts due to missing years of residence. On average, the first income decile in Sweden and 
Denmark received an income just below the 50 per cent of median income line. Likewise 
income poverty was around 7 per cent in Sweden and 9 per cent in Denmark. German 
income standard was a bit lower for the poorest elderly. As discussed before, pensioners did 
not receive minimum pensions and may also not claim social assistance, leading to the 
situation that the elderly in the first decile had very low income. The poverty gap was higher 
for Germany than in the Nordic countries. The picture was similar for the United Kingdom; 
elderly in the first and second decile were protected on a lower level as compared to the 
Nordic countries. This relates to cuts in the basic pension due to missing years of 
employment and meagre second-tier benefits; poverty was clearly the highest in the UK in 
this comparison. 
Median elderly’s relative income level revealed a different pattern in terms of generosity. In 
Denmark the median elderly person received only slightly more income than the low-income 
group. As shown before in Figure 3, only a small share of persons received additional private 
Figure 4: Income distribution of net disposable income, total pensions, and public pensions (65+, mid 00s)
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database.  
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pension income. However, public benefits maintained only a low income level of only 69 per 
cent of median income of the total society. This indicates a strong private pension provision 
gap in Denmark in the past (cf. also Chapter IV). The mixed income package in the United 
Kingdom related to 78 per cent. Slightly higher was the relative income level for Sweden 
(.81), where earnings-related pensions could better maintain the previous income standard. 
The ideal-typical case of social insurance in Germany provided the highest income standard 
(.91). However, in contrast to Sweden, also other income sources made an important 
contribution to elderly households in Germany. On average the Swedish pension system was 
still the most generous for those elderly in the lower part of the income distribution.  
The German elderly were best off at the P80 value, followed by the British, Swedish, and 
lastly Danish retirees. Above this income level the income curves drift apart due the 
increasing importance of all income sources. With regard to pension income, the German 
public scheme provides by far the highest benefits. However, public pensions were only 
topped up slightly by selective private pensions to a level of ca. 85 per cent of median 
income. Swedish private pensions lifted up moderate public pension incomes to a similar 
high level of 80-85 per cent. Since the previous public pension scheme involved a rather low 
income ceiling, the middle-to-high income group (fifth to seventh decile) was less secured. 
Very beneficial private schemes existed only for the highest income group. In the United 
Kingdom and Denmark, public pensions diminished in terms of benefits and relevance for 
the income mix. Due to the basic pension component in both countries, income maintenance 
is only reached by additional private income sources. Both countries’ income mixes were 
characterised by a historical development of primarily voluntary occupational and personal 
schemes. The mixture of contracting out and SERPS provision led to a rather low income 
standard for the majority of British elderly, only securing a small proportion in the highest 
income decile well. Particularly low was the income security in Denmark, where even the 
elderly at the P80 value (.98) was slightly less well off than the society’s median income. 
However, there needs to be one point highlighted. Wage dispersion was much higher in 
Germany and the United Kingdom than in the Nordic countries. Thus income standards of 
the elderly do not necessarily reflect a low replacement; these indicators are more related to 
wage dispersion, particularly at the upper end.  
In order to get a better insight, if the income inequalities among the elderly found in Figure 4 
need to be understood as a result of high labour market inequalities or pension system 
design, I will analyse in the following the income distributions of the total population and 
the 65 and above population simultaneously. 12  Both the total population and the 65+ 
population have been divided each in ten deciles. The division of each decile’s equivalised 
net disposable income for the 65+ population by the respective decile for the total population 
curve leads to a relative income level of each income decile group.  
Figure 5a shows equivalised net disposable income of the elderly in relation to equivalised 
net disposable income by the total population. A second line (Figure 5b) demonstrates net 
                                                          
12 A similar technique has been applied by the OECD before (OECD 2001); see also more detailed 
explanations in Chapter IV.5. 
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total pension income of the elderly in relation to equivalised net disposable income by the 
total population (only households whose pension income share was at least 60 per cent were 
kept); this procedure aims to reflect income replacement and the level of reproduced market 
income inequalities for each decile; hence, if income inequality is similarly reproduced for all 
income groups, one would expect a stable income level over all income groups. This 
technique is certainly only an approximation, as it does not compare actual individual 
replacement rates; however, it may still clarify the generic cross-national differences in the 
income distribution of the elderly that may have its origin in regular pension payments from 
national pension systems.  
The calculated ratios in Figure 5 clarify the importance of minimum pensions for the low-
income group. Elderly persons in the first income decile were reaching on average a similar 
income level as those in the first decile of the total population. In Germany and the United 
Kingdom the elderly´s income even slightly exceeded the incomes as compared to the total 
society (Figure 5a). With respect to pension income only (Figure 5b) these ratios remained 
slightly below 1, but on a similar high level in all four countries.  
Denmark particularly sticks out in this comparison. Danish relative income levels for the 
elderly declined comparatively fast form the low-income group to the median; as shown in 
Figure 4, due to the nearly absent mandated contributory second-tier schemes, income 
groups below the median received rather similar pensions (Figure 4). Figure 5b demonstrates 
that inequality among the total population was much higher than among pensioners. 
Pensioners below and around the median seem to have lacked to save adequately for their 
old age; their income level dropped down below 55 per cent. However, for the high income 
group, the ratio increases again, which signifies that occupational systems are quite 
important for the ones who have them.  
Figure 5: Income level of the elderly in relation to total population (mid 2000s) 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. 
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Also in the United Kingdom the low to middle-income group among the pensions was less 
secured as compared to the total society and also compared to the much higher ratios in 
Germany and Sweden. This finding can be linked to the rather low contributions to SERPS 
and/or the low obligations to contribute to complementary occupational or personal pension 
plans. Also in the high income groups the ratios continues to drop, which signifies that the 
pension system failed to replace previous income levels; it is noteworthy to mention that the 
British income groups still received comparatively high pensions as compared to the median 
in line with pension income levels observed in Germany. 
In contrast to the Beveridge systems, the more public contribution-based pension systems 
seem to fare much better with respect to income replacement for the low-to-middle income 
groups. In both countries, Sweden and Germany, pension income seems in general more in 
line with inequality of earnings, which can be identified from more stable income ratios 
throughout all income deciles. Also the existence of contribution ceilings in these two 
countries does not change this picture as compared to Finland (see Chapter IV.5); most 
persons in the upper income deciles hold occupational or private pensions, which 
complement to the public schemes.  
Table 2 evaluates inequality indicators and measures income standards in relation to 
society’s median income. A special focus is placed on the relative income standards of each 
pension income source and total disposable household income. The relative developments 
are shown as percentage change over the two points in time. Thus an increase by 
approximately 4 per cent in British disposable income documents an average increase from 
92 to 96 per cent of national median income. Correspondingly, the decrease from 71 to 69 per 
cent in the case of German public pension income relates to a decrease of 3 per cent.  
There occurred two main developments. On one hand, income standards of the elderly 
increased relatively compared to the society’s total median disposable income. On the other 
hand, public pension income slightly decreased, with exception of Denmark.  
British elderly showed the strongest increase in disposable income (4 per cent). Particularly 
private pension income strongly increased (22 per cent) which consequently affected the 
income standard. Private pensions have become more important also for the low and 
middle-income groups. This was caused by two opposing effects. In principle, the 
reformation of public pensions aimed at topping up the poorest pension income groups, thus 
raising the public pension income and share. This effect however is outreached by a stronger 
role of private pension income and higher security among the younger cohorts. As a result 
public pensions even declined in relevance. Still poverty was decreased.  
The on-going transformations of Swedish and German public systems reveal comparatively 
strong effects. Cuts in generosity affected the middle and high-income groups in Germany 
and the high-income group in Sweden. In contrast to the United Kingdom, private pension 
development only partially made up for relatively lower income. In Germany, the increased 
spread of private pensions resulted in a benefit mostly towards the high-income group, 
whereas the middle-income group was slightly less well secured. Hence, an increased gap 
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between the elderly middle and high-income group could be observed, which in turn 
resulted in a boost in the Gini coefficient. The other way around was the situation in Sweden; 
here all income groups profited from still maturing private pension benefits. However, the 
high-income group stayed less secured with pension income due the stronger decrease in 
public pension standards. This development was linked to a lower Gini coefficient for the 
elderly.  
Also Danish relative income standards have increased between the two points in time, 
mainly generated by the increases in private pension income. Whereas public pensions for all 
income groups have closely developed in line with median income (around 1 per cent), 
private pensions increased strongly in importance (around 10 per cent). Particularly the 
middle-income group benefitted from the private pension development. This increased 
inequality between the low and middle-income group, but also decreased income inequality 
between the middle and high-income group, as additional occupational benefits no longer 
only act as selective fringe benefits. As a consequence the Gini coefficient remained nearly 
unchanged, as these two effects cancelled each other out.  
  
Table 2: Development of income and inequality measures (65+) 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database.  
DK DE SE UK
2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2005 1999 2004    trend between the 
two points in time in %
Poverty in % (65+)
below 40% of median 0.9 1.2 3.2 2.1 2.0 1.3 6.5 5.0 33% -35% -34% -24%
below 50% of median 13.3 9.4 8.0 7.0 6.9 5.6 15.4 14.2 -29% -12% -18% -8%
below 60% of median 38.1 33.0 14.8 13.6 18.7 17.3 29.4 25.7 -13% -8% -7% -13%
Poverty gap at 60 % (65+)
14.4 13.8 22.4 20.1 16.1 14.1 21.7 21.5 -4% -10% -12% -1%
Gini coefficient
0.214 0.213 0.258 0.266 0.218 0.211 0.288 0.294 0% 3% -3% 2%
Disposable income level in relation to society's median income (65+)
all 0.78 0.80 1.04 1.07 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.96 3% 3% 1% 4%
low income 0.51 0.52 0.59 0.60 0.57 0.58 0.49 0.51 3% 2% 2% 3%
medium income 0.67 0.69 0.91 0.91 0.80 0.81 0.77 0.79 3% 0% 1% 3%
high income 1.16 1.20 1.61 1.67 1.32 1.33 1.49 1.56 3% 4% 1% 5%
Net pension income level in relation to society's median income (65+)
all 0.57 0.59 0.76 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.64 0.67 3% -2% 0% 6%
low income 0.46 0.47 0.53 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.43 0.44 2% 0% 5% 2%
medium income 0.56 0.58 0.77 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.61 0.64 4% -4% 1% 5%
high income 0.70 0.73 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.87 0.93 3% 0% -3% 7%
Net public pension income level in relation to society's median income (65+)
all 0.42 0.42 0.71 0.69 0.59 0.58 0.39 0.39 1% -3% -2% -2%
low income 0.45 0.46 0.52 0.51 0.46 0.48 0.37 0.36 1% -1% 4% -3%
medium income 0.47 0.47 0.73 0.70 0.64 0.63 0.43 0.43 1% -4% -1% -1%
high income 0.34 0.34 0.88 0.85 0.68 0.64 0.38 0.37 0% -4% -6% -2%
Net private pension income level in relation to society's median income (65+)
all 0.15 0.17 0.05 0.06 0.15 0.16 0.24 0.28 10% 22% 8% 18%
Denmark Germany Sweden United Kingdom
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V.6. Conclusion: Different paths to private pensions – different 
inequality developments? 
Pension systems in advanced societies have developed quite differently since their first 
implementation. Reforms of these systems take a long period of time to show their full 
impact on the insured and their financial outcomes during retirement. This chapter pursued 
a twofold strategy. First, the analysis of reform processes made clear in how far inequalities 
may originate from country-specific institutional arrangements. Essentially occupational 
schemes that are at the same time earnings-related, may have favoured specific occupational 
groups one-sidedly. However, collective agreements could also provide a broad universal 
coverage with occupational pensions like in the Nordic countries. Second, empirical analyses 
evaluated current inequalities among retirees in a cross-national perspective and 
demonstrated adequacy levels and on-going transformations of the public-private mix. 
The analyses showed that private pensions strongly affected income inequality of pension 
income in all countries under study, increasing primarily the income position of high-income 
pensioners. In addition, the structure of public pension benefits had a more general impact 
on inequality and adequacy of pensions, particularly for the low-income group. 
Poverty statistics demonstrated that all countries left specific groups of retirees insufficiently 
covered. Basic minimum pension schemes in Sweden and Denmark provided rather 
generous provision for the poorest income group. In contrast, British minimum security was 
set up on a much lower income standard, which led to the highest poverty risk in this 
comparison. Germany’s mixture of social assistance and GRV benefits generated a high 
inequality among the low-income group. 
However, the German benefits from the public pension scheme provided the highest benefit 
level for the middle and high-income group. The development between the two cross-
sections showed that the middle-income group lost a part of their beneficial security. Cuts in 
the public scheme were not yet balanced out by an increase in private pensions. Since 
coverage was still rather selective, inequalities might increase further in the near future.  
Especially Danish old-age income was characterized by strong selectivity of private pension 
benefits. The reformed provision scenario needs additional time to mature further. Current 
developments support that the provision gap of the middle-income group was already partly 
closed.  
The Swedish system was much more advanced in terms of private pension benefits. 
Recipient rates were close to being universal; however these schemes by majority only 
slightly increased the income level. The replacement of the old public scheme led to further 
decreases in the income level of the high-income elderly. In the future, the earnings-related 
pensions will ensure the importance of the public pension income component, but also 
generate some inequalities through the selective coverage with individual pensions with 
financial institutes.  
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British retirees found themselves in the most advanced public-private mix, but also in a very 
diversified and problematic savings structure. Individuals were mostly free to decide on 
their provision above a certain minimum provision. The regulatory approach of basic 
pensions, the SERPS and partial contracting out to private pensions did not effectively reduce 
poverty. Income standards of the elderly for the high-income group seemed relatively high 
compared to median income of the society, however taking into account the much higher 
inequality of the labour market, the elderly high-income group received comparatively low 
pensions. However, the public-private mix was still growing, so that in the near future a 
further rebalancing can be expected. It is likely that inequality remains high due to voluntary 
provision, securing only a selective group of future retirees well.  
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VI. A cohort study: pension income inequality in six European countries 
VI.1. Introduction13 
A cross-national study of cohorts over a certain period of time might shed light on general 
income inequality developments. By evaluating cohorts comparatively across countries we 
can examine the following questions: Can there be shifts in the public-private mix observed? 
Are the on-going developments increasing or decreasing inequalities? In how far are 
differences in pension system regulation also transferred to differences in the pension 
income distribution?  
Therefore, this study’s main aim is to analyse the income mix, old-age income levels, and 
inequality patterns. First, this study will analyse the public and private pension benefits 
independent from each other and second in combination with each other. This proceeding 
will clarify in how far the on-going increase in importance of private pension income affects 
the outcomes of total pension income. An analysis of developments by a cross-sectional 
design is difficult, due to the strong age-related effects as discussed in Chapter III.3. The 
applied cohort design in this chapter solves these problems, particularly as it decreases the 
age effect. This chapter analyses the income mix and income distribution of birth cohorts of 
the retired population of six countries: Sweden, Finland, and Denmark, Germany, Italy, and 
the United Kingdom.  
The remainder is as follows. In a first step, I will present an overview in how far the 
institutional settings of the selected countries differed in the past, and in how far country-
specific hypotheses can be made in addition to general hypotheses on inequality 
developments. The following section focuses on the data selection and the common data 
preparation for the later analyses. In order to answer the research questions, three main 
blocks of changes over time will be evaluated, each applying the cohort design:  
 recipient rates of private pensions and importance in the pension income mix,  
 absolute old-age income,  
 and inequality measures. 
First, the development of coverage with private pension income and income share of private 
pensions in the income mix is presented. These evaluations clarify which countries already 
strongly rely on a private and/or occupational pension component. The analyses of private 
pension income share are shown by income quintiles. Secondly, the generosity of pensions is 
analysed; the income distribution is split in deciles. Finally, the study focuses on the 
inequality measures Gini coefficient and poverty rate. The poverty analyses include a 
breakdown of single pensioner women versus coupled pensioners.  
                                                          
13 Chapter VI is a further development of Neugschwender (2014), LIS Working Paper No. 618. 
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VI.2. Institutional overview and hypotheses 
Cross-national pension research frequently breaks down the analysis in pillars and tiers in 
order to clarify the main differences between institutional arrangements of pension systems 
(Goodin and Rein 2001; OECD 2007; World Bank 1994). In Chapter II.4 these approaches 
were linked to income groups and their protection with respective plans. In this chapter, the 
focus is placed on alternative providers of pension schemes (employer provided schemes 
and personal pensions by financial institutes), the historical development of the interplay 
between alternative providers, and the on-going shift in the income distribution. 
In general, public and private social security can be regulated in a variety of ways. It is 
particularly important to analyse the interplay of such social systems in order to better 
understand the outcomes of inequality. Public social security primarily focuses on protection 
against social risks and redistribution, whereas private social security arrangements may 
supplement, but in some cases entirely substitute public social security programs. Bargaining 
and regulating collective agreements are important for the obligation to additionally 
contribute to complementary pension plans. In mandated pension schemes coverage and 
take-up might be much larger as in schemes where occupational and private pensions 
remained mostly unregulated.  
In a study of 25 OECD countries, Goudswaard and Caminada (2010) found that a higher 
share of public spending for social security slightly decreased the income inequality among 
households. Public pension spending as a percentage of GDP was the most relevant factor in 
explaining levels of inequality; the higher this ratio, the lower the Gini coefficient. In contrast 
to this, private pension spending as a percentage of GDP had the opposite effect; the higher 
the ratio, the higher the Gini coefficient.  
Korpi and Palme (1998) showed that it is not only universal public schemes, but also 
targeting to certain groups that drive redistributive outcomes of social protection schemes. 
The authors argued that universal benefits lead to more equality in incomes, whereas targeting 
towards the poor may lead to more inequality in terms of contributions, and that high-
income earners will benefit more. Furthermore, Korpi and Palme (1998) stress the importance 
of universal social security systems to decrease inequality; such as in the Nordic countries 
which are largely universal with goals for both poverty reduction and income maintenance. 
Korpi and Palme’s (1998) argument is particularly relevant for pension systems. It 
exemplifies that in countries where old-age protection was mostly introduced to protect the 
low-income group against poverty in old age, various supplementary schemes developed, 
which altogether provided the income maintenance (Ebbinghaus and Neugschwender 2011). 
It is also necessary to distinguish between voluntary and mandatory occupational and 
private pension schemes. When there are alternative schemes to choose, it depends strongly 
on the income group which schemes which group prefers. Low-income earners might prefer 
the public redistribution, whereas high-income earners prefer the personal contribution-
based schemes, since these plans will provide them higher returns on their investment 
(Conde-Ruiz and Profeta 2007). This scenario is particularly relevant for the UK where the 
insured can contract out from the public second-tier scheme to the private one. 
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One can expect that complementary occupational and private pensions generally increase 
inequalities as they contain less redistributive elements than public pensions and particularly 
favour the middle and high-income group (cf. Rein and Behrendt 2004). However, van Vliet 
et al. (2012) did not find clear evidence for such a generalised theoretical approach. However, 
also the OECD is concerned that the on-going ‘trends towards working longer and more 
reliance on private pensions may increase inequality among retirees’ (OECD 2013a: 13). 
Thus, this argument needs to be further elaborated and specified; the authors acknowledge 
that the theoretical framework needs to take into account the variety of institutional 
approaches to regulation of complementary pension schemes by the state and/or employers. 
At the same time, inequality analyses of current pensioner’s income need also to be linked to 
the on-going inequality developments. Burtless (2006) emphasised that the current shifts in 
the income mix are particularly relevant for the low-income group, which is gradually better 
secured by supplementary occupational pension plans; however, private pensions have an 
influence on the whole income distribution, and hence no effect on inequality among the 
elderly. 
A cross-sectional perspective at any certain point in time does not account for the historical 
relevance of the introduction of complementary pension schemes. Most of the mandated 
collective agreements in the Nordic countries and partly in Germany were introduced later 
than the main public schemes, particularly late in Denmark (only in the 1990s). Therefore, 
current inequalities among pensioners only partly reflect the complementary occupational 
and private pensions in the income distribution 
As pension systems redistribute financial resources over time they reflect a deferred use of 
financial resources, referred to as horizontal redistribution (Esping-Andersen and Myles 2009; 
Palme 2006). Thus pensions reproduce income inequalities of the labour market through 
equivalence of contributions and benefits. Countries with high market inequalities are 
expected to generate high levels of inequality among pensioners; income maintenance is 
effectively achieved by previous high-income earners. Particularly the selective protection 
against income maintenance of high-income earners might drive the inequality increasing 
effect of private pensions. Therefore, encompassing pension systems, as described by Korpi 
and Palme (1998) might play a major role in limiting inequality among the elderly. These 
systems could reduce the additional need of protection for the high-income group, since 
these occupational groups already profit from a mandated market-oriented second tier of 
pension provision. This scenario fits most closely to the Finnish pension system. 
On the other hand, minimum pensions aim to redistribute income across the elderly on the 
vertical dimension, among pensioner groups. Thus, since the main focus is poverty 
prevention, such policies can only provide income maintenance for the middle-income 
group, when the level of the minimum pension is very generous. In this case, it is very 
important to understand the interplay with complementary pensions.  
A complementary scheme on voluntary basis might have a lower take-up rate. This is 
particularly likely when the individuals have low incentives to contribute to additional 
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personal plans. This is the case when minimum pensions provide rather good replacement of 
income in the future, but also when the minimum pension is income tested against other 
pension income. The latter scenario considerably reduces the incentives to contribute to 
private pensions. 
As shown in Chapters IV and V both arguments applied to the Danish case where income 
maintenance for the middle-income group was strongly underdeveloped until the 
introduction of collective agreements. Until the 1990s, Danish employees were free to 
participate in occupational plans offered by their employers, and hence rather selective. In 
the early 1990s, collective agreements made participation quasi mandatory for the broad 
majority of employees (Andersen 2011). Since then, Denmark showed recently a strongly 
developing private pension component in the income mix.  
In contrast, the British basic pension was linked to previous insurance year and provided a 
rather low level of protection. In addition, mandated contributions to the public, or 
occupational, or personal plans were kept on a rather low level which left a broad scope for 
additional complementary schemes to develop. However, the key problems remained: the 
SERPS provided low benefits, and particularly low-income earners hardly contracted out of 
the SERPS (Schulze and Moran 2007, Blake 2003).  
Also in Germany the private component was mostly kept on a voluntary basis. In contrast to 
Denmark and the United Kingdom, the public scheme offered income maintenance for the 
long-time insured up to a certain ceiling; additional complementary schemes covered only a 
few occupational groups. Recent German reforms in the early 2000s aimed at strengthening 
tax incentives and subsidies for private pension plans (particularly the Riester pension 
(Anderson and Meyer 2003, Ebbinghaus et al. 2011, Neugschwender 2008). Future 
developments may lead to a cut in the income maintenance level and will balance the 
pension income mix differently.  
Pension incomes are likely to reveal two main developments when comparing the older to 
the younger cohorts, which blur the empirical findings:   
 First, the older cohorts started and ended their employment career earlier than the 
younger ones. Particularly in the after war period the economic situation boomed 
which is linked to a strong increase in living standards, and wages in particular. Thus 
the wages of younger birth cohorts were on average higher, which is likely to lead to 
higher pension benefits as well, as they had higher income and contributions to old-
age income systems. This is very much relevant for the birth cohorts that are 
evaluated. Whereas the oldest birth cohorts entered the labour market age already 
during the Second World War, the younger cohorts did start their employment career 
only in the after war years. This situation can be linked to more stable employment 
patterns, better inclusion to earnings-related pension schemes, and subsequently 
higher pension income. 
115 
 
 A second complication is that old-age income is generally expected to be higher the 
longer the coverage within more beneficial public pension scheme institutions. Public 
pension schemes were broadly extended during the mid-1950s; this may be more 
beneficial for the younger cohorts, whereas the older cohorts contributed less over 
their entire working career. In addition, the expansion of occupational schemes, 
which took place even later than the public pension scheme expansion, might be even 
more selective for the oldest cohorts.  
Therefore, I expect to find a strong increase in amounts among the younger cohorts in 
general, both in public and private pension income. In addition, I expect to find a stable 
increase of public pensions for middle-to high-income earners, due to the beneficial 
employment situation and the gradual maturing of public pension schemes. The middle and 
high-income groups receive a combined income package of universal minimum pensions 
and various earnings-related second-tier schemes. Consequently, for the better-off retirees 
the contribution years and the country-specific regulation might make a difference. In 
contrast to the middle and high-income groups, the low-income group is dependent on 
minimum pensions and/or social assistance, independent of their previous employment 
history. Depending on generosity and benefit regulation over time, this might indicate a 
change in welfare state activity to prevent at-risk and extreme poverty among the aged.  
On the other hand, I expect to find a more mixed structure for private pensions, particularly 
driven by the degree of mandated occupational schemes. In countries where occupational 
pensions were in general regulated on a mandatory basis, only a few more contribution 
years to occupational pensions might result in substantially higher pensions. However, this 
process is very slowly taking place, over a period of ten years, the effects of matured 
obligated occupational pensions can be best observed in terms of coverage and income share, 
but the observed inequality development may remain marginal across cohorts.  
If there are no mandated occupational pensions, one can expect that there is only a small 
group of pensioners that were covered with occupational schemes, mainly as fringe benefits 
for the highly skilled or state employees. This scenario applies mostly to the Italian system 
and for most occupational groups in Germany, where public pensions were introduced as 
income maintenance schemes on rather high level.  
However, there is also an alternative scenario that applies to the United Kingdom and 
Denmark until the early 1990s. In both countries public pensions mainly provided the first 
tier aiming to prevent poverty, whereas the income maintenance was limited. In order to 
maintain the standard of living, employees were offered occupational pension plans by 
individual employers or the private financial sector. Similarly, when occupational earnings-
related schemes successively covered more and more employees and employment years, 
retirees with such a more diversified pension income mix were likely to be on the upper end 
of the income distribution, receiving higher total pensions in comparison to the oldest 
cohorts. This most likely would result in an increase in inequality caused by selective 
increases among the upper end of the income distribution through maturing voluntary 
occupational pension schemes, but not so much through the nature of occupational pension 
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schemes per se. Thus the increase of inequality can be temporary and reflect an increasing 
awareness to additionally provide for old age through individual pension plans. The latter 
could be shown also quite strongly through the private market in Sweden, where more and 
more persons were only expecting rather low public pension benefits due to the low ceilings, 
and therefore did take up more private plans since the 1980s (Lindquist and Wadensjö 2011). 
There are certain circumstances that counterbalance the beneficial situation for private 
pension recipients: First of all, public pensions can be cut respectively if sufficient other 
(pension) income is received, e.g. through income tests. This scenario is less relevant for 
public social insurance systems, whereas it is very much common in the pension systems in 
the Nordic countries. Secondly, the period between the 1980s and until the early 2000s is 
characterised by a strong trend of decreasing effective age of retirement (OECD 2015: 162-
163). Whereas many public schemes even favoured the early exit without deductions, in 
occupational and private schemes this early exit trend might relate to shorter contribution 
periods and therefore limit the relevance of private pensions in the old-age income mix. 
These two circumstances partially restrain the clear inequality increasing effect from the 
maturing occupational schemes.  
VI.3. Operationalisation 
For the following analyses datasets from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database were 
used. LIS provides a standardised database from national survey/register data. Six countries 
were selected for the analyses: Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. Various datasets, containing for each country at least three points in time, were 
pooled: Denmark (1992, 1995, 2000, 2004), Finland (1995, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2010), Germany 
(1994, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2010), Italy (1995, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2010), Sweden (1995, 2000, 
2005), and the United Kingdom (1994, 1999, 2004, 2007, 2010).  
This study applies a cohort and longitudinal design using cross-sectional input data. 77251 
elderly were observed at 3-5 points in time for each of the six countries. These data were 
pooled in one data file reflecting the individual birth cohort. In the following subsections, I 
will discuss some of the main data restrictions and solutions, pointing to its implications for 
the interpretation of the data. 
The different cross-sectional datasets were treated as quasi cohorts, which mean pensioners 
that were observed at one point in time are very likely to have constant pension benefits 
since retirement, which are adjusted in line with consumer prices. Therefore, pension 
outcomes for pensioners for the same birth year from different survey years should reflect 
similar pension benefits and distribution. Thus, pooling the income data for pensioners was 
less problematic. By doing so, I implicitly assumed a full indexation of pensions in line with 
consumer prices, which is plausible for advanced pension systems.  
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Sample selection 
The sample selection for the analyses contained various data preparation steps. The previous 
chapters signalled that personal labour market income blurred the pension income 
distribution; both labour market and and/or private pension income were important income 
sources on the upper end of the income distribution. Therefore, in this study, a clearer focus 
on analysing the inactive and already retired population is taken. Since the main interest in 
this study was the measurement of inequality of pensions, persons and households with a 
strong connection to the labour market were excluded systematically.  
The analyses include only persons who were defined to be the head of the household, and 
their respective spouse. Acknowledging that multiple generation households are also an 
important social group to study, they were excluded due to reasons of limited comparability 
of all countries under study. For the exception of Italy, all countries had rather low 
percentage of multiple generation households; thus the results did represent the situation of 
the broad majority of retirees. In general, the measurement of pension income inequality in 
multi-generational households would require a quite different operationalisation. 
By keeping heads and spouses only, employment income of other household members 
already influences the income situation of the elderly less. In a next step, both head and 
spouse of the pensioner couple should not be ‘mainly employed’ or, in case where the main 
activity was not available, they should not be ‘currently employed’ (this applied for the older 
datasets prior than Wave V of the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database). In Italy the 
information was taken from the usual activity during the income reference period. Thus also 
the influence of a working spouse is drastically reduced; otherwise the pension income of the 
couple shows an incomplete picture before actual retirement, and respectively labour income 
of the working spouse might lift the household up in the income distribution.  
Moreover, in order to exclude pensioner households who may receive only partial retirement 
pensions before reaching the actual retirement age, both partners had to be at least 66 years 
of age at the time of interview. The sample was also restricted to household members with at 
least one partner that was not older than 75 years in order to exclude the elderly that retired 
a long time ago. Unfortunately, the same threshold of 75 years cannot be applied in Sweden 
and Denmark. For these two countries, in those two countries a threshold of 80 years was 
applied in order to keep additional observations for the cohorts from different waves.  
Finally, the main income source of the household should not come from employment income 
(i.e. dependent work and self-employed income together do not add up to more than 50 per 
cent of the total gross household income). This condition is set up complementary to the 
previous ones; it can very well be that persons who retired during the income reference 
period self-assessed themselves as being ‘not mainly employed’, however the income 
situation still refers to the labour market earnings of the previous income reference year of 
the survey.  
These sample selection procedures may bias the general income distribution of the elderly by 
not reflecting the relevance of partial or delayed retirement nor accounting for the 
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importance of multi-generational households. To account for some of these particular 
households, work income was implicitly allowed as a secondary income source besides 
pension income. However, by setting up all these criteria, the influence of early and delayed 
retirement was minimised; the remaining sample of pensioner households were likely to 
receive the full amount of retirement pensions, which allowed a more precise measurement 
of pension outcomes and pension income (re-) distribution.  
Figure 1 shows which observation points and cohorts were used for the analyses. For 
representativeness, two birth cohort years were combined to one observation point, as 
otherwise the number of observations would be very low for some of the analyses by deciles. 
For example, the birth-cohorts 1921 and 1922 were pooled together to one cohort; each of 
these two-year cohorts contained respectively pooled observations from the country-years. 
The birth cohort 1921-22 in Denmark contained observations from the dataset DK92, where 
these persons were approximately 70 to 71 years old, additional observations from the 
dataset DK95 where the persons were 73 to 74 years old, and also observations from the 
dataset DK00 where the persons were 78 to 79 (see Figure 1).  
As discussed previously, two cohort designs were operationalised based on different age 
ranges. In Sweden and Denmark, persons with at least one partner being in the age range 66 
to 80 were included, whereas in the other four countries at least one partner had to be in the 
age range 66 to 75. As a consequence the Danish and Swedish results were problematic since 
not all cohorts contained observation from a similar age range. The oldest cohorts could not 
possibly contain persons who were aged below 70 in Denmark and 73 in Sweden; the 
youngest cohorts could not contain persons older than 71 in Denmark and 72 in Sweden. 
Since the socio-demographic characteristics differ particularly with age, age-related effects 
could not be fully eliminated in these cohort designs. Thus, the results for the cohorts in 
Denmark and Sweden were partly driven by increased importance of pensions and less 
single households among the younger cohorts. For the other four countries persons aged 
between 66 and 75 and their respective partners were equally represented. In this scenario, it 
was possible to measure inequality developments for cohorts unlinked from the major 
influencing factor age. 
In total, the pooled files contained 77251 observations, see Figure 2 for details. In each of the 
countries the sample restrictions reduced the observations for persons aged 66 and older by 
25 to 30 per cent.  
The unit of analysis is the household. This decision is based on data limitations; individual 
level data on pensions that allowed a separate evaluation of public and private pensions 
were not available for the earlier datasets. But also it is common practice to evaluate 
inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient and poverty rates at the household level.  
Comparability of the pooled observations within countries was achieved by price-adjusted 
income amounts, expressing income standards of the year 2000 for Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Italy, and Sweden. As the British data were collected in two periods 1999 and 
2000, incomes were adjusted to the mean of the two years 1999 and 2000. In order to receive 
comparability across countries income amounts are shown in purchasing power parities 
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Figure 1: Sample design: birth cohorts and country years from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database 
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1922 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88
1923 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87
1924 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86
1925 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85
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Table 1: Number of observations by country, country years, and birth cohort years (Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS) Database) 
 
Total sample
    of which DK92 DK95 DK00 DK04 FI95 FI00 FI04 FI07 FI10 DE94 DE00 DE04 DE07 DE10
858 9218 13834 11300 487 972 1341 1001 609 287 1668 2069 1620 1336
Total observations for each cohort
1921-22
1923-24
1925-26
1927-28
1929-30
1931-32
1933-34
1935-36
1937-38
    of which DK92 DK95 DK00 DK04 FI95 FI00 FI04 FI07 FI10 DE94 DE00 DE04 DE07 DE10
1921-22 339 2258 1840 290
1923-24 298 2296 2074 992
1925-26 221 2003 2178 1858 202 186 41 11 3 145 306 41 18 9
1927-28 0 1884 2127 1921 192 193 71 26 7 142 361 86 24 10
1929-30 0 777 2025 2065 93 210 255 74 25 0 376 362 69 46
1931-32 0 0 1957 2093 0 197 220 166 48 0 301 302 198 64
1933-34 0 0 1633 2081 0 186 246 218 73 0 324 410 371 120
1935-36 0 0 249 243 222 0 0 445 443 480
1937-38 0 0 259 263 231 0 0 423 497 607
Total sample
    of which IT95 IT98 IT00 IT04 IT08 IT10 SE95 SE00 SE05 UK94 UK99 UK04 UK07 UK10
717 922 1378 1874 1402 1029 1903 3348 3046 1963 3933 4444 2945 1747
Total observations for each cohort*
1921-22
1923-24
1925-26
1927-28
1929-30
1931-32
1933-34
1935-36
1937-38
    of which* IT95 IT98 IT00 IT04 IT08 IT10 SE95 SE00 SE05 UK94 UK99 UK04 UK07 UK10
1921-22 513 640 93
1923-24 471 698 188
1925-26 304 247 287 61 22 8 416 568 571 891 786 69 0 0
1927-28 274 248 287 105 45 13 359 445 613 774 853 147 97 0
1929-30 139 241 307 362 61 41 144 415 643 298 830 609 99 0
1931-32 0 186 268 333 100 67 0 307 473 0 796 920 184 161
1933-34 0 0 229 348 362 116 0 275 465 0 668 921 838 165
1935-36 0 0 0 343 406 376 0 0 881 881 526
1937-38 0 0 0 322 406 408 0 0 897 846 895
*for the United Kingdom the numbers refer to the birth cohorts minus one year, e. g. 1925-26 refers to 1924-25. 
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(ppp), which means that the amounts in national currencies were divided by an adjustment 
factor to receive a standardised currency unit, which then reflected the International dollar 
(I$) at current prices in 2000. Furthermore, all income sources were equivalised in order to 
compare the income situation of households of different composition, reflecting economies of 
scale that occur when persons share the same dwelling and resources. The common approach 
of LIS was applied, i.e. all income sources were divided by the square root of household 
members. 
VI.4. Recipient rates and public-private mix by cohorts 
This section evaluates the development of coverage with private pension income and income 
share of private pensions in the income mix. The following questions will be addressed: 
Which groups of the elderly are already strongly covered? Is private pension income an 
important source of income? For this section the income distribution of the pensioner sample 
was divided in income quintiles using the equivalised household’s gross total income. Thus, 
the first 20 per cent of persons living in households with the lowest equivalised gross total 
household income ended up in the first income quintile.  
Figure 2 evaluates the recipient rate of public and private pensions, and income shares in the 
pension income mix by income quintiles and by cohorts. Hence, for each of the income 
quintiles percentage shares for each of the cohorts and quintiles are calculated. The pension 
income shares were calculated on gross-income amounts, except in Italy they are based on 
net-income amounts.  
Figure 3 links the findings of the recipient rate of private pensions and the income share of 
private pension in the income mix from Figure 2 by showing the average over all quintiles by 
cohorts. All statistics are representative on the individual level; however they were 
calculated on equivalised household level coverage and amounts. Therefore, an individual is 
considered to receive pensions as soon as single person in the household receives pensions.  
A general finding is the extensively high recipient rate of public pension income, most 
cohort/quintile observations exceeded recipient rates of 98 or 99 per cent. This could be 
expected with the restrictive sample selection minimizing the role of employment income; 
this illustrates that nearly all observation units are pensioner households. Moreover 
additional analyses on the individual level revealed that the vast majority of individuals did 
receive public or private pension income.14 This also supports the high recipient rate of 
public pensions among the lowest income quintile.  
                                                          
14 The individual data are not shown here, as they do not allow the split in public vs. private pension 
income sources. In general it could be doubtful that personal level analyses can be meaningful, as 
e.g. couple households may receive a combined benefit from public pensions, which thus is reported 
only once as the total amount. The latter is likely to happen when the pension system pays 
supplementary benefits to dependents. Thus personal level data analyses are also not undertaken 
due to reliability concerns of the data itself. 
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Figure 2: Recipient rates of public/private pension income and income share of private pension 
income in the pension income mix by cohort and income quintile 
  
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. 
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Figure 2 (continued): Recipient rates of public/private pension income and income share of private 
pension income in the pension income mix by cohort and income quintile 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. 
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Figure 3: Recipient rate of private pension income and income share of private pensions by cohort 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. 
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that those who did not receive private pensions were likely to end up in the lowest income 
quintile. The share of households who do not receive any private pensions was a bit higher 
in Sweden than in Finland (20 per cent for the oldest cohorts, see Figure 3); however, the 
development over time showed a strong increase of the recipient rate in the first quintile for 
Sweden. The other income quintiles already reached coverage of nearly 100 per cent for the 
youngest cohort 1933-34. In Finland the development over cohorts demonstrates a 
continuation of comprehensive coverage, whereas in Sweden a higher share of the 
population was covered than before, so that now approximately 90 per cent of pensioner 
households received second-pillar supplements in addition to public pension income. This is 
a combined effect of increased coverage with occupational and personal pension plans 
(Lindquist and Wadensjö 2011). 
In the United Kingdom and Denmark the distribution of private pension income was much 
more unequal and concentrated among the high-income groups. This is in line with the 
expectations of selective coverage with complementary occupational pensions that were left 
mostly unregulated. Both countries show a strong increase of recipient rates over the lowest 
quintile to the highest income quintile.  
The recipient rate in Denmark was especially selective; receiving occupational pensions was 
strongly linked to a higher position in the income distribution, whereas, the low-income 
groups hardly received any private pensions. The development over time confirms a better 
inclusion of many pensioners due to the increasing importance of obligatory occupational 
pensions since the 1990s. The recipient rate rose in the third and fourth income quintile. 
However the observed cohorts do not yet depict comprehensive inclusion, which relates to 
the fact that not all employees who were close to retirement age when the regulation was 
implemented received annuity payments. Instead, these employees with less contribution 
years may have received lump sum payments. Lump sum payments became less relevant for 
the more recent cohorts; however, they were the common way for low accumulated 
entitlements in occupational pension accounts (Andersen and Skjodt 2007). Therefore, these 
figures are partly biased by the decreasing importance of lump sum pensions over time.  
The British sample signals a more balanced interplay of public and private pensions, 
reflecting the contracting out scenario. Since contracting out from the public scheme was 
mostly a substitute of contributions from public to private schemes, private pension 
recipients were not necessarily better off than non-private pension recipients. In line with 
this expectation, more than 40 per cent of the pensioners in the lowest income quintile (for 
birth cohort 1924/25) received partly private pension income; thus their total pension income 
was not so different in comparison to those who stayed entirely in the public second-tier 
scheme. The United Kingdom showed a rather stable recipient rate pattern across time for 
the cohorts, which can be also linked to the contracting out structure. Many individuals were 
either not willing, or up to 1986 (when also the possibility of contracting out to personal 
pension plans was introduced) had no option to contract out of the public pension, since the 
supply of those plans remained an employer’s choice (Blake 2003, Dilnot et al. 1994). Overall, 
contracting out was attractive for those who believed in higher returns of the capital market.  
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In Germany and Italy, private pensions were far less important for the broad majority of 
pensioners. Since both countries had extended their pay as you go public pension schemes in 
order to provide income maintenance to middle- and high-income earners, there was no 
major need to develop additional complementary schemes (Ebbinghaus and Gronwald 
2011). However, the German system contained some regulated supplementary occupational 
pensions. Coverage with occupational pensions was not so much linked to income, but 
rather linked to occupation and core membership to a profession (Ebbinghaus et al. 2011). As 
a result, even in the highest income quintile for the most recent birth cohorts only every 
second German elderly couple received private pension income. In Italy, private pensions 
reached almost no importance in the income mix; this can partly be explained by the high-
income ceiling (Barr 2012, OECD 2013a), and thus take-up rates of additional private pension 
plans were low.  
In terms of income share of private pension income in the pension income mix, Sweden 
showed a rather low importance of supplementary private pensions. The breakdown in 
income quintiles reveals that even high-income earners did receive mostly public pension 
income; the income share in the highest income quintile was twice as high as in the fourth 
income quintile, but public pension income was clearly the more important pension income 
source with approximately 70 per cent for the most recent birth cohort. However, the share 
of private pension income strongly increased from 23 per cent (for birth cohorts 1921-22) to 
36 per cent (for birth cohorts 1933-34), which was the strongest increase among all income 
quintiles. This development might indicate that Swedish retirees started taking up selectively 
additional retirement plans, which lifted their incomes much higher that they find 
themselves in the highest income quintile after retirement. In fact, since the income ceiling 
was particularly low in Sweden, during the 1980s many insured expected to receive rather 
similar benefits (Kangas et al. 2010); it became evident that if better income earners were 
interested in maintaining a certain living standard they had to save or invest in additional 
personal retirement accounts.  
While the importance of public pensions was decreasing in Finland, the income share of 
occupational and personal pensions was increasing. With nearly 89 per cent (for the birth 
cohorts 1937-38) in comparison to 74 per cent (for the birth cohorts 1925-26) second and 
third-pillar pensions have become by far the most relevant pension income source. The 
relative increases over time were strongest for the low-income pensioners, however even for 
high-income group the balance shifted towards a stronger role of private pensions. It is 
unclear from this analysis, if the cut in public benefits and the increase in occupational 
pensions hindered the financial wellbeing of Finnish retirees. For example, if the benefits 
from the matured occupational pensions exceeded the cuts in the public pensions, then 
Finnish pensioners would be better off.  
Similar to the recipient rate, the income share of private pensions was slightly higher in the 
United Kingdom than in Denmark, which was mostly driven by a stronger role of private 
pensions among the low-income pensioners in the United Kingdom. Whereas up to the third 
income quintile most Danish pensioners did receive only public pension income (more than 
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90 per cent), British retirees had a more balanced income package. In both countries, the 
importance of private pensions in the pension income mixes increased strongly from the 
lowest to the highest income quintile. However, private pension income was the main source 
of pension income only for the highest income quintiles, whereas in all other quintiles public 
pensions remained more important than private pensions. 
Both countries’ patterns are in line with the expectations. In Denmark historically coverage 
with private pensions was extremely low for the broad majority of the population, since 
pensioners could expect rather generous public pensions. Employees in higher positions 
were covered, and also received high occupational pensions on top of the public pension. 
However, the same group did no longer receive the income-tested supplements to the basic 
pensions. The latter might strongly shift the income share towards private pensions among 
the high-income group, but may also limit inequality. The relevance of private pensions 
increased among the middle-income pensioner group, which indicates that the shape of the 
replacement rate curve slightly might return back to the typical shape as in the other 
countries, providing an increasing replacement rate for the middle-income group (see 
Chapters IV and V).  
In the United Kingdom, private pensions played a minor role for the low-income group, 
reflecting that the low-income group only contracted out a few years from the public second 
tier, and then switched back to the public pillar. Consequently, they did not accumulate high 
benefits. In the mixed British system of voluntary and mandatory contributions two 
scenarios were more likely to occur. First, a general contracting out to occupational pensions 
and thus lower entitlements to the SERPS can be assumed. Second, high-income earners 
were more willing to pay additional contributions besides their mandatory contribution rate. 
Both factors favoured a strong shift towards private pension accumulation among the upper 
end of the income distribution of the elderly. In the United Kingdom the income share went 
up on average from 40 to 45 per cent; in Denmark the income share increased from 25-29 per 
cent.  
In Germany the amounts from private pension plans can be identified as being only low 
supplements to the public pensions. Private pension income accounted for only 9 per cent for 
the most recent cohort. Even in the highest income quintile only about one fifth of the total 
pension income came from private pension income sources. The public-private pension mix 
hardly changed over time.  
Since in Italy only a low percentage of persons received private pension income, those 
pensions were negligible for the income mix. The pension income distribution was almost 
exclusively shaped by the public pension income. For all quintiles private pension income 
was below two per cent; specific plans for some high-income earners (TRF) were covering 
only very few persons so that it cannot be expected that survey data provide reliable 
estimates for public and private pension income for birth cohorts.   
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VI.5. Pension income developments by cohorts 
In the following section, I will focus on the evaluation of the level of the elderly’s income. 
Are the younger birth cohorts better off than the older ones? Which pension income source 
increased for which income group? To answer these questions, the sample’s income 
distribution was divided into income deciles using the household total gross income. 
Analogous to the previous section, the first 10 per cent of persons living in households with 
the lowest equivalised total gross household income ended up in the first income decile. For 
each of the deciles, an average amounts from five income sources was calculated: public 
pension income, private pension income, capital income, employment income, and other 
income (including other social security income besides pensions and private transfers from, 
i.e. other households or non-governmental institutions). The latter three incomes were 
aggregated to other income, since in the developed countries the elderly in the lower income 
deciles almost exclusively received pension income. 
Since the datasets from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database report typically 
incomes gross of social security contributions and income taxes, individual income sources 
were recalculated applying a generic tax rate for each income decile, in order to split the 
disposable income in distinct income sources. As the taxed income of other household 
members has a direct effect on the household tax rate, I did not re-create a percentage for the 
individual household. This allowed for a better adjustment for taxation of pension income 
than the tax rate for the household; the latter would bias the taxation on pensions.15  
As a consequence of this netting-down procedure, all amounts can be interpreted as price 
and ppp-adjusted equivalised net values; allowing for income levels for each income decile 
to be compared cross-nationally and over time. 
The results in Figure 4 show the absolute income development for net public and private 
pension income separately by income decile and birth cohort. Figure 5 presents the complete 
income distribution based on the average net incomes for the income deciles; the 
observations for the cohorts were reduced to two birth cohort observations, ten years apart. 
Hence, for each of the countries, the income distribution of one specific older birth cohort is 
compared with the income distribution for the ten years younger birth cohort. Since the data 
availability restricted the operationalisation, the depicted birth cohort years differ slightly 
across the countries.  
                                                          
15 I acknowledge that there exists institutional variation in the tax system, which is not covered in this 
setting. In this setting I assume that a household which had to pay rather high taxes in the first 
income decile had to pay this amount most likely less on the pension income, but rather on other 
income in the household. In the higher income deciles it is hard to tell whether the tax is applied on 
each pension income separately, or whether a private pension is taxed at all, or the tax is calculated 
by the total income. The study of taxation systems is not part of this analysis, but could be improved 
by country-specific netting down procedures; for further interest, Table 1 in the Appendix reports 
the average taxation over all cohorts by income deciles. 
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Figure 4: Development of public and private pension income by cohort and income decile 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database.  
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Figure 4 (continued): Development of public and private pension income by cohort and income 
decile 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. 
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Figure 5: Development of income mix by income decile (10 year period) 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database.  
Germany Italy
FinlandDenmark
Sweden United Kingdom
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
Income decile
Income  
(PPP) Disposable income  -  1921/22
Total pension income  -  1921/22
Public pension income  -  1921/22
Disposable income  -  1931/32
Total pension income  -  1931/32
Public pension income  -  1931/32
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
Income decile
Income  
(PPP) Disposable income  -  1921/22
Total pension income  -  1921/22
Public pension income  -  1921/22
Disposable income  -  1931/32
Total pension income  -  1931/32
Public pension income  -  1931/32
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
Income decile
Income  
(PPP) Disposable income  -  1927/28
Total pension income  -  1927/28
Public pension income  -  1927/28
Disposable income  -  1936/37
Total pension income  -  1937/38
Public pension income  -  1936/37
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
Income decile
Income  
(PPP) Disposable income  -  1926/27
Total pension income  -  1926/27
Public pension income  -  1926/27
Disposable income  -  1936/37
Total pension income  -  1936/37
Public pension income  -  1936/37
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
Income decile
Income  
(PPP) Disposable income  -  1925/26
Total pension income  -  1925/26
Public pension income  -  1925/26
Disposable income  -  1935/36
Total pension income  -  1935/36
Public pension income  -  1935/36
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
Income decile
Income  
(PPP) Disposable income  -  1927/28
Total pension income  -  1927/28
Public pension income  -  1927/28
Disposable income  -  1937/38
Total pension income  -  1937/38
Public pension income  -  1937/38
132 
 
Both Figures 4 and 5 implicitly also document the income share of the previous Figure 3. 
Thus for example the average income of the fifth income decile in Sweden of public pensions 
(ca. I$s 10.000) and private pensions (ca. I$s 1.050) add up on average to I$s 11.050 at 
constant 2000 prices, which means that on average in the fifth income decile approximately 
10.5 per cent of the public-private pension income mix were received from private pension 
income. 
Table 2 sums up the findings of the graphs, comparing the average incomes of the deciles. 
Two deciles were collapsed to one quintile, as the numbers were quite sensitive due to low 
case numbers in each decile by cohorts; thus the quintiles delivered more stable estimates 
and allowed better interpretation of the findings. Four percentage rates were calculated to 
show the increase/decrease in: public pension income, private pension income, total pension 
income, and total disposable income.In general, these findings support that the income of the 
elderly on average rather increased than decreased for each income source and income decile 
over time. There are two exceptions to this development. In Germany the income 
distribution hardly changed in terms of shape and income amounts. The only notable change 
is the slightly more important share of private pension income in the seventh and eighth 
income decile (Figure 4), which can be linked to broader coverage with supplementary 
pensions before retirement for the younger cohorts.  
The other exception is again the Finnish public pension income, which drastically declined in 
importance as an income source. The declining relevance of public pension income was 
similarly relevant for all income groups (Figure 4); high-income pensioners, who were 
receiving already other pension income, were no longer provided access to the full basic 
pension income. Finnish public pensions are less relevant for the highest income quintile (-70 
per cent; Table 2), suggesting that eligibility to basic pensions declines with income and 
across the cohorts. 
However, the Finnish occupational and personal pension income re-balanced the pension 
income. Figure 4 shows that all income groups profited from the more extensive protection 
with the various occupational pensions. The latter development exceeded the decline of 
public benefits so that the overall effect is positive, and all income deciles of younger Finnish 
pensioners of cohort 1935-36 were better off than the ones from cohort 1925-26 (Figure 5).  
In Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom the younger birth cohort was also better off 
than the older birth cohort. In contrast to Germany and Finland, there was a combined effect 
of increasing importance of public pensions and private pensions. In all three countries there 
was a clear shift from public to private pension income. These developments affected the 
income distributions in a different way in each of the countries.  
In Denmark, strong increases in terms of average amounts were concentrated among the 
high-income group. Private pension income increased by 77 per cent in the third quintile, 
and almost doubled in the fourth quintile (88 per cent; Table 2). This could be expected, since 
the younger birth cohorts were provided with 10 more years of mandatory supplementary 
occupational pensions preceding their retirement. At the same time, voluntary coverage with 
133 
 
occupational pensions favoured particularly high-income earners. Since the supplements to 
basic public pensions were significantly cut in case of other income, it is not surprising that 
public pensions in the highest quintile decreased in importance as a result of increasing 
occupational pensions. Occupational pensions successfully substituted a part of public 
pensions. However, the overall development showed a clear increase in inequality caused by 
the rising relevance of occupational pensions. In the fourth quintile, the public pension cuts 
were outbalanced by increases in occupational pension income. The distance of median-
income pensioner and high-income group as well as the distance between low-income group 
and median-income pensioner became larger, indicating that the income distribution became 
more convex, and inequality figures for the Gini might have increased. 
Table 2: Average increase/decrease by income source (10 year period)** 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database.  
Income 
quintile
Disposable
 Income
Total 
Pension
Public 
Pension
Private 
Pension
Denmark
1st 10 14 14  - *
2nd 13 10 9 200
3rd 12 14 10 77
4th 15 21 2 88
5th 20 22 -4 44
Finland
1st 13 17 -15 69
2nd 11 11 -40 53
3rd 9 11 -47 50
4th 15 13 -38 28
5th 22 20 -70 41
Germany
1st 3 3 2 490
2nd 0 0 -3 216
3rd -2 0 0 1
4th 0 -1 -1 6
5th -2 5 2 23
Italy
1st 19 24 24 - *
2nd 16 15 14 - *
3rd 13 21 21 - *
4th 13 15 14 - *
5th 5 18 24 - *
Sweden
1st 8 18 16 58
2nd 9 19 17 34
3rd 14 22 17 63
4th 18 19 13 57
5th 18 18 4 68
United Kingdom
1st 18 12 10 56
2nd 24 28 19 82
3rd 29 28 16 64
4th 27 28 10 58
5th 21 22 5 34
* unreliable estimate, as recipient rate is below 5 per cent.
** due to data availability and operationalisation, the estimates do refer to slightly different birth cohorts: 
Denmark: 1921/22 and 1931/32, Finland: 1925/26 and 1935/36, Germany: 1925/26 and 1935/36, 
Italy 1925/26 and 1935/36, Sweden 1921/22 and 1931/32, United Kingdom 1924/25 and 1934/35.
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In the United Kingdom the average amounts of private pensions increased much more than 
the public amounts. In contrast to the income-tested pensions in the Nordic countries, the 
higher pension incomes from occupational schemes were not relevant for eligibility to public 
pensions. In this institutional setting the second to forth income quintile especially 
benefitted, where pension income rose by 28 per cent within the 10-year period (Table 2). 
Although private pensions became more relevant for the first quintile and this income group 
was now much better off in terms of absolute income, this group showed the lowest increase 
over the ten years, signalling that there was a high share at the bottom that did not benefit as 
much from the positive development from the increasing pensions. Again, as particularly the 
distance to the median pensioner gets larger, inequality might be increasing.  
In line with the previous findings for Sweden, the evaluations seem to support that 
additional private plans for high-income earners became more relevant. Over the ten years 
period, private pension income increased by 68 per cent for the highest income quintile 
(Table 2); this is the strongest relative increase for private pensions in the highest income 
quintile in this cross-country comparison. On the other hand, Swedish public pension 
income remained nearly unchanged, which supports that the income ceiling limits the 
relevance of public pensions. Overall, total pensions mostly increased for the median 
pensioner; thus the distance between the high-income group and median pensioner slightly 
decreased. On the other hand, since the lower income quintiles did not benefit as much as 
the median pensioner, the distance between low-income pensioners and the median 
pensioner increased.  
The shape of the Italian income distribution was almost exclusively shaped by the various 
public pension schemes. Public pension income amounts increased for the younger cohorts 
in all deciles. Private pension income did not reveal a clear pattern, if at all any pattern. 
Figure 4 suggests that the few persons that receive private pension income, these pensions 
are on average very high and may lift up recipients in the highest income quintile. This 
pattern is can be linked to lump sums from the compulsory severance pay scheme (Tfr) 
(Jessoula 2011).  
In the following the income package of birth cohorts 1931/32 (1930/31 for the United 
Kingdom) will be compared, to assess the living standard of this cohort in a cross-national 
perspective. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 contain four columns for each country, which are calculated 
for each decile. In Table 3.1 the first column shows the gross equivalised pension income, 
price and ppp-adjusted for the year 2000; the second column is a ratio of gross equivalised 
pension income of the pensioner sample by median gross equivalised total household 
income of the whole population in the year 2000. The lower this ratio, the less generous the 
pension income compared to the median living standard of the society. Table 3.2 assesses the 
effect of taxation on pension income. For each statistic there is a ranking from 1 indicating 
the highest level to 6 indicating the lowest level in this country comparison. 
The gross figures (Table 3.1) show that the combined pension income before taxes was 
lowest in Italy for the first income decile (I$ 5.846); hence the reported rank is sixth (lowest) 
in this country comparison. Slightly higher was the level of pensions in the first decile for the 
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Table 3.1: Pension income and pension income to median ratio - gross values
Income 
decile
1st 11806 (1) 0.40 (1) 7615 (3) 0.35 (3) 7430 (4) 0.31 (5) 5846 (6) 0.32 (4) 8990 (2) 0.38 (2) 5979 (5) 0.29 (6)
2nd 13146 (1) 0.44 (3) 9260 (4) 0.43 (5) 10721 (3) 0.45 (2) 7891 (6) 0.43 (4) 12110 (2) 0.51 (1) 7250 (6) 0.35 (6)
3rd 13434 (2) 0.45 (5) 10417 (4) 0.48 (4) 12355 (3) 0.52 (3) 9623 (5) 0.53 (2) 14393 (1) 0.61 (1) 8115 (6) 0.40 (6)
4th 13605 (2) 0.46 (5) 11554 (4) 0.53 (4) 12836 (3) 0.54 (3) 11324 (5) 0.62 (2) 16166 (1) 0.68 (1) 8599 (6) 0.42 (6)
5th 14137 (3) 0.48 (5) 13074 (4) 0.60 (4) 14637 (2) 0.62 (3) 12840 (5) 0.70 (2) 17864 (1) 0.76 (1) 9860 (6) 0.48 (6)
6th 15332 (3) 0.52 (5) 14881 (4) 0.68 (3) 15996 (2) 0.68 (4) 14212 (5) 0.78 (2) 19214 (1) 0.81 (1) 10509 (6) 0.51 (6)
7th 17685 (2) 0.60 (5) 16497 (4) 0.76 (3) 17319 (3) 0.73 (4) 16095 (5) 0.88 (1) 20494 (1) 0.87 (2) 11704 (6) 0.57 (6)
8th 21154 (2) 0.71 (5) 18587 (4) 0.86 (3) 19505 (3) 0.82 (4) 18339 (5) 1.00 (1) 22179 (1) 0.94 (2) 14323 (6) 0.70 (6)
9th 24652 (2) 0.83 (6) 22115 (4) 1.02 (3) 22633 (3) 0.96 (4) 18911 (5) 1.03 (2) 25260 (1) 1.07 (1) 18126 (6) 0.89 (5)
10th 37142 (2) 1.25 (6) 34668 (3) 1.60 (3) 38948 (1) 1.65 (1) 29346 (6) 1.60 (2) 33987 (4) 1.44 (5) 31770 (5) 1.55 (4)
Median of gross equivalised total household income
29619 21733 23668 18302 23616 20468
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study Database.
Table 3.2: Pension income and pension income to median ratio - net values
Income 
decile
1st 9308 (1) 0.46 (2) 7448 (3) 0.46 (3) 7004 (4) 0.39 (4) 5115 (6) 0.36 (5) 7720 (2) 0.46 (1) 5361 (5) 0.32 (6)
2nd 10258 (1) 0.51 (4) 8541 (4) 0.52 (3) 9992 (2) 0.56 (2) 6792 (5) 0.48 (5) 9490 (3) 0.56 (1) 6673 (6) 0.40 (6)
3rd 10513 (3) 0.52 (5) 9442 (4) 0.58 (4) 11445 (1) 0.64 (2) 8333 (5) 0.58 (3) 10943 (2) 0.65 (1) 7495 (6) 0.45 (6)
4th 10626 (3) 0.52 (5) 10081 (4) 0.62 (4) 11941 (2) 0.67 (3) 9872 (5) 0.69 (2) 12161 (1) 0.72 (1) 7874 (6) 0.47 (6)
5th 10999 (4) 0.54 (6) 10788 (5) 0.66 (4) 13538 (1) 0.76 (3) 11094 (3) 0.78 (2) 13312 (2) 0.79 (1) 9019 (6) 0.54 (5)
6th 11707 (5) 0.58 (6) 12122 (3) 0.74 (4) 14924 (1) 0.84 (3) 12045 (4) 0.84 (2) 14273 (2) 0.85 (1) 9586 (6) 0.58 (5)
7th 13196 (4) 0.65 (5) 12856 (5) 0.79 (4) 16114 (1) 0.90 (3) 13396 (3) 0.94 (1) 15231 (2) 0.90 (2) 10556 (6) 0.64 (6)
8th 15316 (3) 0.75 (6) 14172 (5) 0.87 (4) 18064 (1) 1.01 (2) 15231 (4) 1.07 (1) 16334 (2) 0.97 (3) 12717 (6) 0.77 (5)
9th 17539 (3) 0.86 (6) 16024 (4) 0.98 (4) 20933 (1) 1.17 (1) 15225 (6) 1.07 (3) 18299 (2) 1.09 (2) 15671 (5) 0.94 (5)
10th 23898 (3) 1.18 (6) 23387 (4) 1.44 (4) 33574 (1) 1.88 (1) 23047 (6) 1.61 (2) 23358 (5) 1.39 (5) 26161 (2) 1.58 (3)
Median of net equivalised disposable household income
20309 16283 17831 14277 16841 16594
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study Database.
**this number is a ratio of gross pension income by decile of the pensionser sample divided each by median gross household income of the total population; amounts refer to the year 2000 and are equivalised by the square 
root of household members.
***since the Italian dataset for 2000 is net only, but simulated taxes and contributions were provided for the datasets 2004/2008/2010 incomes were grossed up for 2000 by using the average taxation by decile of the more 
recent years.   
* pension income is calculated as the average net pension income for the respective income decile of the pensioner sample; amounts are weighted, price and PPP adjusted, and equivalised by the square root of household 
members.
**this number is a ratio of net pension income by decile of the pensionser sample divided each by median net disposable household income of the total population; amounts refer to the year 2000 and are equivalised by the 
square root of household members.
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United Kingdom (I$ 5.979). German pensioners in the first income decile received a 
comparatively higher income (I$ 7.430), but the low level of the pension income to median 
ratio (0.31) signals that the living standard of the first decile was not secured well by pension 
income; gross pension income in the first income decile accounts only to 31 per cent of the 
median equivalised gross household income received in the German society. These numbers 
were similarly low in Italy (0.32) and lowest in the United Kingdom (0.29). This signifies that 
in these countries there was no effective minimum pension regulation introduced as 
compared to the Nordic countries. Compared to the low incomes and ratios in the United 
Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, the minimum and basic pension schemes of the Nordic 
countries provided higher income levels and ratios. Pension income in the first decile was 
most generous in Denmark, followed by Sweden, and Finland. 
For the following deciles different scenarios apply. There was a steep increase of public 
pension income in Germany and Italy, reflecting the relevance of the previous earnings 
history. Germany’s gross pension income to median ratio was second highest in the second 
decile. Germany switched the rank with Finland also in the second and following deciles. 
Notably high were also the increases in the second and third income decile in Sweden, which 
can be linked to the nature of the previous relevance of the ATP scheme for current pension 
income, which also replaced a certain portion of the previous earnings on top of the 
minimum pension. The Swedish pension transfers were most generous in terms of income 
and pension income to median ratio. In Finland the combination of income-tested minimum 
pensions and earnings-related occupational pensions limited the increase of pension income 
for the second and following deciles. In Denmark pension income was high for the lowest 
income quintile, but for the second quintile Denmark switched ranks with Sweden, and for 
the third quintile also German pensions exceeded on average Danish ones. This signifies 
once again that Danish public pensions barely provided additional transfers besides the 
rather high flat-rate amounts of the two minimum pension components. However, only the 
first decile profited from the generous level of the minimum pension; already in the second 
quintile Denmark ranked only third in the pension income to median ratio, and dropped 
down to fifth rank in the third decile.  
Also in the upper half of the income distribution Swedish pensions remained up to the ninth 
decile the highest in ppp-adjusted and equivalised amounts. Compared to the median living 
standard, they switched rank only with Italy in the seventh and eighth income decile. 
Therefore, in both countries the living standard provided by pensions is rather high in 
international perspective. However, the Italian living standard lacked behind the Swedish 
one, ranking only fifth from the third up to the ninth decile in this comparison. Both 
countries show a restricted importance of pension in the highest income decile. In Italy this 
can be partly explained by the non-existent need of additional private pensions, since public 
pensions hardly contained income ceilings and thus high pensions were already provided by 
the public scheme. In Sweden, on the contrary, rather low ceilings restricted the public 
pensions and therefore additional private pensions were necessary to receive high 
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replacement rates from previous earnings. In addition to this, Swedish wage dispersion was 
comparatively low, which at the same time resulted in a comparatively low pension income 
to median ratio on the upper end of the income distribution.  
On the contrary, since British wage dispersion was much higher; pension income was much 
higher in the highest income deciles in the United Kingdom. However, as shown in    
Chapter V, income levels and pension income to median ratios were surprisingly low at the 
upper end of the income distribution, given the high wage dispersion; this can be explained 
by the selective coverage with voluntary private pensions.  
Similarly the Danish pension system generated only rather low pension income to median 
ratios due to the low importance of compulsory supplementary pensions from employer 
provided schemes; the lowest rank for the two highest deciles can be additionally explained 
by the low wage dispersion. However, Danish pension income was also comparatively high 
for the highest income decile, which could be expected by selective coverage with private 
pensions, which favoured high-income earners.  
German and Finnish pension income for the seventh to ninth were rather similar in terms of 
gross pension income and pension income to median ratio. German pension income ranked 
third and its ratio fourth, whereas Finnish pensions ranked fourth and its ratio third. In the 
highest income decile German pension income was the highest in this comparison combined 
with the highest pension income to median ratio. Similarly to Denmark, this can be 
explained by the favourable coverage with additional pension schemes for high-income 
earners. On the contrary, Finnish pension income was provided almost entirely by the 
employer provided schemes with no income ceilings; hence hardly any additional coverage 
with other private schemes (Barr 2012). 
The perspective of net pension incomes reveals a slightly different country ranking, due to 
the higher taxation in the Nordic countries. As a consequence, Swedish net pension income 
for the second decile, not only lacked behind Danish pensions, but also German pensions. 
However, Sweden ranked highest for the net pension income to median ratio for the whole 
lower half of the income distribution, which can be explained by the in general high level of 
taxation also for the working population.  
But also within the Nordic countries the effect caused by taxation differed, the particular 
high taxation in Denmark dropped the pension income down to the fifth rank in the sixth 
decile, compared to the gross figures now exceeded by the Finnish and Italian net pension 
income; the net pension income to median ratio was lowest in Denmark, even lower than in 
the United Kingdom. The cross-country comparison in net terms signals even more the low 
protection of the middle-income group in Denmark.  
Since German pension income was hardly taxed, Germany ranked better in net values 
compared to gross values. In the net comparison German net pension income was highest for 
the upper half of the pensioner sample, whereas in gross terms German gross pension 
income had been mostly exceeded by the Swedish one (except the highest decile) and the 
Danish one (except the sixth and highest decile). At the same, the low taxation of pension 
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income led too much higher net pension income to median ratios as compared to gross 
pension income to median ratios. Already the eighth income decile of German pensioners 
received on average pensions equal to the equivalised median net disposable household 
income; in gross values pensioners in the same decile received pensions which only related 
to 82 per cent of the equivalised gross median household income. Notably high was also the 
change in rank for net pension income in the United Kingdom for the highest income decile, 
which in net terms strongly exceeded the Nordic countries. 
VI.6. Inequality and poverty development 
This section will address the following questions: How did inequality of pension income 
develop? Is there a general development towards a lower risk of poverty for the younger 
birth cohorts? These questions will be addressed by evaluating two main indicators used in 
inequality and poverty research: Gini coefficients and poverty rates. 
The Gini coefficient is a measurement of inequality of the income distribution. The more 
unequal income is distributed, the higher its value. Table 3 reports Gini coefficients for the 
specific birth cohorts of the adjusted sample and a Gini coefficient for the core working age 
group (25 to 59) to put the figures in perspective with the inequality among the working 
aged group. In all countries inequality of net disposable income was lower among the 
elderly than among the working aged group. However, differences were substantially large 
in Sweden and the United Kingdom, slightly less pronounced in Denmark and Finland, and 
rather low in Finland and Germany. Inequality was particularly low in Denmark and 
Sweden, followed by Finland and Germany in the middle, and United Kingdom and Italy 
with the highest level of inequality.  
Regarding inequality development, Sweden showed a strong increase in terms of Gini 
development, which again might be mostly linked to additional take up of individual 
pensions for the younger cohorts. Also the numbers for Denmark seem to slightly increase, 
the more the income mix is generated by additional pension benefits from the mandated 
occupational schemes. In Italy, inequality decreased by seven per cent during the ten year 
period.  
In this study, poverty rates are defined as percentage share of persons earning below a 
certain threshold of total population’s median net equivalised disposable household income. 
Poverty rates are shown for three thresholds: 40, 50, and 60 per cent of the median; the 40 per 
cent criterion reflects extreme poverty, 50 per cent poverty, and 60 per cent at-risk-of-
poverty. Figure 6 documents the respective poverty rates for each cohort among pensioner 
couples and among single women. Since all income amounts are expressed in 2000s values, 
the median of net equivalised disposable household income is calculated from the respective 
dataset in 2000 (except 1999 in the United Kingdom). In a second step the respective poverty 
lines were created by multiplying this median income by 0.4, 0.5, and 0.6, which were then 
used to estimate the percentage shares of each cohort of the pensioner population who were 
living in household with net equivalised disposable household income below these 
thresholds.  
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A common finding for all countries in this study is the general decrease of poverty rates 
(Table 6). Thus the living standard of pensioners has increased more than the living standard 
of each nation state’s median living standard. This could be expected, since the younger birth 
cohorts observed in this study were mostly in a situation with growing pension entitlements 
for later birth cohorts due to higher contributions during their careers. 
For couple pensioners for the birth cohorts 1925-26, the United Kingdom had the highest 
poverty rate (14.5 per cent) for the less than 50 per cent of median threshold. This could be 
expected given the low pension income as compared to the median living standard in the 
total British society. Second highest was the poverty rate in Italy (11.8), followed by Denmark 
(9.2), Finland (5.2), Germany (5.2), and Sweden (1.2).  
In the following younger birth cohorts, poverty rates for couple pensioners can be grouped 
in two clusters, one being the Nordic countries with almost no poverty for couples, and the 
other cluster being Italy, the United Kingdom and Germany, where poverty rates remained 
at a level between five to seven per cent. The pattern was very similar for the 40 per cent 
threshold.  
The comparison of the 60 per cent at-risk-of-poverty threshold revealed two specific country 
cases. Denmark’s poverty rate switched rank with Germany, signalling the rather low 
protection with minimum pensions compared to the living standard in Denmark. In  
Table 3: Gini development (10 year period) 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. 
  Gini coefficient for age group 25 to 59 in 2000*
Denmark Finland Germany Italy Sweden United Kingdom
0.206 0.244 0.259 0.328 0.245 0.342
  Gini coefficient for birth cohorts - average over 5 birth cohort years**
Birth cohort Denmark Finland Germany Italy Sweden United Kingdom
1923 0.176 0.159
1924 0.176 0.160
1925 0.177 0.164
1926 0.181 0.172 0.270
1927 0.180 0.229 0.244 0.304 0.174 0.273
1928 0.180 0.227 0.259 0.297 0.177 0.278
1929 0.185 0.230 0.254 0.296 0.179 0.278
1930 0.186 0.219 0.256 0.291 0.180 0.278
1931 0.179 0.219 0.266 0.283 0.181 0.276
1932 0.178 0.220 0.265 0.285 0.189 0.277
1933 0.220 0.252 0.279 0.277
1934 0.222 0.250 0.279 0.277
1935 0.220 0.253 0.280 0.275
1936 0.216 0.243 0.281
  Increase/decrease of Gini coefficient (10 year period) 
Denmark Finland Germany Italy Sweden United Kingdom
(1923-32) (1927-36) (1927-36) (1927-36) (1923-32) (1926-35)
+1.2% -5.7% -0.4% -7.4% +18.6% +1.7%
* Gini coefficient was calculated on individual level based on equivalised net disposable household income.
**  Gini coefficient was calculated on individual level based on equivalised net disposable household income; figures refer 
to the adjusted pensioner sample in each country; for each birth-cohort a five year average over five birth cohort years was 
calculated; thus e.g. birth cohort 1923 refers to the birth-cohorts 1921-1925.  
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Figure 6: Poverty rates by single pensioners and pensioner couples by cohort
* for UK the figures refer to birth-cohorts minus 1 year, e.g. 1924-1925 for 1925-26. 
less than 40 per cent of median income in % less than 60 per cent of median income in %
Pensioner couples
less than 50 per cent of median income in %
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study Database.
Single pensioners
less than 50 per cent of median income in % less than 60 per cent of median income in %less than 40 per cent of median income in %
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Germany the oldest cohorts were better protected against risk-of-poverty than in Denmark 
and Finland, exemplifying the high relevance of rather generous wage replacement from the 
pay-as-you-go benefits. However, among this comparison Germany was the only country 
where poverty rates stagnated at the same level for the younger birth cohorts. Thus for the 
youngest birth cohorts German couples were at a higher risk of poverty than in Finland and 
similar risk than in Denmark. The decreasing poverty rate in Finland supports that the 
partial substitution of public pensions by occupational pension had no negative effect on the 
outcomes of the low-income pensioners.  
In general pensioner couples were better off than single women. For all three thresholds the 
poverty rates substantially decreased for the younger birth cohorts. For the birth cohorts 
1933-34 Sweden and Denmark were at a comparatively low level below 10 per cent, whereas 
in all other countries poverty rates were between 15 and 25 per cent. Notably high were also 
the poverty rates for Finnish single women (above 20 per cent), which can be explained by 
the non-existent protection of survivors above the age of 65. Similarly to the couple’s 
statistics for the at-risk-of-poverty rate, the Danish curve moves slightly stronger upwards 
compared to the other countries. Also German women in pensionable age remained the most 
stable at-risk group in this comparison. Whereas for the oldest cohorts every second Finnish 
and British woman was at risk of poverty and only every fourth in Germany, for the 
youngest cohorts the rates dropped to 25.7 per cent in the United Kingdom and 16.1 per cent 
in Finland, and thus the German rate (19.6 per cent) exceeded the Finnish one for the 
youngest cohort.  
VI.7. Conclusion 
This comparative cross-national study focused on a comparison of six countries with broad 
institutional variation of pension systems. The main aim of this chapter was to study the 
impact of these institutional differences on current pension outcomes and developments 
across cohorts. Summing up the findings reflected quite different income mixes and 
inequality developments.  
Three countries (Denmark, Germany, and the United Kingdom) showed a rather high 
inequality at the upper end of the income distribution, which was mostly driven by the 
selective coverage with supplementary occupational or personal individual pensions. Across 
the whole income distribution in the United Kingdom pensioners were secured with a rather 
low pension income compared to the median equivalised disposable household income; 
consequently, this drastically reduced the inequality among the elderly in comparison to the 
total population. The Danish pension system provided mainly minimum pensions, and 
hardly mandated income maintenance policies, whereas the German public earnings-related 
scheme contained contribution ceilings. Both schemes made additional protection for the 
better off employees necessary in order to replace previous earnings on a reasonable income 
level. The Danish reformation of the pension system towards mandatory occupational 
pensions during the 90s did not lead towards increased inequality yet, but substantially 
lifted up the income distribution for the third and fourth income quintile.  
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Also the Swedish system changed quite strongly its nature. The oldest birth cohorts were 
mostly protected by rather equalizing pensions due the low contribution ceiling. In contrast 
to this the younger cohorts aimed more at replacing their living standard by additional 
personal pension plans. This development resulted in a strongly inequality increasing effect. 
In Finland and Italy the income distribution did show a more balanced increasing pension 
income level for all income groups, representing a more similar replacement rate for 
occupational groups. 
The main limitation of this comparison is the restricted period of time for the cohort design. 
Thus the developments of inequality were strongly characterised by the specific regulation 
that affected the protection in a very specific way. Also the oldest cohorts entered their 
working age in times of the Second World War. Future research with a more extended cohort 
design and more recent cohorts might put the findings better in perspective. This study also 
cannot capture the effect of early-retirement regulation and nature of derived benefits which 
particularly shape the inequality of women’s pension income. 
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Appendix (Chapter VI) 
 
Source: own calculations based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. 
  
Income Decile Denmark Finland Germany Sweden United Kingdom
1st 16.9% 3.5% 6.5% 11.1% 10.5%
2nd 21.5% 7.4% 7.2% 19.3% 8.2%
3rd 22.1% 10.6% 7.1% 22.1% 7.8%
4th 22.1% 13.4% 7.4% 23.2% 8.0%
5th 22.4% 15.3% 7.3% 24.5% 8.6%
6th 23.5% 18.5% 7.3% 25.5% 8.9%
7th 25.9% 20.1% 7.3% 26.2% 9.6%
8th 28.3% 22.0% 7.2% 26.7% 11.5%
9th 30.0% 24.5% 7.7% 27.8% 13.5%
10th 36.9% 31.4% 13.4% 31.6% 18.0%
Table 1: Estimated average tax rate* by income decile
* the estimated average tax rate is calculated for each decile as a percentage of household gross income by household disposable
 income for the respective income decile. 
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VII. Conclusion and outlook 
Nowadays, societies face various challenges to enable stable financial resources during 
working life and old age. First of all, labour markets are changing; women are more and 
more included in employment. Single parent families have become more frequent, and thus 
reconciliation of work and family life should become more relevant on the political agenda. 
But also qualification needs change in post-industrialist societies; labour markets have 
become more flexible.  
As a result, many working careers show interruptions due to care periods and unemploy-
ment during times of economic crises. Social security systems in general and pension 
systems in particular need to be capable to address these on-going societal transformations. 
Many women remained a major social risk group, as they require both reconciliation of work 
and family life, and adequate pension benefits in old age. In pension systems that 
increasingly balance their public pension schemes with complementary occupational and 
personal pension schemes, it becomes particularly important that such non-public pension 
schemes also provide adequate redistributive elements. 
Reflections on the comprehensive framework for studying pension systems and outcomes 
This monograph started with a comprehensive perspective that explains variation in old-age 
income security and its different outcomes within and between countries: pension system 
characteristics, labour market attachment, and living arrangements. 
With respect to pension system characteristics, this comprehensive framework incorporated the 
concept of pension pillars that elaborated a distinction in the involved actors in regulation of 
pension systems: the state, employers, and financial institutes. The concept of income tiers 
clarified the functions (goals) of pension income: poverty prevention and income maintenance. In 
the following, these two policy goals were formalised with two indicators: pension adequacy 
and income replacement. Pension adequacy refers to the idea that income of the elderly should 
meet a certain income standard. Income replacement can be measured by a replacement ratio 
that results in a percentage of the average life-time earnings. 
Additionally, the typology of Bismarckian vs. Beveridgean pension systems was introduced. 
Along the Bismarckian path developed public social insurance systems that primarily aimed 
at maintaining living standards. In most advanced Bismarckian systems, the development of 
important complementary private second-tier pension schemes was crowded out, as the 
mandatory social insurance system already provided the first and second tier of income. 
Beveridgean systems guaranteed an absolute minimum level of public benefits to provide 
poverty prevention; such first-tier benefits could be either universally paid to the elderly based 
on age and residency, or targeted to the income poor elderly. Due to this restricted public 
approach, in advanced Beveridge type systems various alternative public, occupational and 
personal schemes were crowded in, thus various multi-pillar systems emerged. This 
monograph focused on analysing the variation of second-tier pension schemes and their 
impact on pension outcomes. 
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Second-tier schemes showed a broad worldwide cross-national variation depending on the 
state of development. Particularly in Latin American countries, large informal sectors had 
consistently diminished the development of public mandatory earnings-related systems. 
Therefore, this group of countries and later on various Eastern European countries 
fundamentally departed from the Western European approach, and introduced frequently 
mandatory individual savings plans; these reforms have been also promoted by the World 
Bank’s (1994) study Averting the Old Age Crisis. In contrast to this, most Western European 
countries upheld in their second-tier schemes a strong link between employment and 
contributions to public (first pillar) or occupational (second pillar) pensions. The United 
Kingdom and the United States continued providing a combination of limited public 
mandatory earnings-related schemes and almost equally important voluntary occupational 
and personal pension plans. 
Next to the analysis of variation in pension system arrangements, the argument on labour 
market attachment stressed the importance of continuous contributions to pension systems to 
facilitate individuals’ independency during the retirement phase. New social risks theory 
argues that new risk groups (persons with instable labour market attachment and low 
wages) require adjusted social security protection. In the past, various advanced public 
earnings-related systems specifically required long contribution periods for men and women 
that may have particularly excluded women from pension claims due to their shorter 
contribution period as compared to men. On the other hand, the development of non-
contributory systems might offer a viable alternative safety net for women; however, in some 
cases this development can be considered a necessity to secure adequacy of benefits due to 
insufficient pension system protection through contributory schemes throughout the 
working phase. Individual pension claims remained below a self-sufficient level. 
The comparative view on living arrangements of the elderly around the world (Chapter III.1) 
proved that the elderly in developing countries, particularly Latin America, still heavily 
relied on family support instead of pensions, thus they were not living on their own. This 
contrasted Latin America from the Eastern European country group, where pension income 
was similarly important as in other advanced countries. Particularly in Western Europe, but 
also in Eastern Europe, independent single and two person households were more 
frequently observed as compared to the rest of the world. The Western European country 
group stuck out in comparative perspective with the highest share of independently living 
elderly persons, low employment rates, and comparatively high importance of pension 
income in the income mix.  
Reflections on the variation of second-tier schemes – country-specific conclusions 
After having clarified the presence of essential cultural and socio-demographic differences 
between developed and developing countries, but also between the advanced countries, this 
monograph was restricted to analyses of Western European countries that showed rather 
similar outcomes in terms of living arrangements of elderly persons and the maturity of 
pension systems: Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  
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The main theoretical argument in this monograph is that different pension systems are 
expected to cause differences in pension outcomes and inequalities among the elderly. It is 
argued that specific inequality patterns can be explained by the interplay of public and 
private pension income along the income distribution. The comparative studies (Chapters 
IV, V, and VI) aimed at clarifying the role of complementary second-tier schemes for the 
pension income mix and income inequalities among the elderly. The reasoning is that 
institutional arrangements for second-tier schemes do not necessarily bear comprehensive 
coverage; on the contrary, coverage with such schemes can be very selective, depending on 
the bargaining power of corporatist actors in occupational welfare policies, and might drive 
inequality of pension outcomes. 
Similarly, individual protection during the life-course varies in balanced public private 
pension systems as compared to purely public pension systems, which may result in a 
different pension outcome also on the aggregate level, the income distribution among the 
elderly. Labour force participation rates and concentration of low paid jobs vary across 
gender and states, which similarly affect the inequality of pension entitlements and final 
payments. Although these differences are particularly important for the explanation of cross-
national differences in the income inequality of the elderly, labour market outcomes have 
been discussed merely theoretically, as the main focus of explaining inequalities has been 
placed on the pension system characteristics itself. A follow up study might better link 
observed differences in labour market outcomes to the income distribution among the 
elderly. 
Methodologically, country-specific patterns of income replacement and pension adequacy were 
analysed by a cross-national comparative study that put country-specific outcomes in 
perspective to other countries. The comparative chapters aimed at a standardised procedure 
of classifying pension systems and measurement of pension outcomes. 
More specifically, Chapter IV analysed in how far countries from the Beveridge tradition 
reveal different second-tier schemes and pension outcomes. The second study (Chapter V) 
aimed at contrasting the Bismarckian and Beveridgean pension systems and its consequences 
for pension outcomes. In contrast to the repeated cross-sectional designs of Chapters IV and 
V, the third study (Chapter VI) applied a longitudinal data design; its main focus was the 
analysis of current shifts in the income mix and the income distribution by birth cohorts. In 
the following, the main findings for each country are summarised.  
The Finnish system offers a combination of minimum pensions and mandatory earnings-
related pensions. It is considered a Beveridge type system, as public policy first concentrated 
on residence based universal pensions. Mandatory second-tier contributory schemes were 
already introduced in the 1960s, as an outcome of tripartite negotiations between the state, 
employers and trade unions. As a result, recipient rates and importance of these second-tier 
pensions also for the poorest elderly group was remarkably high. Consequently, the public 
basic pension scheme was abolished in 1996, so that most pensioners indeed only receive 
earnings-related benefits from the various second-tier schemes. The non-existence of income 
ceilings for contributions, and the fact that the administration of various schemes has been 
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shifted to financial institutes, clearly restricted the development of additional third pillar 
pensions. Throughout the income distribution of the elderly one can observe that labour 
market inequalities were broadly reproduced in old age. In addition the targeted minimum 
pension secured particularly persons in need in the lowest income deciles. However, single 
pensioners showed considerably higher poverty rates as compared to two person 
households. Particularly for the younger birth cohorts extreme poverty could be further 
reduced. Possible positive effects of the newly introduced guaranteed minimum pension in 
2011 could not yet be observed with the data used. 
The Italian system has been foremost studied due to its expected similarity in outcomes of 
second-tier schemes with the Finnish pension outcomes. Similarly as in Finland, the third 
pillar is currently underdeveloped due to the high income ceiling for contributions to the 
public pension system. In contrast to Finland, Italy is considered as a Bismarckian system 
due to its historical development. Although the system later on incorporated a targeted 
minimum pension to the elderly poor, the ppp-adjusted equivalised income for the lowest 
income group was the lowest in this six country comparison, which resulted in the highest 
poverty rates in this country group. Pension outcomes for the middle and high-income 
group supported again a close reproduction of labour market inequalities. Although the Gini 
coefficients revealed a reduction for the younger cohorts, inequality remained the highest for 
the six elderly samples.  
The German system is the origin country of Bismarckian social insurance; however, at a 
second look, it reveals an explicit modification. Only the low-to-middle income earners were 
included in the extension of the public social insurance system; the income ceiling limited 
contributions for the high-income group. Alternatively, various collective agreements and 
firm specific plans, and since the early 2000s tax favoured personal savings plans (in 
particular Riester pensions) developed. Instead of an integrated minimum pension as part of 
the first pillar Germany offers an independent scheme (Grundsicherung im Alter) which is part 
of the social assistance system, the benefit needs to be specifically claimed. Pension payments 
from the various mandatory and voluntary complementary second-tier schemes contributed 
considerably to the income mix. Private pensions were increasingly important along the 
income distribution, whereas in the lowest income quintile almost no one received private 
pensions, in the highest quintile every second elderly showed a mixed income from public 
and private pensions. Although, the various complementary public and private second-tier 
schemes only supplemented the income, the analyses revealed that these schemes increased 
inequalities at the upper end of the income distribution as compared to the Italian and 
Finnish system; those who received complementary pensions were financially best off in this 
comparison. Unfortunately, for the observed birth cohorts the combined effect of reduced 
generosity of public pensions and strengthened personal pensions could not yet been 
observed. 
The Swedish system is classified as a hybrid system; the state already early on introduced a 
balanced approach between Beveridge type minimum pensions and Bismarckian social 
insurance. In the mid-1990s the government initiated a transformation of the old public 
system to a notional defined contribution system, which resolved the problem of low public 
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pension benefits for middle-to-high income earners. Two main complementary second-tier 
schemes were built up on top. First, as a result of various collective agreements in the 
1960/1970s, most individuals accumulated contributions through mandatory occupational 
schemes. Second, since the mid-1990s, individuals were required to also make contributions 
to personal investment accounts (premium pensions). It was observed that the younger cohorts 
increasingly replaced their income by additional private pension plans. This development 
resulted in a strong inequality increasing effect driven by the strongly increasing incomes in 
the fourth and fifth income quintile. At the bottom of the income distribution the Swedish 
pensioners were comparatively well protected through a guaranteed minimum pension. 
Since work income and occupational income are excluded from the income-test, the system 
creates a very flexible situation for continued work after statutory retirement age.  
The Danish public system provides a combination of two Beveridge type minimum schemes. 
One element of this scheme aims at poverty prevention through a residency based universal 
minimum pension. Another supplement to this scheme is income-tested, and respectively 
reduced if other income above a certain threshold is received. Although, mandatory public 
second-tier schemes (with exception of the negligible working hour’s related scheme ATP) 
were practically absent, until the early 1990s, saving in occupational pensions remained a 
voluntary decision. Since then, through collective agreements the various voluntary schemes 
were gradually transformed to mandatory schemes, so that the complementary second-tier 
schemes by the employers can be considered as quasi mandatory since the mid-1990s. It 
could be shown, that the Danish design of minimum pensions guaranteed the highest 
pensions for the lowest income group. However, the middle-income group showed rather 
low income levels. This can be explained by the former voluntary second-tier schemes. 
Pensions for the middle-income group were the lowest in this six country comparison with 
respect to society’s median living standard. The high-income group, however, revealed a 
strong importance of private pensions also for the oldest birth cohorts. Similarly as in 
Sweden, particularly the incomes of the fourth and fifth income quintile increased due the 
strongly increasing importance of second-tier schemes. In contrast to Sweden, this trend had 
no inequality increasing effect among the elderly cohorts. 
The United Kingdom shows the most advanced public-private provision mix in this 
European country group. The state approach provides a targeted pension based on years in 
employment, and a mixture of public, occupational, and personal second-tier schemes. When 
an individual already contributes to an occupational pension scheme or an approved personal 
plan, then a contracting out of the public second tier is possible. As benefits from both first and 
second-tier public schemes were expected to be low, various alternative private schemes 
developed that all had one feature in common, voluntary inclusion. Although the Danish 
and British system had voluntary private second-tier schemes in common, in the United 
Kingdom a much stronger coverage with occupational and personal pensions throughout the 
income distribution was observed. These main differences can be explained by the fact that 
British workers were at least obliged to contribute to one public or private scheme. Since the 
minimum pension also provided much lower benefits as compared to Denmark, individuals 
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could be expected to consider more seriously an additional need for second-tier benefits as 
compared to Denmark. However, the analyses showed that the mixture of public and private 
schemes resulted in comparatively low pensions for the low, middle, and to some extent also 
the high-income group. Vertical and horizontal redistribution worked insufficiently; the low-
income group had a high risk of poverty and the middle and high-income groups received 
rather low pension income due to the mixture of low public pensions and selective coverage 
with private schemes. The British government seeks to increase private pension savings 
behaviour by automatic enrolment to occupational pensions. Although the highest income 
group was financially well off in cross-national perspective, given the high wage dispersion 
in the United Kingdom, this group was still surprisingly low secured; net pension income 
lagged far behind the German ppp-adjusted values and was not much higher as compared to 
the equal Nordic societies. Due to this low protection of the middle and high-income groups, 
the Gini coefficient substantially decreased among the elderly as compared to the total 
British society, but remained second highest behind the Italian one.  
What have we learned? - Implications for pension system design and social inequality  
The measurement of inequalities of pension outcomes and tracing it back to differences in 
the pension system design is a difficult endeavour, due to various reasons. First, 
contribution-based pension systems need to develop over a long time to show their outcome. 
Nevertheless, for the observed cohorts it could be shown that pensions were slightly 
increasing, but also that the combination of pension income mixes along the income 
distribution was changing very slowly over the cohorts. Second, the measurement is also 
complex due to the interactions between public pensions and the variation in their non-
public pension counterparts. And third, individual contribution payments follow 
increasingly less standard un-interrupted employment careers; thus not only the regulations 
as such, but also the actual labour market attachment increasingly influence on the final 
pension outcome across the elderly population. Similarly, occupational schemes might focus 
primarily on protection of labour market insiders, but exclude outsiders. Last, pension systems 
are primarily designed to pay individual benefits, whereas poverty and inequality measures 
are typically measured at the household level, considering shared resources among the 
household members.  
Summing up, the analyses support that in all countries under study, where private second 
tier-schemes were present, these schemes strongly affected income inequality of pension 
income, as these schemes disproportionately tended to lift up persons in such households in 
the highest income deciles. Among the highest income deciles the income share of private 
pensions was by far the highest in all countries. However, one should be careful to conclude 
that private pensions increase inequality. As soon as private pensions are considered as a 
partial substitute to otherwise public contributions, inequalities from multi-pillar and public 
dominant systems create quite similar inequalities, which will be elaborated in detail in the 
following.  
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Pension systems among other goals (e.g. long-term sustainability) should provide poverty 
prevention and income maintenance. Both goals are intertwined, particularly for the low-
income group income maintenance not necessarily secures poverty prevention, whereas when 
for the middle-and-high income group income maintenance is secured, implicitly poverty 
prevention is reached.  
Thus, following up on these considerations, in an idealised scenario, where future retirees 
during his/her working career are sufficiently covered with a reasonable contribution period 
resulting from rather stable labour market attachment and where average earnings were 
above the poverty threshold, these retirees could expect pension income from contributory 
pension schemes that secures both poverty prevention and income maintenance. Mandatory 
contributions to public or private second-tier schemes can enforce this kind of independency 
in old age. Although this scenario seems very simple, it is a heavily debatable one due to 
various reasons. In the next paragraphs, I will first specify this scenario with respect to 
poverty prevention, and then focus on income maintenance. 
First of all, those who cannot acquire sufficient contributions during their working career 
need specific security to be effectively protected against poverty. This protection might be 
provided either through minimum pension or social assistance schemes. It is argued that the 
elderly are a specific group at risk for whom automatically a minimum pension should be 
foreseen, if pension income is not sufficient. There exist three alternative designs for this 
minimum pension. First, a separate scheme that provides benefits based on residency. 
Second, a separate scheme that pays targeted benefits as soon as other personal/household 
pension or total income is below a certain threshold. Third, an embedded minimum pension 
amount in the mandatory contributory second-tier scheme. All three solutions suggest that 
public solutions may be better suited than private ones, as payments can be (cross-) financed 
through the general budget. The Nordic country’s basic and guaranteed minimum pension 
schemes seem to work best, as these schemes do not only prevent mostly extreme poverty 
(measured relatively as 40 per cent of median income), but also provide the highest ppp-
adjusted net and gross incomes for the income poorest decile. 
There are two major reasons that reflect the need for minimum pensions, in general; first, the 
existence of periods of inactivity during working age, and second, work histories, where 
average earnings are so low that contribution-based pensions during retirement cannot 
effectively prevent poverty. Especially the combination of both create a particular group at 
risk that is put in spotlight by new social risks theory, the increasing challenge to stay in well 
paid and stable jobs for the low educated.  
Reasons for inactivity can be rising of children and taking care of other family members, 
unemployment, and long-term sickness, invalidity, or disability. But inactivity can be also a 
deliberate decision by couple households to restrict one partner’s role to function as a 
homemaker. In many public contributory systems, periods of inactivity are already 
accounted for. Again, these features seem more easily to be realised by a public system that 
allows a cross-financing from general taxation. It is challenging to rationalise additional 
payments to account for periods of inactivity without contribution payments in a fully-
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funded pension scheme financed by personal contributions and administered by employers 
or financial institutes. However, the introduction of social security funds which could cross-
finance pension funds might be a solution to complement also privatised pension schemes 
with a personal account structure. 
The scenario of low contributions due to low average life-time earnings is slightly different. 
For decades it has been feared that due to wage competition the increase in social security 
contributions should be restricted; along these lines, labour market regulations (for example 
in Germany mini jobs) that allowed exemptions or reduced social insurance contributions, 
were introduced. However, if persons continue working a long period in low-wage jobs they 
no longer accumulate considerable own pension entitlements. Thus minimum pensions seem 
an inevitable need to prevent poverty in old age. An alternative approach can be seen in a 
direct subsidy to low contributions that at least may allow those who keep a close 
attachment to the labour market (with a reasonable period of own or partly subsidised 
contribution payments) to receive personal pension incomes above the minimum pension. 
Again, in principle this kind of subsidised contributions through the state/employers could 
be made to any public, occupational, or personal savings plan. Whereas subsidised 
contributions can favour a personalised pension income and independency in old age, it 
cannot provide poverty prevention per se, as persons with a low contribution period still are at 
risk and need additional support by a minimum pension scheme or social assistance scheme.  
The non-existence of a minimum pension is for example heavily discussed in Germany, and 
the evolving new scenario from public pensions and marginal employment (mini jobs) might 
create an increasing group at risk in the future (Hauser 2008; Hinrichs 2008); indeed, already 
now the elderly low-income group in Germany revealed a comparatively strong poverty gap 
and insufficient pension adequacy. 
Having clarified the need of public minimum pensions to reach poverty prevention, I will now 
focus on the interplay of public and private pensions in fulfilling the goal income maintenance. 
As shown throughout the theoretical and empirical sections in this monograph, various 
pathways in second-tier pension provision can be observed, among which are for example a 
purely public social insurance system without income ceiling, a mainly public system with 
income ceiling and complementary private schemes, a mixed system with reduced public 
contributions and major complementary private schemes, a hybrid system designed by 
public and private actors, or a privatised system that is regulated by the state.  
In systems, where mandatory public second-tier contributions were comparatively low and 
where no private mandatory counterparts have been introduced (in this study represented 
by Denmark and the United Kingdom), pension income of the elderly middle and high-
income groups as compared to society’s median income were the lowest. Voluntary second-
tier schemes seem not to have been attractive enough to reliably supplement the future low 
public pension claims with voluntary privatised pension plans. Thus a comprehensive 
mandatory second-tier scheme with reasonably high contributions seems the superior option 
to reliably secure income maintenance, also in the sense of pension adequacy, so that the elderly 
can maintain their living standard at a suitable level. This solution of comprehensive 
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mandatory second-tier schemes may also favour the opportunity of low-wage workers to 
accumulate own pension entitlements that only need to be topped up by a minimum 
pension,  if the pension claims remained below a certain threshold.  
The importance of private second/third-tier schemes can be also determined by the existence 
of an income ceiling for contributions in the main public system (in this study represented by 
Germany and Sweden). Depending on the income ceiling, the middle and high-income 
group or only the high-income group may need complementary schemes to reach income 
maintenance. When contrasting the mixed pension outcomes from the pension systems with 
second-tier schemes with income ceilings against those pension systems without ceilings (in 
this study represented by Finland and Italy), one can conclude that the high-income groups 
in systems with income ceilings seem comparatively well covered. One could argue that this 
group is more likely to be financial literate as compared to the low-to-middle income group; 
however the major reasons might be better opportunities and financial resources to make 
additional contributions to occupational and personal pension plans. From an inequality 
perspective this might even create an inequality increasing effect when an ‘overprotection’ 
with additional mandatory or voluntary pension plans occurs. In contrast to this, pension 
systems with no income ceilings hardly left scope for a crowding in of supplementary 
second/third-tier schemes; thus elderly’s income distribution strongly reproduced 
inequalities of the labour income distribution (Finland and Italy).  
In conclusion, it is not so much the question Who provides second-tier pension schemes?, but 
more the question How are second-tier pension schemes designed? that will create stable financial 
resources and income maintenance for the broad majority of the elderly. For most advanced 
countries issues of portability and securing payments in the case of insolvency for 
occupational pensions have been already addressed (Ebbinghaus and Wiß 2011); thus, 
individuals in advanced societies may experience disadvantages with occupational pensions 
as compared to public pensions only when there are no credits for interruptions of working 
careers foreseen, as frequently introduced in public second-tier schemes. The introduction of 
more flexible pension accounts would allow continued contribution payments to 
occupational accounts even during working career interruptions; additionally the state’s role 
would be to subsidise these reduced contributions in order to incentivise uninterrupted 
contribution periods (for example Riester pension in Germany). This proposed reform 
scenario favours again a development towards more individualised pension entitlements, 
however, embedded in the regulations in state and occupational welfare policies. 
Outlook 
In the following, additional remarks on shortcomings and limitations of this study, as well as 
alternative measurement techniques and perspectives on policy advice will be presented. 
These considerations focus on a better reflection of individual risk profiles, for example the 
implication of shorter contribution periods through interrupted working careers.  
The on-going trend towards multi-pillar pension systems not only refers to a stronger 
institutionalised role of private savings, but entails also a more personalised risk structure. 
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Thus, if individuals aim for independency in old age, in the sense of pension annuities above 
the minimum pension level, then they need to select the respective savings instruments 
partly on their own, particularly when second-tier schemes in multi-pillar pension systems 
neither foresee comprehensive coverage nor credits for interrupted working careers. 
Therefore, Hinrichs and Jessoula (2012) emphasize that this more personalised risk structure 
entails a need for studies that particularly focus on individual pension entitlements to better 
understand risk profiles and risk prevention. This concern is shared by the author; an 
individualised perspective is considered a valuable extension to the studies in this 
monograph, as inequality of pension income and insufficient protection can be additionally 
explained by specific careers of under-protection respectively accumulated years of low 
contributions/protection.  
In general, individual risk and entitlement can be studied at various points in time. First, 
during retirement, such analyses simply evaluate pension outcomes of previous entitlements 
as it has been also studied in this monograph. Second, at a specific stage during the working 
career; such analyses might mirror under-protection of social risk groups even before 
reaching retirement age. The latter analyses seem promising, as for example analyses of birth 
cohorts over time could immediately reveal if specific reforms influenced savings behaviour 
and respectively increased individual pension entitlements effectively in order to 
prospectively maintain living standards above the secured minimum level. 
As promising as these studies of pension entitlements and pension assets during the working 
career seem, they include a series of limitations. First, they require detailed information 
about individual working careers and/or current pension entitlements/assets, but second, 
even if this information exists, it is not clear how future labour market attachment, savings 
behaviour and individual entitlement will turn out. Thus, until retirement many 
determinants will still affect the final individual pension income mix. Among these 
determinants are the stability of jobs, changing family patterns and care obligations, which 
again impact on the labour market attachment and stability of contributions to pension 
systems. Personal skills development might also positively affect wages and contributions in 
later stages of the working career; defined-benefit occupational schemes may particularly 
consider the final salary or salaries over the last years before retirement, rather than the 
lifetime earnings for the final pension. As a result, pension assets might look comparatively 
low in the middle of their career. 
With regard to pension asset measurement, this endeavour is rather complex and future 
pension promises might look rather different as the one of today. Besides the already above 
mentioned differences in future labour market attachment and contributions, also different 
pension scheme structures complicate a calculation of current and future pension assets. 
Pension schemes with defined-benefit structure (which is the typical set of the public pay-as-
you-go scheme) might foresee various specific elements in their benefit calculation formula, 
such as taking into account periods of unemployment and inactivity, or final salary. Thus 
personal contributions are valued very differently as compared to a defined-contribution 
scheme, where individual pension assets are accumulated in individual pension balance 
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accounts and mostly affected by the development of interest rates and return on investments. 
In pension systems that combine various defined-contribution and defined-benefit schemes, it 
becomes a tricky endeavour to calculate pension assets in a comparative way (see for 
example Frick and Grabka 2010; Kennickel and Sundén 1997). 
Nevertheless, a pioneer cross-national study in this field by Grech (2013) stresses the need to 
comprehensively measure current and future pension wealth in order to alternatively 
measure pension adequacy, a promising field of study that allows to link pension annuities 
with pension assets and wealth. In general, a restricted perspective that only looks at income 
can be considered as too narrow and one-sided for analysing social inequality. A better 
understanding about the interrelations between wealth, pension assets, and income seems 
essential for explaining poverty and pension income inequalities among the elderly 
population in advanced economies.  
The recently introduced data projects such as the ECB’s Household Finance and Consumption 
Survey (HFCS) and LIS’ Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS), are extending the perspective for 
comparative studies on wealth, pension assets, and income. Surveys that additionally 
integrate also a complete measurement of household consumption are particularly 
promising. Such data allow a joint measurement of incomes, assets, and consumption, and 
thus create a scope for further development of multidimensional poverty measurement 
techniques.  
So what is finally left for cross-national comparative studies and policy advice in this 
increasingly individualised old-age protection scenario? First, when old-age security 
becomes increasingly individualised, it can be expected that a variety of savings instruments 
and flexible options will be offered and combined by the future elderly to secure themselves 
against poverty in old age. For example, increased women´s participation in additional 
personal pension schemes might be a considerable outcome of individualised pension 
schemes, given the possibly lower inclusion to occupational schemes, while holding part-
time employment jobs. Subsidised contribution payments during periods of inactivity might 
increase the attractiveness of personal savings plans. 
Finally, it has become more unrealistic to expect a comparative situation of income mixes in 
the future. Besides public protection, alternative old age protection products range from 
occupational and individual old-age savings plans over individual life insurances, survivor 
or disability insurance plans to traditional savings plans. At the same time, for example the 
possibility of withdrawing lump-sums from balance accounts of (old-age) savings plans for 
home purchase and/or renovation, might strongly affect individual’s decision which savings 
instruments to choose best for old-age protection. Consequently, the elderly may indeed 
show more diversity in their income mixes (and wealth portfolio) in the coming years. For 
example in Australia individual’s decision to withdraw a lump-sum from their 
superannuation accounts for home purchase is one major source explaining comparatively 
high income poverty rates for the elderly (Barrett and Chapman 2001). 
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A variety of such hybrid systems and outcomes developed in Latin American countries, 
which during the 1980s and 1990s faced a second transformation of their pension systems 
(see for example Müller 2002; Yermo 2000). As summarized by Yermo (2000), there can be a 
divergent trend observed when comparing Latin American’s individualized old-age 
protection schemes against most individual protection schemes in OECD countries. Whereas 
many OECD countries favoured the development of specialized financial products for old 
age, Latin American countries mostly created a broad range of alternative investment 
products that at the same time were utilized to build up stable capital markets with stratified 
risk portfolios.  
These varieties of saving portfolio options seem primarily relevant from a macro-economic 
perspective, but can be studied also from the perspective of socio-economic inequalities 
among future retirees and elderly population. As reforms in Latin American countries 
followed foremost an individualised approach through mandating private savings plans (see 
Yermo 2000), these experiences provide interesting counterparts to the European and other 
advanced economies, where supplementary second-tier schemes were foremost provided by 
employer-based occupational pensions combined with a much stronger role of trade unions 
and employer associations.  
Some more general challenges remain for outcome oriented studies. In general, each study, 
which is based on data collection and observed outcomes, can only function as a snap shot of 
inequalities at a specific point in time. When repeated at a later stage, outcomes will differ 
coupled with the development of inequalities in labour market participation rates and labour 
market incomes by age and gender, changes in pension system design, and societal change. 
Thus national studies, which aim at adopting other country’s national experiences to their 
own national context, need to carefully analyse comparability of the surroundings such as 
labour markets and individual labour market attachment, living arrangements, and other 
cultural differences. Once these cross-national differences are carefully considered, 
comparative studies on alternative pathways of pension policy and outcomes are promising 
for national reform scenarios that for example reassess the minimum pension income level, 
the income ceiling for mandatory contributions to the public system, or the implication of tax 
or contribution subsidies for voluntary personal pensions.  
At the same time, such national reform-oriented studies require also elaborate sections on 
cost containment and long-term sustainability of proposed reform measures. For this 
purpose, a less restricted access to administrative data sources and tax records for research 
purposes should be reached. From the perspective of future retirees, it can be argued that 
pension asset accumulation and its multiple pathways need more transparency in order to 
save today and be secure tomorrow.  
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